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free every man from fear； that he may live in all possible security； in
other words； to strengthen his natural right to exist and work … without
injury to himself or others。
（20：19） No； the object of government is not to change men from rational
beings into beasts or puppets； but to enable them to develope their minds
and bodies in security； and to employ their reason unshackled； neither
showing hatred； anger； or deceit； nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and
injustice。 （20） In fact； the true aim of government is liberty。
（20：21） Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws
must either be vested in the body of the citizens； or in a portion of them；
or in one man。 （22） For； although mens free judgments are very diverse； each
one thinking that he alone knows everything； and although complete unanimity
of feeling and speech is out of the question； it is impossible to preserve
peace； unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their
own judgment。 ＇20：3＇ （23） Therefore； the individual justly cedes the right
of free action； though not of free reason and judgment； no one can act
against the authorities without danger to the state； though his feelings and
judgment may be at variance therewith； he may even speak against them；
provided that he does so from rational conviction； not from fraud； anger； or
hatred； and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his
private authority。
（20：24） For instance； supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound
reason； and should therefore be repealed； if he submits his opinion to the
judgment of the authorities （who； alone； have the right of making and
repealing laws）； and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law； he has
deserved well of the state； and has behaved as a good citizen should； but if
he accuses the authorities of injustice； and stirs up the people against
them； or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their
consent； he is a mere agitator and rebel。
（20：25） Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he
believes； without injury to the authority of his rulers； or to the public
peace； namely； by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as
it affects action； and by doing nothing against their laws； though he
be compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes； and
openly feels； to be best。
（20：26） Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and
dutifulness； nay； it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt。
（27） We have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities；
so that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just； while the
highest regard for duty； as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter； is
exercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity； these could not be
preserved if every man were to live as he pleased； therefore it is no less
than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws； for if the
practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow。
（20：28） Hence； so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers；
he in nowise contravenes his reason； for in obedience to reason he
transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to
theirs。 （29） This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom； for in a
conference of great and small powers； schemes are seldom carried
unanimously； yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on； whether they
voted for or against。 （30） But I return to my proposition。
（20：31） From the fundamental notions of a state； we have discovered how a
man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power： from
the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be
seditious。 （32） Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the
compact by which the right of free action was ceded。 （33） For instance； a
man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him； or that
promises ought not to be kept； or that everyone should live as he pleases；
or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the above…
mentioned contract； is seditious； not so much from his actual opinions
and judgment； as from the deeds which they involve； for he who maintains
such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly； or openly； he made with
his rulers。 （34） Other opinions which do not involve acts violating the
contract； such as revenge； anger； and t he like； are not seditious； unless
it be in some。 corrupt state； where superstitious and ambitious persons；
unable to endure men of learning； are so popular with the multitude
that their word is more valued than the law。
（20：35） However； I do not deny that there are some doctrines which； while
they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods； are
yet propounded and published with unworthy motives。 （36） This question we
have discussed in Chapter XV。； and shown that reason should nevertheless
remain unshackled。 （37） If we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to
the state should be judged； like his loyalty to God； from his actions only …
namely； from his charity towards his neighbours； we cannot doubt that the
best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than
of religious belief。 （38） I confess that from such freedom inconveniences
may sometimes arise； but what question was ever settled so wisely that no
abuses could possibly spring therefrom？ （39） He who seeks to regulate
everything by law； is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them。 （40）
It is best to grant what cannot be abolished； even though it be in itself
harmful。 （41） How many evils spring from luxury； envy； avarice； drunkenness；
and the like； yet these are tolerated … vices as they are … because they
cannot be prevented by legal enactments。 （42） How much more then should free
thought be granted； seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot
be crushed！ （43） Besides； the evil results can easily be checked； as I will
show； by the secular authorities； not to mention that such freedom
is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts： for no
man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free
and unhampered。
（20：44） But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed； and men be so
bound down； that they do not dare to utter a whisper； save at the bidding of
their rulers； nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making
them think according to authority； so that the necessary consequences would
be that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another； to the
corruption of good faith； that mainstay of government； and to the fostering
of hateful flattery and perfidy； whence spring stratagems； and the
corruption of every good art。
（20：45） It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech； for the more
rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech； the more obstinately are
they resisted； not indeed by the avaricious； the flatterers； and other
numskulls； who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs
and gloating over their money…bags； but by those whom good education； sound
morality； and virtue have rendered more free。 （46） Men； as generally
constituted； are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions
which they believe to be true； and the proscription as wicked of that which
inspires them with piety towards God and man； hence they are ready to
forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities； thinking it not
shameful but honourable to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of
crime with this end in view。 （47） Such being the constitution of human
nature； we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous
minded rather than the wicked； and are adapted less for coercing criminals
than for irritating the upright； so that they cannot be maintained without
great peril to the state。
（20：48） Moreover； such laws are almost always useless； for those who hold
that the opinions proscribed are sound； cannot possibly obey the law；
whereas those who already reject them as false； accept the law as a kind of
privilege； and make such boast of it； that authority is powerless to repeal
it； even if such a course be subsequently desired。
（20：49） To these considerations may be added what we said in Chapter XVIII。
in treating of the history of the Hebrews。 （50） And； lastly； how many
schisms have arisen in the Church from the attempt of the authorities to
decide by law the intricacies of theological controversy！ （51） If men were
not allured by the hope of getting the law and the authori