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＇17：0＇ CHAPTER XVII … IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN； OR
NEED； TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER。
OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC； AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME
OF MOSES； AND AFTER HIS DEATH； TILL THE FOUNDATION
OF THE MONARCHY； AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE。 LASTLY； OF
THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL； AND WHY
IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION。
＇17：1＇ （1） The theory put forward in the last chapter； of the universal
rights of the sovereign power； and of the natural rights of the individual
transferred thereto； though it corresponds in many respects with actual
practice； and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more
and more； must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal。 （2）
No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and； consequently；
his rights； as to cease to be a man； nor can there ever be a power so
sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish。 （3） It will always be
vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage； or to
love what brings him loss； or not to be offended at insults； or not to wish
to be free from fear； or a hundred other things of the sort； which
necessarily follow from the laws of human nature。 （4） So much； I think； is
abundantly shown by experience： for men have never so far ceded their power
as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power
and right； and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own
subjects as from external enemies。 （5） If it were really the case； that men
could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any
further influence on affairs ＇Endnote 29＇； except with the permission of the
holders of sovereign right； it would then be possible to maintain with
impunity the most violent tyranny； which； I suppose； no one would for an
instant admit。
（17：6） We must； therefore； grant that every man retains some part of his
right； in dependence on his own decision； and no one else's。
（7） However； in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's
right and power； we must take notice that it does not cover only those
actions to which it can compel men by fear； but absolutely every action
which it can induce men to perform： for it is the fact of obedience； not the
motive for obedience； which makes a man a subject。
（17：8） Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the
sovereign； whether it be fear or hope； or love of his country； or any other
emotion … the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself； and
nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders。 （9） We must not； therefore；
assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are
done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign：
as a matter of fact； all actions spring from a man's deliberation with
himself； whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment；
therefore； either dominion does not exist； and has no rights over its
subjects； or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on
men to decide to obey it。 （10） Consequently； every action which a subject
performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign； whether such
action springs from love； or fear； or （as is more frequently the case） from
hope and fear together； or from reverence。 compounded of fear and
admiration； or； indeed； any motive whatever； is performed in virtue of his
submission to the sovereign； and not in virtue of his own authority。
（17：11） This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does
not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person
obeying； so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole
heart determines to obey another's commands； and consequently the firmest
dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of
his subjects； if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion；
the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant； for they are
always greatly feared by their ruler。 （12） Furthermore； though it is
impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue； nevertheless
minds are； to a certain extent； under the control of the sovereign； for he
can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should
follow his wishes in their beliefs； their loves； and their hates。 （13）
Though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign
they often result （as experience shows） from the authority of his power； and
from his direction ； in other words； in virtue of his right； we may；
therefore； without doing violence to our understanding； conceive men who
follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs； their loves；
their hates； their contempt； and all other emotions whatsoever。
（17：14） Though the powers of government； as thus conceived； are sufficiently
ample； they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of
their possessors。 （15） This； I think； I have already shown clearly enough。
（16） The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not；
as I have said； intend to discuss； but in order to arrive at the object I
have in view； I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in
this respect； and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews；
gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns
to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their
dominion。
＇17：2＇ （17） That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the
subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive； is
most clearly taught both by reason and experience； how subjects ought to be
guided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious。
（18） All； both rulers and ruled； are men； and prone to follow after their
lusts。 （19） The fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduces those who
have experience of it to despair； for it is governed solely by emotions； not
by reason： it rushes headlong into every enterprise； and is easily corrupted
either by avarice or luxury： everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes
to fashion all things to his liking； judging a thing to be just or unjust；
lawful or unlawful； according as he thinks it will bring him profit or loss：
vanity leads him to despise his equals； and refuse their guidance： envy of
superior fame or fortune （for such gifts are never equally distributed）
leads him to desire and rejoice in his neighbour's downfall。 （20） I need
not go through the whole list； everyone knows already how much crime。
results from disgust at the present … desire for change； headlong anger；
and contempt for poverty … and how men's minds are engrossed and kept
in turmoil thereby。
（17：21） To guard against all these evils； and form a dominion where no room
is left for deceit； to frame our institutions so that every man； whatever
his disposition； may prefer public right to private advantage； this is the
task and this the toil。 （22） Necessity is often the mother of invention； but
she has never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less danger
from its own citizens than from open enemies； or whose rulers did not fear
the latter less than the former。 （23） Witness the state of Rome； invincible
by her enemies； but many times conquered and sorely oppressed by her own
citizens； especially in the war between Vespasian and Vitellius。 （24） （See
Tacitus； Hist。 bk。 iv。 for a description of the pitiable state of the city。）
（17：25） Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire than prestige
at home； and believed that his greatness could be destroyed by his own
followers。 （26） Fearing such a disaster； he thus addressed his friends：
〃Keep me safe from internal treachery and domestic plots； and I will front
without fear the dangers of battle and of war。 （27） Philip was more secure
in the battle array than in the theatre： he often escaped from the hands of
the enemy； he could not escape from his own subjects。 （28） If you think over
the deaths of kings； you will count up more who have died by the assassin
than by the open foe。〃 （Q。 Curtius； chap。 vi。）
（17：29） For the sake of making themselves secure； kings who seized the
throne in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were
descended from the immortal gods； thinking that if their subjects and the
rest of mankind did not look on them as equals； but believed them to be
gods； they would willingly submit to their rule； and obey their commands。
（30） Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was descended from