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and will （intellectus et voluntas）。 They are mere modifications which only exist for us apart from
God； therefore whatever refers to this difference and is specially brought about by it； is not
absolute； but finite。 These affections Spinoza sums up （Ethices； P。 I。 Prop。 XXIX。 Schol。 pp。 61；
62） under the head of natura naturata： “Natura naturans is God regarded as free cause； in so
far as He is in Himself and is conceived by Himself： or such attributes of substance as express the
eternal and infinite essence。 By natura naturata； I understand all that follows from the necessity
of the divine nature； or from any of the attributes of God； all modes of the divine attributes； in so
far as they are regarded as things which are in God； and which without God can neither exist nor
be conceived。” From God proceeds nothing； for all things merely return to the point whence they
came； if from themselves the commencement is made。
These then are Spinoza's general forms； this is his principal idea。 Some further determinations have
still to be mentioned。 He gives definitions of the terms modes； understanding； will； and of the
affections； such as joy and sadness。（6） We further find consciousness taken into consideration。 Its
development is extremely simple； or rather it is not developed at all； Spinoza begins directly with
mind。 “The essence of man consists of certain modifications of the attributes of God”； these
modifications are only something related to our understanding。 “If we； therefore； say that the
human mind perceives this or that； it means nothing else than that God has this or that idea； not in
so far as He is infinite； but in so far as He is expressed by the idea of the human mind。 And if we
say that God has this or that idea； not in so far as He constitutes the idea of the human mind； but in
so far as He has； along with the human mind； the idea of another thing； then we say that the human
mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately。” Truth is for Spinoza； on the other hand； the
adequate。（7） The idea that all particular content is only； a modification of God is ridiculed by
Bayle；（8） who argues from it that God modified as Turks and Austrians； is waging war with
Himself； but Bayle has not a trace of the speculative element in him； although he is acute enough as
a dialectician； and has contributed to the intelligent discussion of definite subjects。
The relation of thought and extension in the human consciousness is dealt with by Spinoza as
follows： “What has a place in the object” （or rather in the objective） “of the idea which constitutes
the human mind must be perceived by the human mind； or there must necessarily be in the mind an
idea of this object。 The object of the idea which constitutes the human mind is body； or a certain
mode of extension。 If； then； the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind； is the body；
there can happen nothing in the body which is not perceived by the mind。 Otherwise the ideas of
the affections of the body would not be in God； in so far as He constitutes our mind； but the idea
of another thing： that is to say； the ideas of the affections of our body would not be likewise in our
mind。” What is perplexing to understand in Spinoza's system is； on the one hand； the absolute
identity of thought and Being； and； on the other hand； their absolute indifference to one another；
because each of them is a manifestation of the whole essence of God。 The unity of the body and
consciousness is； according to Spinoza； this； that the individual is a mode of the absolute
substance； which； as consciousness； is the representation of the manner in which the body is
affected by external things； all that is in consciousness is also in extension； and conversely。 “Mind
knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of body；” it has only the idea
of the affections of its body； this idea is synthetic combination； as we shall immediately see。 “The
ideas； whether of the attributes of God or of individual things； do not recognize as their efficient
cause their objects themselves； or the things perceived； but God Himself； in so far as He is that
which thinks。”（9） Buhle （Geschichte der neuern Philos。 Vol。 III。 Section II。 p。 524） sums up these
propositions of Spinoza thus： “Thought is inseparably bound up with extension； therefore all that
takes place in extension must also take place in consciousness。” Spinoza； however； also accepts
both in their separation from one another。 The idea of body； he writes （Epistol。 LXVI。 p。 673）；
includes only these two in itself； and does not express any other attributes。 The body which it
represents is regarded under the attribute of extension； but the idea itself is a mode of thought。
Here we see a dividing asunder； mere identity； the undistinguishable nature of all things in the
Absolute； is insufficient even for Spinoza。
The individuum； individuality itself； is thus defined by Spinoza （Ethic。 P。 11。 Prop。 XIII。 Defin。 p。
92）： “When several bodies of the same or of different magnitudes are so pressed together that they
rest on one another； or when； moving with like or different degrees of rapidity； they communicate
their movement to one another in a certain measure； we say that such bodies are united to one
another； and that all together they form one body or individuum； which by this union distinguishes
itself from all the other bodies。〃 Here we are at the extreme limit of Spinoza's system； and it is here
that his weak point appears。 Individuation； the one； is a mere synthesis； it is quite a different thing
from the Ichts or self…hood of Boehme （supra； pp。 205…207）； since Spinoza has only universality；
thought； and not self…consciousness。 If； before considering this in reference to the whole； we take
it from the other side； namely from the understanding； the distinction really falls under that head it is
not deduced； it is found。 Thus； as we have already seen （p。 270） “the understanding in act
（intellectus actu）； as also will； desire； love； must be referred to natura naturata； not to natura
naturans。 For by the understanding； as recognized for itself； we do not mean absolute thought；
but only a certain mode of thought — a mode which is distinct from other modes like desire； love；
etc。； and on that account must be conceived by means of absolute thought； i。e。； by means of an
attribute of God which expresses an eternal and infinite essentiality of thought； without which the
understanding； as also the rest of the modes of thought； could neither be nor be conceived to be。”
（Spinoza； Ethices； P。 1。 Propos。 XXXI。 pp。 62； 63）。 Spinoza is unacquainted with an infinity of
form； which would be something quite different from that of rigid； unyielding substance。 What is
requisite is to recognize God as the essence of essences； as universal substance； identity； and yet
to preserve distinctions。
Spinoza goes on to say： “What constitutes the real （actuale） existence of the human mind is nothing
else than the idea of a particular” （individual） “thing； that actually exists；” not of an infinite thing。
“The essence of man involves no necessary existence； i。e。； according to the order of nature a man
may just as well be as not be。” For the human consciousness； as it does not belong to essence as
an attribute； is a mode — a mode of the attribute of thought。 But neither is the body； according to
Spinoza； the cause of consciousness； nor is consciousness the cause of the body； but the finite
cause is here only the relation of like to like； body is determined by body； conception by
conception。 “The body can neither determine the mind to thought； nor can the mind determine the
body to motion； or rest； or anything else。 For all modes of thought have God as Cause； in so far as
He is a thinking thing； and not in so far as He is revealed by means of another attribute。 What
therefore determines the mind to thought； is a mode of thought and not of extension； similarly
motion and rest of the body must be derived from another body。”（10） I might quote many other
such particular propositions from Spinoza； but they are very formal； and a continual repetition of
one and the same thing。
Buhle （Gesch。 d。 neuern Phil。 Vol。 III。 Section 2； pp。 525…528）； attributes limited conceptions to
Spinoza： “The soul experiences in the body all the 'other' of which it becomes aware as outside of
the body； and it becomes aware of this 'other' only by means of the conceptions of the qualities
which the body perceives therein。 If； therefore； the body can perceive no qualities of a thing； the
soul also can come to no knowledge of it。 On the other hand； the soul is equally unable to arrive at
the perception of the body which belongs to it； the soul knows not that the body is there； and
knows itself even in no other way than by means of the qualities which the body perceives in things
which are outside of it； and by means of the conceptions of the same。 For the body is an individual
thing； determined in a certain manner； which can only gradually； in association with and amidst
other individual things； attain to existence； and can preserve itself in existence only as thus
connected； combined and a