the critique of practical reason-第27章

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pplies　to　appearances　its　fundamental　principle　of　presupposing　the　unconditioned　to　everything　conditioned。　By　this；　however；　reason　is　compelled　to　trace　this　illusion　to　its　source；　and　search　how　it　can　be　removed；　and　this　can　only　be　done　by　a　complete　critical　examination　of　the　whole　pure　faculty　of　reason；　so　that　the　antinomy　of　the　pure　reason　which　is　manifest　in　its　dialectic　is　in　fact　the　most　beneficial　error　into　which　human　reason　could　ever　have　fallen；　since　it　at　last　drives　us　to　search　for　the　key　to　escape　from　this　labyrinth；　and　when　this　key　is　found；　it　further　discovers　that　which　we　did　not　seek　but　yet　had　need　of；　namely；　a　view　into　a　higher　and　an　immutable　order　of　things；　in　which　we　even　now　are；　and　in　which　we　are　thereby　enabled　by　definite　precepts　to　continue　to　live　according　to　the　highest　dictates　of　reason。　　　It　may　be　seen　in　detail　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　how　in　its　speculative　employment　this　natural　dialectic　is　to　be　solved；　and　how　the　error　which　arises　from　a　very　natural　illusion　may　be　guarded　against。　But　reason　in　its　practical　use　is　not　a　whit　better　off。　As　pure　practical　reason；　it　likewise　seeks　to　find　the　unconditioned　for　the　practically　conditioned　（which　rests　on　inclinations　and　natural　wants）；　and　this　is　not　as　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　but　even　when　this　is　given　（in　the　moral　law）　it　seeks　the　unconditioned　totality　of　the　object　of　pure　practical　reason　under　the　name　of　the　summum　bonum。　　　To　define　this　idea　practically；　i。e。；　sufficiently　for　the　maxims　of　our　rational　conduct；　is　the　business　of　practical　wisdom；　and　this　again　as　a　science　is　philosophy；　in　the　sense　in　which　the　word　was　understood　by　the　ancients；　with　whom　it　meant　instruction　in　the　conception　in　which　the　summum　bonum　was　to　be　placed；　and　the　conduct　by　which　it　was　to　be　obtained。　It　would　be　well　to　leave　this　word　in　its　ancient　signification　as　a　doctrine　of　the　summum　bonum；　so　far　as　reason　endeavours　to　make　this　into　a　science。　For　on　the　one　band　the　restriction　annexed　would　suit　the　Greek　expression　（which　signifies　the　love　of　wisdom）；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　would　be　sufficient　to　embrace　under　the　name　of　philosophy　the　love　of　science：　that　is　to　say；　of　all　speculative　rational　knowledge；　so　far　as　it　is　serviceable　to　reason；　both　for　that　conception　and　also　for　the　practical　principle　determining　our　conduct；　without　letting　out　of　sight　the　main　end；　on　account　of　which　alone　it　can　be　called　a　doctrine　of　practical　wisdom。　On　the　other　hand；　it　would　be　no　harm　to　deter　the　self…conceit　of　one　who　ventures　to　claim　the　title　of　philosopher　by　holding　before　him　in　the　very　definition　a　standard　of　self…estimation　which　would　very　much　lower　his　pretensions。　For　a　teacher　of　wisdom　would　mean　something　more　than　a　scholar　who　has　not　come　so　far　as　to　guide　himself；　much　less　to　guide　others；　with　certain　expectation　of　attaining　so　high　an　end：　it　would　mean　a　master　in　the　knowledge　of　wisdom；　which　implies　more　than　a　modest　man　would　claim　for　himself。　Thus　philosophy　as　well　as　wisdom　would　always　remain　an　ideal；　which　objectively　is　presented　complete　in　reason　alone；　while　subjectively　for　the　person　it　is　only　the　goal　of　his　unceasing　endeavours；　and　no　one　would　be　justified　in　professing　to　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to　assume　the　name　of　philosopher　who　could　not　also　show　its　infallible　effects　in　his　own　person　as　an　example　（in　his　self…mastery　and　the　unquestioned　interest　that　he　takes　pre…eminently　in　the　general　good）；　and　this　the　ancients　also　required　as　a　condition　of　deserving　that　honourable　title。　　　We　have　another　preliminary　remark　to　make　respecting　the　dialectic　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　on　the　point　of　the　definition　of　the　summum　bonum　（a　successful　solution　of　which　dialectic　would　lead　us　to　expect；　as　in　case　of　that　of　the　theoretical　reason；　the　most　beneficial　effects；　inasmuch　as　the　self…contradictions　of　pure　practical　reason　honestly　stated；　and　not　concealed；　force　us　to　undertake　a　complete　critique　of　this　faculty）。　　　The　moral　law　is　the　sole　determining　principle　of　a　pure　will。　But　since　this　is　merely　formal　（viz。；　as　prescribing　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　as　universally　legislative）；　it　abstracts　as　a　determining　principle　from　all　matter　that　is　to　say；　from　every　object　of　volition。　Hence；　though　the　summum　bonum　may　be　the　whole　object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　i。e。；　a　pure　will；　yet　it　is　not　on　that　account　to　be　regarded　as　its　determining　principle；　and　the　moral　law　alone　must　be　regarded　as　the　principle　on　which　that　and　its　realization　or　promotion　are　aimed　at。　