the critique of practical reason-第31章

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this　firm　purpose；　and　with　it　the　consciousness　of　steadfastness　in　the　moral　progress。　But　naturally　one　who　is　conscious　that　he　has　persevered　through　a　long　portion　of　his　life　up　to　the　end　in　the　progress　to　the　better；　and　this　genuine　moral　motives；　may　well　have　the　comforting　hope；　though　not　the　certainty；　that　even　in　an　existence　prolonged　beyond　this　life　he　will　continue　in　these　principles；　and　although　he　is　never　justified　here　in　his　own　eyes；　nor　can　ever　hope　to　be　so　in　the　increased　perfection　of　his　nature；　to　which　he　looks　forward；　together　with　an　increase　of　duties；　nevertheless　in　this　progress　which；　though　it　is　directed　to　a　goal　infinitely　remote；　yet　is　in　God's　sight　regarded　as　equivalent　to　possession；　he　may　have　a　prospect　of　a　blessed　future；　for　this　is　the　word　that　reason　employs　to　designate　perfect　well…being　independent　of　all　contingent　causes　of　the　world；　and　which；　like　holiness；　is　an　idea　that　can　be　contained　only　in　an　endless　progress　and　its　totality；　and　consequently　is　never　fully　attained　by　a　creature。

　　V。　The　Existence　of　God　as　a　Postulate　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　In　the　foregoing　analysis　the　moral　law　led　to　a　practical　problem　which　is　prescribed　by　pure　reason　alone；　without　the　aid　of　any　sensible　motives；　namely；　that　of　the　necessary　completeness　of　the　first　and　principle　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　viz。；　morality；　and；　as　this　can　be　perfectly　solved　only　in　eternity；　to　the　postulate　of　immortality。　The　same　law　must　also　lead　us　to　affirm　the　possibility　of　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　viz。；　happiness　proportioned　to　that　morality；　and　this　on　grounds　as　disinterested　as　before；　and　solely　from　impartial　reason；　that　is；　it　must　lead　to　the　supposition　of　the　existence　of　a　cause　adequate　to　this　effect；　in　other　words；　it　must　postulate　the　existence　of　God；　as　the　necessary　condition　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　（an　object　of　the　will　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　the　moral　legislation　of　pure　reason）。　We　proceed　to　exhibit　this　connection　in　a　convincing　manner。　　　Happiness　is　the　condition　of　a　rational　being　in　the　world　with　whom　everything　goes　according　to　his　wish　and　will；　it　rests；　therefore；　on　the　harmony　of　physical　nature　with　his　whole　end　and　likewise　with　the　essential　determining　principle　of　his　will。　Now　the　moral　law　as　a　law　of　freedom　commands　by　determining　principles；　which　ought　to　be　quite　independent　of　nature　and　of　its　harmony　with　our　faculty　of　desire　（as　springs）。　But　the　acting　rational　being　in　the　world　is　not　the　cause　of　the　world　and　of　nature　itself。　There　is　not　the　least　ground；　therefore；　in　the　moral　law　for　a　necessary　connection　between　morality　and　proportionate　happiness　in　a　being　that　belongs　to　the　world　as　part　of　it；　and　therefore　dependent　on　it；　and　which　for　that　reason　cannot　by　his　will　be　a　cause　of　this　nature；　nor　by　his　own　power　make　it　thoroughly　harmonize；　as　far　as　his　happiness　is　concerned；　with　his　practical　principles。　Nevertheless；　in　the　practical　problem　of　pure　reason；　i。e。；　the　necessary　pursuit　of　the　summum　bonum；　such　a　connection　is　postulated　as　necessary：　we　ought　to　endeavour　to　promote　the　summum　bonum；　which；　therefore；　must　be　possible。　Accordingly；　the　existence　of　a　cause　of　all　nature；　distinct　from　nature　itself　and　containing　the　principle　of　this　connection；　namely；　of　the　exact　harmony　of　happiness　with　morality；　is　also　postulated。　Now　this　supreme　cause　must　contain　the　principle　of　the　harmony　of　nature；　not　merely　with　a　law　of　the　will　of　rational　beings；　but　with　the　conception　of　this　law；　in　so　far　as　they　make　it　the　supreme　determining　principle　of　the　will；　and　consequently　not　merely　with　the　form　of　morals；　but　with　their　morality　as　their　motive；　that　is；　with　their　moral　character。　Therefore；　the　summum　bonum　is　possible　in　the　world　only　on　the　supposition　of　a　Supreme　Being　having　a　causality　corresponding　to　moral　character。　Now　a　being　that　is　capable　of　acting　on　the　conception　of　laws　is　an　intelligence　（a　rational　being）；　and　the　causality　of　such　a　being　according　to　this　conception　of　laws　is　his　will；　therefore　the　supreme　cause　of　nature；　which　must　be　presupposed　as　a　condition　of　the　summum　bonum　is　a　being　which　is　the　cause　of　nature　by　intelligence　and　will；　consequently　its　author；　that　is　God。　It　follows　that　the　postulate　of　the　possibility　of　the　highest　derived　good　（the　best　world）　is　likewise　the　postulate　of　the　reality　of　a　highest　original　good；　that　is　to　say；　of　the　existence　of　God。　