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whatsoever exists； necessarily proceed from God's eternal laws and counsels； and perpetually
depend on God； they are yet not distinguished from one another in degree； but in essence； for
although a mouse as well as an angel depends on God； and sorrow as well as joy； yet a mouse
cannot be a kind of angel； and sorrow cannot be a kind of joy；〃 — they are different in essence。
There is therefore no ground for the objection that Spinoza's philosophy gives the death…blow to
morality； we even gain from it the great result that all that is sensuous is mere limitation； and that
there is only one true substance； and that human liberty consists in keeping in view this one
substance； and in regulating all our conduct in accordance with the mind and will of the Eternal
One。 But in this philosophy it may with justice be objected that God is conceived only as
Substance； and not as Spirit； as concrete。 The independence of the human soul is therein also
denied； while in the Christian religion every individual appears as determined to salvation。 Here； on
the contrary； the individual spirit is only a mode； an accident； but not anything substantial。 This
brings us to a general criticism of the philosophy of Spinoza； in the course of which we shall
consider it from three different points of view。
In the first place Spinozism is asserted to be Atheism — by Jacobi； for instance （Werke； Vol。 IV。
Section I； p。 216） — because in it no distinction is drawn between God and the world； it makes
nature the real God； or lowers God to the level of nature； so that God disappears and only nature
is established。 But it is not so much God and nature that Spinoza sets up in mutual opposition； as
thought and extension； and God is unity； not One made up of two； but absolute Substance； in
which has really disappeared the limitation of the subjectivity of thought and nature。 Those who
speak against Spinoza do so as if it were on God's account that they were interested； but what
these opponents are really concerned about is not God； but the finite — themselves。 The
relationship between God and the finite； to which we belong； may be represented in three different
ways： firstly； only the finite exists； and in this way we alone exist； but God does not exist — this is
atheism； the finite is here taken absolutely； and is accordingly the substantial。 Or； in the second
place； God alone exists； the finite has no reality； it is only phenomena； appearance。 To say； in the
third place； that God exists and we also exist is a false synthetic union； all amicable compromise。 It
is the popular view of the matter； that the one side has as much substantiality as the other； God is
honoured and supreme； but finite things also have Being to exactly the same extent。 Reason cannot
remain satisfied with this 〃also；” with indifference like this。 The philosophic requisite is therefore to
apprehend the unity of these differences in such a way that difference is not let slip； but proceeds
eternally from substance； without being； petrified into dualism。 Spinoza is raised above this
dualism； religion is so also； if we turn its popular conceptions into thoughts。 The atheism of the first
attitude — when men set up as ultimate the arbitrariness of the will； their own vanity； the finite
things of nature； and the world dwells for ever in the mind — is not the standpoint of Spinoza； for
whom God is the one and only substance； the world on the contrary being merely an affection or
mode of this substance。 In the respect that Spinoza does not distinguish God from the world； the
finite； it is therefore correct to term his theory atheism； for his words are these： Nature； the human
mind； the individual； are God revealed under particular forms。 It has been already remarked （pp。
257； 258； 280） that undoubtedly Substance with Spinoza does not perfectly fulfill the conception
of God； since it is as Spirit that He is to be conceived。 But if Spinoza is called an atheist for the
sole reason that he does not distinguish God from the world； it is a misuse of the term。 Spinozism
might really just as well or even better have been termed Acosmism； since according to its
teaching it is not to the world； finite existence； the universe； that reality and permanency are to be
ascribed； but rather to God alone as the substantial。 Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing
as what is known as the world； it is merely a form of God； and in and for itself it is nothing。 The
world has no true reality； and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the
one identity。 There is therefore no such thing as finite reality； it has no truth whatever； according to
Spinoza what is； is God； and God alone。 Therefore the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of
atheism are the direct opposite of the truth； with him there is too much God。 They say： If God is
the identity of mind and nature； then nature or the individual man is God。 This is quite correct； but
they forget that nature and the individual disappear in this same identity： and they cannot forgive
Spinoza for thus annihilating them。 Those who defame him in such a way as this are therefore not
aiming at maintaining God； but at maintaining the finite and the worldly； they do not fancy their own
extinction and that of the world。 Spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated
into thought。 Spinozism is therefore very far removed from being atheism in the ordinary sense； but
in the sense that God is not conceived as spirit； it is atheism。 However； in the same way many
theologians are also atheists who speak of God only as the Almighty Supreme Being； etc。； who
refuse to acknowledge God； and who admit the validity and truth of the finite。 They are many
degrees worse than Spinoza。
The second point to be considered is the method adopted by Spinoza for setting forth his
philosophy； it is the demonstrative method of geometry as employed by Euclid； in which we find
definitions； explanations； axioms； and theorems。 Even Descartes made it his starting…point that
philosophic propositions must be mathematically handled and proved； that they must have the very
same evidence as mathematics。 The mathematical method is considered superior to all others； on
account of the nature of its evidence； and it is natural that independent knowledge in its
re…awakening lighted first upon this form； of which it saw so brilliant an example。 The mathematical
method is； however； ill…adapted for speculative content； and finds its proper place only in the finite
sciences of the understanding。 In modern times Jacobi has asserted （Werke； Vol。 IV。 Section I。
pp。 217…223） that all demonstration； all scientific knowledge leads back to Spinozism； which alone
is a logical method of thought； and because it must lead thither； it is really of no service whatever；
but immediate knowledge is what we must depend on。 It may be conceded to Jacobi that the
method of demonstration leads to Spinozism； if we understand thereby merely the method of
knowledge belonging to the understanding。 But the fact is that Spinoza is made a testing…point in
modern philosophy； so that it may really be said： You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at
all。 This being so； the mathematical and demonstrative method of Spinoza would seem to be only a
defect in the external form； but it is the fundamental defect of the whole position。 In this method the
nature of philosophic knowledge and the object thereof； are entirely misconceived； for
mathematical knowledge and method are merely formal in character and consequently altogether
unsuited for philosophy。 Mathematical knowledge exhibits its proof on the existent object as such；
not on the object as conceived； the Notion is lacking throughout； the content of Philosophy；
however； is simply the Notion and that which is comprehended by the Notion。 Therefore this
Notion as the knowledge of the essence is simply one assumed； which falls within the philosophic
subject； and this is what represents itself to be the method peculiar to Spinoza's philosophy。 Of
this demonstrative manner we have already seen these examples： The definitions from which
Spinoza takes his start — as in geometry a commencement is made with the line； triangle； &c。 —
concern universal determinations； such as cause of itself； the finite； substance； attribute； mode； and
so on； which are solely and simply accepted and assumed； not deduced； nor proved to be
necessary； for Spinoza is not aware of how he arrives at these individual determinations。 He
further speaks of axioms； for instance （Ethic。 P。 I。 Ax。 I。 p。 36）： “What is； is either in itself or in
another。” The determinations “in itself” and “in another” are not shown forth in their necessity：
neither is this disjunction proved； it is merely assumed。 The propositions have； as such； a subject
and predicate which are not similar。 When the predicate is proved of the subject and necessarily
combined with it； the discrepancy remains that the one as universal is related to the other as
particular： therefore even although the relation is proved； there is present at the same time a
secondary relation。 Mathematical science； in its true propositions respec