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n。 No income tax； for instance； can be laid on the general incomes of the United States that shall be universal throughout the States。 An income tax can be levied； but it must be levied in proportion to the representation。 It is as though our Chancellor of the Exchequer； in collecting an income tax； were obliged to demand the same amount of contribution from the town of Chester as from the town of Liverpool； because both Chester and Liverpool return two members to Parliament。 In fitting his tax to the capacity of Chester； he would be forced to allow Liverpool to escape unscathed。 No skill in money matters on the part of the Treasury Secretary； and no aptness for finance on the part of the Committee of Ways and Means； can avail here。 The Constitution must apparently be altered before any serviceable resort can be had to direct taxation。 And yet； at such an emergency as that now existing； direct taxation would probably give more ready assistance than can be afforded either by the customs or the excise。 It has been stated to me that this difficulty in the way of direct taxation can be overcome without any change in the Constitution。 Congress could only levy from Rhode Island the same amount of income tax that it might levy from Iowa； but it will be competent to the legislature of Rhode Island itself to levy what income tax it may please on itself； and to devote the proceeds to National or Federal purposes。 Rhode Island may do so； and so may Massachusetts； New York； Connecticut； and the other rich Atlantic States。 They may tax themselves according to their riches； while Iowa； Illinois； Wisconsin； and such like States are taxing themselves according to their poverty。 I cannot myself think that it would be well to trust to the generosity of the separate States for the finances needed by the national government。 We should not willingly trust to Yorkshire or Sussex to give us their contributions to the national income； especially if Yorkshire and Sussex had small Houses of Commons of their own in which that question of giving might be debated。 It may be very well for Rhode Island or New York to be patriotic！ But what shall be done with any State that declines to evince such patriotism？ The legislatures of the different States may be invited to impose a tax of five per cent。 on all incomes in each State； but what will be done if Pennsylvania； for instance； should decline； or Illinois should hesitate？ What if the legislature of Massachusetts should offer six per cent。； or that of New Jersey decide that four per cent。 was sufficient？ For awhile the arrangement might possibly be made to answer the desired purpose。 During the first ebullition of high feeling the different States concerned might possibly vote the amount of taxes required for Federal purposes。 I fear it would not be so； but we may allow that the chance is on the card。 But it is not conceivable that such an arrangement should be continued when； after a year or two； men came to talk over the war with calmer feelings and a more critical judgment。 The State legislatures would become inquisitive； opinionative； and probably factious。 They would be unwilling to act； in so great a matter； under the dictation of the Federal Congress； and； by degrees； one and then another would decline to give its aid to the central government。 However broadly the acknowledgment may have been made that the levying of direct taxes was necessary for the nation； each State would be tempted to argue that a wrong mode and a wrong rate of levying had been adopted； and words would be forthcoming instead of money。 A resort to such a mode of taxation would be a bad security for government stock。 All matters of taxation； moreover； should be free from any taint of generosity。 A man who should attempt to lessen the burdens of his country by gifts of money to its exchequer would be laying his country under an obligation for which his country would not thank him。 The gifts here would be from States； and not from individuals but the principle would be the same。 I cannot imagine that the United States government would be willing to owe its revenue to the good…will of different States； or its want of revenue to their caprice。 If under such an arrangement the Western States were to decline to vote the quota of income tax or property tax to which the Eastern States had agreedand in all probability they would declinethey would in fact be seceding。 They would thus secede from the burdens of their general country； but in such event no one could accuse such States of unconstitutional secession。 It is not easy to ascertain with precision what is the present amount of debt due by the United States； nor probably has any tolerably accurate guess been yet given of the amount to which it may be extended during the present war。 A statement made in the House of Representatives by Mr。 Spaulding； a member of the Committee of Ways and Means； on the 29th of January last； may perhaps be taken as giving as trustworthy information as any that can be obtained。 I have changed Mr。 Spaulding's figures from dollars into pounds； that they may be more readily understood by English readers：
There was due up to July 1； 1861 18；173；566 pounds。 〃 added in July and August 5；379；357 〃 〃 borrowed in August 10；000；000 〃 〃 borrowed in October 10；000；000 〃 〃 borrowed in November 10；000；000 〃 〃 amount of Treasury Demand Notes issued 7；800；000 〃 61；352；923 〃
This was the amount of the debt due up to January 15th； 1862。 Mr。 Spaulding then calculates that the sum required to carry on the government up to July 1st； 1862； will be 68；647；077l。 And that a further sum of 110；000；000l。 will be wanted on or before the 1st of July； 1863。 Thus the debt at that latter date would stand as follows：
Amount of debt up to January； 1862 61；352；923 pounds。 Added by July 1st； 1862 68；647；077 〃 Again added by July 1st； 1803 110；000；000 〃 … 240；000；000 〃
The first of these items may no doubt be taken as accurate。 The second has probably been founded on facts which leave little doubt as to its substantial truth。 The third； which professes to give the proposed expense of the war for the forthcoming year； viz。； from July 1st； 1862； to June 30th； 1863； must necessarily have been obtained by a very loose estimate。 No one can say what may be the condition of the country during the next yearwhether the war may then be raging throughout the Southern States； or whether the war may not have ceased altogether。 The North knows little or nothing of the capacity of the South。 How little it knows may be surmised from the fact that the whole Southern army of Virginia retreated from their position at Manassas before the Northern generals knew that they were moving； and that when they were gone no word whatever was left of their numbers。 I do not believe that the Northern government is even yet able to make any probable conjecture as to the number of troops which the Southern Confederacy is maintaining； and if this be so； they can certainly make no trustworthy estimates as to their own expenses for the ensuing year。 Two hundred and forty millions is； however； the sum named by a gentleman presumed to be conversant with the matter； as the amount of debt which may be expected by midsummer； 1863； and if the war be continued till then； it will probably be found that he has not exceeded the mark。 It is right； however； to state that Mr。 Chase in his estimate does not rate the figures so high。 He has given it as his opinion that the debt will be about one hundred and four millions in July； 1862； and one hundred and eighty millions in July； 1863。 As to the first amount； with reference to which a tolerably accurate calculation may probably be made； I am inclined to prefer the estimate as given by the member of the committee； and as to the other； which hardly； as I think； admits of any calculation； his calculation is at any rate as good as that made in the Treasury。 But it is the immediate want of funds； and not the prospective debt of the country； which is now doing the damage。 In this opinion Mr。 Chase will probably agree with me； but readers on this side of the water will receive what I say with a smile。 Such a state of affairs is certainly one that has not uncommonly been reached by financiers； it has also often been experienced by gentlemen in the management of their private affairs。 It has been common in Ireland； and in London has created the wealth of the pawnbrokers。 In the States at the present time the government is very much in this condition。 The prospective wealth of the country is almost unbounded； but there is great difficulty in persuading any pawnbroker to advance money on the pledge。 In February last Mr。 Chase was driven to obtain the sanction of the legislature for paying the national creditors by bills drawn at twelve months' date； and b