按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
so to speak； intellectual in Him。 If this be further analyzed it in no way differs from Spinozism。
Malebranche indeed in a popular way allows soul and things to subsist as independent； but this
independence vanishes away like smoke when the principle is firmly grasped。 The catechism says：
“God is omnipresent；” and if this omnipresence be developed Spinozism is arrived at； and yet
theologians then proceed to speak against the system of identity； and cry out about Pantheism。
b。 We must further remark that Malebranche also makes the universal； thought； the essential； by
placing it before the particular。 “The soul has the Notion of the infinite and universal： it knows
nothing excepting through the Idea which it has of the infinite； this Idea must hence come first。 The
universal is not a mere confusion of individual ideas； it is not a union of individual things。”
According to Locke the individual from which the universal is formed precedes （infra； p。 299）；
according to Malebranche the universal Idea is what comes first in man。 “If we wish to think of
anything particular we think first of the universal；” it is the principle of the particular； as space is of
things。 All essentiality precedes our particular conceptions； and this essentiality comes first。 “All
essential existences （essences） come before our ordinary conception； they cannot be such
excepting by God’ s presence in the mind and spirit。 He it is who contains all things in the
simplicity of His nature。 It seems evident that mind would not be capable of representing to itself
the universal Notions of species； kind； and suchlike； if it did not see all things comprehended in
one。” The universal is thus in and for itself； and it does not take its rise through the particular。
“Since each existent thing is an individual； we cannot say that we see something actually created
when； for example； we see a triangle in general；” for we see it through God。 “No account can be
given of how spirit knows abstract and common truths； excepting through the presence of Him
who can enlighten spirit in an infinite way；” because He is in and for Himself the universal。 “We
have a clear idea of God；” of the universal： “We can have such only through union with Him； for
this idea is not a created one；” but is in and for itself。 As with Spinoza； the one universal is God；
and in so far as it is determined； it is the particular； we see this particular only in the universal； as
we see bodies in space。 “We already have a conception of infinite Being； inasmuch as we have a
conception of Being without regard to whether it is finite or infinite。 To know a finite we must limit
the infinite； and this last must thus precede。 Thus spirit perceives all in the infinite； this is so far from
being a confused conception of many particular things that all particular conceptions are merely
participations in the universal Idea of infinitude — in the same way that God does not receive this
Being from〃 finite “creatures； but；” on the contrary； “all creatures only subsist through Him。〃（3）
c。 As regards the turning of the soul to God； Malebranche says what Spinoza said from his ethical
point of view： “It is impossible that God should have an end other than Himself （the Holy
Scriptures place this beyond doubt）；” the will of God can only have the good； what is without
doubt universal as its end。 “Hence not only is it essential that our natural love； i。e。； the emotion
which he brings forth in our spirit； should strive after Him〃 — 〃the will is really love towards God〃
— 〃but it is likewise impossible that the knowledge and the light He gives to our spirit should make
anything else known than what is in Him；” for thought only exists in unity with God。 “If God were
to make a spirit and give it the sun as an idea or as the immediate object of its knowledge； God
would have made this spirit and the idea of this spirit for the sun and not for Himself。” All natural
love； and still more knowledge； and the desire after truth； have God as their end。” All motions of
the will as regards the creatures are only determinations of motion as regards the creator。”
Malebranche quotes from Augustine “that we see God even from the time we first enter upon this
life （dès cette vie）； through the knowledge that we have of eternal truths。 The truth is uncreated；
unchangeable； immeasurable； eternal above all things； it is true through itself； and has its perfection
from no thing。 It makes the creator more perfect； and all spirits naturally seek to know it： now
there is nothing that has these perfections but God； and thus the truth is God。 We perceive these
unchangeable and eternal truths； hence we see God。” “God indeed sees but He does not feel
sensuous things。 If we see something sensuous； sensation and pure thought are to be found in our
consciousness。 Sensation is a modification of our spirit； God occasions this because He knows
that our soul is capable of it。 The Idea which is bound up with the sensation is in God； we see it；
etc。 This relation； this union of our mind and spirit with the Word （Verbe） of God； and of our will
with His love； is that we are formed after the image of God and in His likeness。〃（4） Thus the love
of God consists in relating one’ s affections to the Idea of God； whoever knows himself and
thinks his affections clearly； loves God。 We further find sundry empty litanies concerning God； a
catechism for children of eight years of age respecting goodness； justice； omnipresence； the moral
order of the world； in all their lifetime theologians do not get any further。
We have given the principal of Malebranche’ s ideas； the remainder of his philosophy is
composed partly of formal logic； and partly of empirical psychology。 He passes to the treatment of
errors； how they arise； how the senses； the imagination； the understanding； deceive us； and how
we must conduct ourselves in order to effect a remedy。 Then Malebranche goes on （T。 III。 L。 VI。
P。 I。 chap。 i。 pp。 1…3） to the rules and laws for recognizing the truth。 Thus here the term
Philosophy was even applied to the manner in which reflections on particular objects are drawn
from formal logic and external facts。
1。 Buhle： Gesch。 d。 neuern Philosophie； Vol。 III。 Sec。 2； pp。 430； 431。
2。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité （Paris； 1736）； T。 II。 L。 III。 Part I。 chap。 i。 pp。 4…6；
T。 I。 L。 I。 chap。 i。 pp。 6； 7； P。 II chap。 ii。 pp。 66…68； chap。 iii。 p。 72； chap。 iv。 p。 84； chap。 v。 p。
92； chap。 vi。 pp。 95； 96。
3。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité； T。 II。 L。 III。 Part II。 chap。 vi。 pp。 100…102。
4。 Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité； T。 II。 L。 III。 P。 II。 chap。 vi。 pp。 103…107；
109…111。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I。 — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
B 1。 LOCKE。
When experience means that the Notion has objective actuality for consciousness； it is indeed a
necessary element in the totality； but as this reflection appears in Locke； signifying as it does that
we obtain truth by abstraction from experience and sensuous perception； it is utterly false； since；
instead of being a moment； it is made the essence of the truth。 It is no doubt true that against the
hypothesis of the inward immediacy of the Idea； and against the method of setting it forth in
definitions and axioms； as also against absolute substance； the demand that ideas should be
represented as results； and the claims of individuality and self…consciousness； assert their rights to
recognition。 In the philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz； however； these necessities make themselves
known in an imperfect manner only； the one fact which is common to both philosophers is that
they； in opposition to Spinoza and Malebranche； take for their principle the particular； finite
determinateness and the individual。 According to Spinoza and Malebranche substance or the
universal is the true； the sole existent； the eternal； that which is in and for itself； without origin； and
of which particular things are only modifications which are conceived through substance。 But
hereby Spinoza has done an injury to this negative； he hence arrived at no immanent determination；
for all that is determined and individual is merely annihilated in his system。 Now； on the contrary；
the general inclination of consciousness is to maintain the difference； partly in order to； mark itself
out as implicitly free in opposition to its object … Being； nature； and God； and partly in order to
recognize the unity in this opposition； and from the opposition itself to make the unity emerge。 But
those who were the instruments of this tendency comprehended themselves but little； they had still
no clear consciousness of their task； nor of the manner in which their claims could be satisfied。
With Locke； this principle makes its first entrance into Philosophy in a manner so completely at
variance with the inflexible undifferentiated identity of the substance of Spinoza； that the sensuous
and limited； the immediate present and existent； is the main and fundamental matter。 Locke does
not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness； viz。