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justification； not yet entering on the question of whether they are absolutely
true。 In the third place we have Leibnitz's monad … the world viewed as a
totality。
A。 First Division
We here encounter the innate ideas of Descartes。 The philosophy of
Spinoza； in the second place； is related to the philosophy of Descartes
as its necessary development only； the method is an important part of it。
A method which stands alongside of Spinozism and which is also a
perfected development of Cartesianism； is； in the third place； that by
which Malebranche has represented this philosophy。
1。 Descartes
2。 Spinoza
3。 Malebranche
B。 Second Division
It was Locke who became the instrument of setting forth this entire
manner of thinking in a systematic way； for he worked out Bacon's
position more fully。 And if Bacon made sensuous Being to be the truth；
Locke demonstrated the universal； Thought； to be present in sensuous
Being； or showed that we obtained the universal； the true； from
experience。 From Locke a wide culture proceeds； influencing English
philosophers more especially； the forms adopted by this school were
various； but the principle was the same； it became a general method of
regarding things in a popular way； and calls itself Philosophy； although
the object of Philosophy is not to be met with here。
1。 Locke
2。 Hugo Grotius
3。 Thomas Hobbes
4。 Cudworth； Clarke； Wollaston
5。 Puffendorf
6。 Newton
C。 Third Division
The third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that
represented by Leibnitz and Wolff。 If Wolff's metaphysics is divested
of its rigid form； we have as a result the later popular philosophy。
1。 Leibnitz
2。 Wolff
3。 German Popular Philosophy
Chapter II。 … Transition Period
THE decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of Kant is
reached； is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition to the
metaphysic of the understanding； and which may be called a general popular
philosophy； a reflecting empiricism； which to a greater or less extent becomes
itself a metaphysic； just as； on the other hand； that metaphysic； in as far as it
extended to particular sciences； becomes empiricism。 As against these
metaphysical contradictions； as against the artificialities of the metaphysical
synthesis； as against the assistance of God； the preestablished harmony； the
best possible world； &c。； as against this merely artificial understanding； we
now find that fixed principles； immanent in mind； have been asserted or
maintained respecting what is felt； intuitively perceived and honoured in the
cultured human breast。 And in distinction to the assertion that we only find the
solution in the principles of a fixed and permanent content form a reconciliation
here and now； they adopt a position of independence； and assume an
intellectual standing…ground which they find in what has generally been termed
the healthy human understanding。 Such determinations may indeed be found to
be perfectly good and valid if the feelings； intuitions； heart and understanding
of man be morally and intellectually fashioned； for in that case better and more
noble feelings and desires may rule in men and a more universal content； may
be expressed in these principles。 But when men make what we call sound
reason … that which is by nature implanted in man's breast … into the content
and the principle； the healthy human understanding discovers itself to be
identical with a feeling and knowledge belonging to nature。 The Indians who
worship a cow； and who expose or slay newborn children； and commit all
sorts of barbarous deeds； the Egyptians who pray to a bird； the apis； &c。； and
the Turks as well； all possess a healthy human understanding similar in nature。
But the healthy human understanding and the natural feeling of rude and
barbarous Turks； when taken as a standard； result in shocking principles。
When we speak of healthy human understanding； however； of natural feelings；
we always have before our eyes a cultured mind； and those who make the
healthy human reason； the natural knowledge； the immediate feelings and
inspirations found in themselves； into a rule and standard； do not know that
when religion； morality； and rectitude are discovered to be present in the
human breast； this is due to culture and education； which are the first to make
such principles into natural feelings。 Here natural feelings and the healthy
human understanding are thus made the principle； and much may be
recognized as coming under these heads。 This then is the form taken by
Philosophy in the eighteenth century。 Taken as a whole； three points of view
have to be considered； in the first place； Hume must be regarded on his own
account； then the Scottish； and； thirdly； the French philosophy。 Hume is a
sceptic； the Scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of Hume； the French
philosophy has in the 〃enlightenment〃 of Germany （by which expression is
indicated that form of German philosophy which is not Wolffian metaphysics）
an appendage of a feebler form。 Since from the metaphysical God we can
make no further progress in the concrete； Locke grounds his content on
experience。 But that empiricism leads thought to no fixed standpoint； Hume
demonstrates by denying every universal； the Scottish philosophers； on the
contrary； undoubtedly maintain universal propositions and truths； but not
through thought。 Hence in empiricism itself the fixed standpoint has now to be
adopted； thus the French find the universal in the actuality which they call
réalité。 They do not； however； find its content in and from thought； but as
living substance； as nature and matter。 All this is a further working out of
reflecting empiricism； and some more details respecting it must still be given。
A。 Idealism and Scepticism
Thought generally is simple； universal self…identity； but in the form of
negative movement； whereby the determinate abrogates itself。 This
movement of Being…for…self is now an essential moment of thought；
while hitherto it was outside it； and thus grasping itself as movement in
itself； thought is self…consciousness … at first indeed formal； as individual
self…consciousness。 Such a form it has in scepticism； but this distinction
marks it off from the older scepticism； that now the certainty of reality is
made the starting point。 With the ancients； on the contrary； scepticism is
the return into individual consciousness in such a way that to it this
consciousness is not the truth； in other words that scepticism does not
give expression to the results arrived at； and attains no positive
significance。 But since in the modern world this absolute substantiality；
this unity of implicitude and self…consciousness is fundamental … that is；
this faith in reality generally … scepticism has here the form of idealism；
i。e。； of expressing self…consciousness or certainty of self as all reality
and truth。 The crudest form of this idealism is when self…consciousness；
as individual or formal； does not proceed further than to say： All objects
are our conceptions。 We find this subjective idealism in Berkeley； （1）
and another form of the same in Hume。
1。 Berkeley
2。 Hume
B。 Scottish Philosophy
In Scotland quite another school