This　remark　is　important　in　so　delicate　a　case　as　the　determination　of　moral　principles；　where　the　slightest　misinterpretation　perverts　men's　minds。　For　it　will　have　been　seen　from　the　Analytic　that；　if　we　assume　any　object　under　the　name　of　a　good　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　prior　to　the　moral　law　and　then　deduce　from　it　the　supreme　practical　principle；　this　would　always　introduce　heteronomy　and　crush　out　the　moral　principle。　　　It　is；　however；　evident　that　if　the　notion　of　the　summum　bonum　includes　that　of　the　moral　law　as　its　supreme　condition；　then　the　summum　bonum　would　not　merely　be　an　object；　but　the　notion　of　it　and　the　conception　of　its　existence　as　possible　by　our　own　practical　reason　would　likewise　be　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　since　in　that　case　the　will　is　in　fact　determined　by　the　moral　law　which　is　already　included　in　this　conception；　and　by　no　other　object；　as　the　principle　of　autonomy　requires。　This　order　of　the　conceptions　of　determination　of　the　will　must　not　be　lost　sight　of；　as　otherwise　we　should　misunderstand　ourselves　and　think　we　had　fallen　into　a　contradiction；　while　everything　remains　in　perfect　harmony。　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Reason　in　defining　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conception　of　the　〃Summum　Bonum〃。

　　The　conception　of　the　summum　itself　contains　an　ambiguity　which　might　occasion　needless　disputes　if　we　did　not　attend　to　it。　The　summum　may　mean　either　the　supreme　（supremum）　or　the　perfect　（consummatum）。　The　former　is　that　condition　which　is　itself　unconditioned；　i。e。；　is　not　subordinate　to　any　other　（originarium）；　the　second　is　that　whole　which　is　not　a　part　of　a　greater　whole　of　the　same　kind　（perfectissimum）。　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Analytic　that　virtue　（as　worthiness　to　be　happy）　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all　that　can　appear　to　us　desirable；　and　consequently　of　all　our　pursuit　of　happiness；　and　is　therefore　the　supreme　good。　But　it　does　not　follow　that　it　is　the　whole　and　perfect　good　as　the　object　of　the　desires　of　rational　finite　beings；　for　this　requires　happiness　also；　and　that　not　merely　in　the　partial　eyes　of　the　person　who　makes　himself　an　end；　but　even　in　the　judgement　of　an　impartial　reason；　which　regards　persons　in　general　as　ends　in　themselves。　For　to　need　happiness；　to　deserve　it；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　not　to　participate　in　it；　cannot　be　consistent　with　the　perfect　volition　of　a　rational　being　possessed　at　the　same　time　of　all　power；　if；　for　the　sake　of　experiment；　we　conceive　such　a　being。　Now　inasmuch　as　virtue　and　happiness　together　constitute　the　possession　of　the　summum　bonum　in　a　person；　and　the　distribution　of　happiness　in　exact　proportion　to　morality　（which　is　the　worth　of　the　person；　and　his　worthiness　to　be　happy）　constitutes　the　summum　bonum　of　a　possible　world；　hence　this　summum　bonum　expresses　the　whole；　the　perfect　good；　in　which；　however；　virtue　as　the　condition　is　always　the　supreme　good；　since　it　has　no　condition　above　it；　whereas　happiness；　while　it　is　pleasant　to　the　possessor　of　it；　is　not　of　itself　absolutely　and　in　all　respects　good；　but　always　presupposes　morally　right　behaviour　as　its　condition。　　　When　two　elements　are　necessarily　united　in　one　concept；　they　must　be　connected　as　reason　and　consequence；　and　this　either　so　that　their　unity　is　considered　as　analytical　（logical　connection）；　or　as　synthetical　（real　connection）　the　former　following　the　law　of　identity；　the　latter　that　of　causality。　The　connection　of　virtue　and　happiness　may　therefore　be　understood　in　two　ways：　either　the　endeavour　to　be　virtuous　and　the　rational　pursuit　of　happiness　are　not　two　distinct　actions；　but　absolutely　identical；　in　which　case　no　maxim　need　be　made　the　principle　of　the　former；　other　than　what　serves　for　the　latter；　or　the　connection　consists　in　this；　that　virtue　produces　happiness　as　something　distinct　from　the　consciousness　of　virtue；　as　a　cause　produces　an　effect。　　　The　ancient　Greek　schools　were；　properly　speaking；　only　two；　and　in　determining　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　these　followed　in　fact　one　and　the　same　method；　inasmuch　as　they　did　not　allow　virtue　and　happiness　to　be　regarded　as　two　distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　consequently　sought　the　unity　of　the　principle　by　the　rule　of　identity；　but　they　differed　as　to　which　of　the　two　was　to　be　taken　as　the　fundamental　notion。　The　Epicurean　said：　〃To　be　conscious　that　one's　maxims　lead　to　happiness　is　virtue〃；　the　Stoic　said：　〃To　be　conscious　of　one's　virtue　is　happiness。〃　With　the　former；　Prudence　was　equivalent　to　morality；　with　the　latter；　who　chose　a　high