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what was previously known； but by far the greatest part remains stationary and by means of fresh
matter is merely added to without itself being affected by the addition。 With a science like
Mathematics； history has； in the main； only the pleasing task of recording further additions。 Thus to
take an example； elementary geometry in so far as it was created by Euclid； may from his time on
be regarded as having no further history。
The history of Philosophy； on the other hand； shows neither the motionlessness of a complete；
simple content； nor altogether the onward movement of a peaceful addition of new treasures to
those already acquired。 It seems merely to afford the spectacle of ever…recurring changes in the
whole； such as finally are no longer even connected by the common aim。
1。 COMMON IDEAS REGARDING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY。
At this point appear these ordinary superficial ideas regarding the history of Philosophy which have
to be referred to and corrected。 As regards these very current views； which are doubtless known
to you； gentlemen； for indeed they are the reflections most likely to occur in one's first crude
thoughts on a history of Philosophy； I will shortly explain what requires explanation； and the
explanation of the differences in philosophies will lead us further into the matter itself。
a。 The History of Philosophy as an accumulation of Opinions。
History； at the first glance； includes in its aim the narration of the accidental circumstances of times；
of races； and of individuals； treated impartially partly as regards their relation in time； and partly as
to their content。 The appearance of contingency in time…succession is to be dealt with later on。 It is
contingency of content which is the idea with which we have first to deal…the idea of contingent
actions。 But thoughts and not external actions； or griefs； or joys； form the content of Philosophy。
Contingent thoughts； however； are nothing but opinions； and philosophical opinions are opinions
relating to the more special content of Philosophy； regarding God； Nature and Spirit。
Thus we now meet the view very usually taken of the history of Philosophy which ascribes to it the
narration of a number of philosophical opinions as they have arisen and manifested themselves in
time。 This kind of matter is in courtesy called opinions； those who think themselves more capable
of judging rightly； call such a history a display of senseless follies； or at least of errors made by
men engrossed in thought and in mere ideas。 This view is not only held by those who recognize
their ignorance of Philosophy。 Those who do this； acknowledge it； because that ignorance is； in
common estimation； held to be no obstacle to giving judgment upon what has to do with the
subject； for it is thought that anybody can form a judgment on its character and value without any
comprehension of it whatever。 But the same view is even held by those who write or have written
on the history of Philosophy。 This history； considered only as the enumeration of various opinions；
thus becomes an idle tale； or； if you will； an erudite investigation。 For erudition is； in the main；
acquaintance with a number of useless things； that is to say； with that which has no intrinsic interest
or value further than being known。 Yet it is thought that profit is to be derived from learning the
various opinions and reflections of other men。 It stimulates the powers of thought and also leads to
many excellent reflections； this signifies that now and then it occasions an idea and its art thus
consists in the spinning one opinion out of the other。
If the history of Philosophy merely represented various opinions in array； whether they be of God
or of natural and spiritual things existent； it would be a most superfluous and tiresome science； no
matter what advantage might be brought forward as derived from such thought…activity and
learning。 What can be more useless than to learn a string of bald opinions； and what more
unimportant？ Literary works； being histories of Philosophy in the sense that they produce and treat
the ideas of Philosophy as if they were opinions； need be only superficially glanced at to find how
dry and destitute of interest everything about them is。
An opinion is a subjective conception； an uncontrolled thought； an idea which may occur to me in
one direction or in another： an opinion is mine； （3） it is in itself a universal thought which is existent
in and for itself。 But Philosophy possesses no opinions； for there is no such thing as philosophical
opinions。 When we hear a man speaking of philosophical opinions； even though he be an historian
of philosophy itself； we detect at once this want of fundamental education。 Philosophy is the
objective science of truth； it is science of necessity； conceiving knowledge； and neither opinion nor
the spinning out of opinions。
The more precise significance of this idea is that we get to know opinions only； thus laying
emphasis upon the word Opinion。 Now the direct opposite of opinion is the Truth； it is Truth
before which mere opinion pales。 Those who in the history of Philosophy seek mere theories； or
who suppose that on the whole only such are to be found within it； also turn aside when that word
Truth confronts them。 Philosophy here encounters opposition from two different sides。 On the one
hand piety openly declares Reason or Thought to be incapable of apprehending what is true； and
to lead only to the abyss of doubt； it declares that independent thought must be renounced； and
reason held in bounds by faith in blind authority； if Truth is to be reached。 Of the relation existing
between Religion and Philosophy and of its history； we shall deal later on。 On the other hand； it is
known just as well； that so…called reason has maintained its rights； abandoning faith in mere
authority； and has endeavoured to make Christianity rational； so that throughout it is only my
personal insight and conviction which obliges me to make any admissions。 But this affirmation of
the right of reason is turned round in an astonishing manner； so that it results in making knowledge
of the truth through reason an impossibility。 This so…called reason on the one hand has combated
religious faith in the name and power of thinking reason； and at the same time it has itself turned
against reason and is true reason's adversary。 Instinct and feeling are maintained by it against the
true reason； thus making the measure of true value the merely subjective…that is a particular
conviction such as each can form in and for himself in his subjective capacity。 A personal
conviction such as this is no more than the particular opinion that has become final for men。
If we begin with what meets us in our very first conceptions； we cannot neglect to make mention
of this aspect in the history of Philosophy。 In its results it permeates culture generally； being at once
the misconception and true sign of our times。 It is the principle through which men mutually
understand and know each other； an hypothesis whose value is established and which is the
ground of all the other sciences。 In theology it is not so much the creed of the church that passes
for Christianity； as that every one to a greater or less degree makes a Christianity of his own to
tally with his conviction。 And in history we often see theology driven into acquiring the knowledge
of various opinions in order that an interest may thus be furnished to the science； and one of the
first results of the attention paid them is the honour awarded to all convictions； and the esteem
vouchsafed to what has been constituted merely by the individual。 The endeavour to know the
Truth is then of course relinquished。 It is true that personal conviction is the ultimate and absolute
essential which reason and its philosophy； from a subjective point of view； demand in knowledge。
But there is a distinction between conviction when it； rests on subjective grounds such as feelings；
speculations and perceptions； or； speaking generally； on the particular nature of the subject； and
when it rests on thought proceeding from acquaintance with the Notion and the nature of the thing。
In the former case conviction is opinion。
This opposition between mere opinion and truth now sharply defined； we already recognize in the
culture of the period of Socrates and Plato…a period of corruption in Greek life…as the Platonic
opposition between opinion （doxa） and Science （episteme）。 It is the same opposition as that
which existed in the decadence of Roman public and political life under Augustus； and
subsequently when Epicureanism and indifference set themselves up against Philosophy。 Under this
influence； when Christ said； 〃I came into the world that I should bear witness unto the Truth；〃
Pilate answered； 〃What is Truth？〃 That was said in a superior way； and signifies that this idea of
truth is an expedient which is obsolete： we have got further； we know that there is no longer any
question about knowing the Truth； seeing that we have gone beyond it。 Who makes this statement
has gone beyond it indeed。 If this is made our starting point in the history of Philosophy； its whole
significance