Now　it　was　seen　to　be　a　duty　for　us　to　promote　the　summum　bonum；　consequently　it　is　not　merely　allowable；　but　it　is　a　necessity　connected　with　duty　as　a　requisite；　that　we　should　presuppose　the　possibility　of　this　summum　bonum；　and　as　this　is　possible　only　on　condition　of　the　existence　of　God；　it　inseparably　connects　the　supposition　of　this　with　duty；　that　is；　it　is　morally　necessary　to　assume　the　existence　of　God。　　　It　must　be　remarked　here　that　this　moral　necessity　is　subjective；　that　is；　it　is　a　want；　and　not　objective；　that　is；　itself　a　duty；　for　there　cannot　be　a　duty　to　suppose　the　existence　of　anything　（since　this　concerns　only　the　theoretical　employment　of　reason）。　Moreover；　it　is　not　meant　by　this　that　it　is　necessary　to　suppose　the　existence　of　God　as　a　basis　of　all　obligation　in　general　（for　this　rests；　as　has　been　sufficiently　proved；　simply　on　the　autonomy　of　reason　itself）。　What　belongs　to　duty　here　is　only　the　endeavour　to　realize　and　promote　the　summum　bonum　in　the　world；　the　possibility　of　which　can　therefore　be　postulated；　and　as　our　reason　finds　it　not　conceivable　except　on　the　supposition　of　a　supreme　intelligence；　the　admission　of　this　existence　is　therefore　connected　with　the　consciousness　of　our　duty；　although　the　admission　itself　belongs　to　the　domain　of　speculative　reason。　Considered　in　respect　of　this　alone；　as　a　principle　of　explanation；　it　may　be　called　a　hypothesis；　but　in　reference　to　the　intelligibility　of　an　object　given　us　by　the　moral　law　（the　summum　bonum）；　and　consequently　of　a　requirement　for　practical　purposes；　it　may　be　called　faith；　that　is　to　say　a　pure　rational　faith；　since　pure　reason　（both　in　its　theoretical　and　practical　use）　is　the　sole　source　from　which　it　springs。　　　From　this　deduction　it　is　now　intelligible　why　the　Greek　schools　could　never　attain　the　solution　of　their　problem　of　the　practical　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　because　they　made　the　rule　of　the　use　which　the　will　of　man　makes　of　his　freedom　the　sole　and　sufficient　ground　of　this　possibility；　thinking　that　they　had　no　need　for　that　purpose　of　the　existence　of　God。　No　doubt　they　were　so　far　right　that　they　established　the　principle　of　morals　of　itself　independently　of　this　postulate；　from　the　relation　of　reason　only　to　the　will；　and　consequently　made　it　the　supreme　practical　condition　of　the　summum　bonum；　but　it　was　not　therefore　the　whole　condition　of　its　possibility。　The　Epicureans　had　indeed　assumed　as　the　supreme　principle　of　morality　a　wholly　false　one；　namely　that　of　happiness；　and　had　substituted　for　a　law　a　maxim　of　arbitrary　choice　according　to　every　man's　inclination；　they　proceeded；　however；　consistently　enough　in　this；　that　they　degraded　their　summum　bonum　likewise；　just　in　proportion　to　the　meanness　of　their　fundamental　principle；　and　looked　for　no　greater　happiness　than　can　be　attained　by　human　prudence　（including　temperance　and　moderation　of　the　inclinations）；　and　this　as　we　know　would　be　scanty　enough　and　would　be　very　different　according　to　circumstances；　not　to　mention　the　exceptions　that　their　maxims　must　perpetually　admit　and　which　make　them　incapable　of　being　laws。　The　Stoics；　on　the　contrary；　had　chosen　their　supreme　practical　principle　quite　rightly；　making　virtue　the　condition　of　the　summum　bonum；　but　when　they　represented　the　degree　of　virtue　required　by　its　pure　law　as　fully　attainable　in　this　life；　they　not　only　strained　the　moral　powers　of　the　man　whom　they　called　the　wise　beyond　all　the　limits　of　his　nature；　and　assumed　a　thing　that　contradicts　all　our　knowledge　of　men；　but　also　and　principally　they　would　not　allow　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　namely；　happiness；　to　be　properly　a　special　object　of　human　desire；　but　made　their　wise　man；　like　a　divinity　in　his　consciousness　of　the　excellence　of　his　person；　wholly　independent　of　nature　（as　regards　his　own　contentment）；　they　exposed　him　indeed　to　the　evils　of　life；　but　made　him　not　subject　to　them　（at　the　same　time　representing　him　also　as　free　from　moral　evil）。　They　thus；　in　fact；　left　out　the　second　element　of　the　summum　bonum　namely；　personal　happiness；　placing　it　solely　in　action　and　satisfaction　with　one's　own　personal　worth；　thus　including　it　in　the　consciousness　of　being　morally　minded；　in　which　they　Might　have　been　sufficiently　refuted　by　the　voice　of　their　own　nature。　　　The　doctrine　of　Christianity；*　even　if　we　do　not　yet　consider　it　as　a　religious　doctrine；　gives；　touching　this　point；　a　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　（the　kingdom　of　God）；　which　alone　satisfies　the　strictest　demand　of　practical　reason。　The　moral　law　is　holy　（unyielding）　and　demands　holiness　of　morals；　although　all　the　moral　perfection　to　which　m