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1。 Nachrichten von dem Leben und den Schriften des Bischofs Berkeley （in Berkeley's philosph。
Werk。 Pt。 I。 Leipzig； 1781）； pp。 1； 45； Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1；
pp。 86…90。
2。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 pp。 90； 91； The Works of George Berkeley；
Prof。 Fraser's edition （Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous）； Vol。 I。 p。 264； seq。 et passim。
3。 Buhle； Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 92； 93； The Works of George
Berkeley； Vol。 I。 p。 279 seq。
4。 Buhle； ibidem； pp。 91； 92； Berkeley； ibidem； pp。 288 seq。； 300 seq。 et passim。
5。 Buhle； ibidem； pp。 93； 94； Berkeley； ibidem； pp。 289； 308。 seq。
6。 Buhle： Geschichte der neuern Philosophie； Vol。 V。 Sect。 1； pp。 94； 95； The Works of George
Berkeley； Vol。 I。 pp。 308； 335。
7。 Buhle； ibidem； pp。 96…99； Berkeley； ibidem； p。 325； seq。 et passim。
8。 Cf。 Berkeley； ibidem； passim。
Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter II。 — Transition Period； A Idealism & Scepticism
2。 HUME。
We must add to what has preceded an account of the Scepticism of Hume； which has been given
a more important place in history than it deserves from its intrinsic nature； its historic importance is
due to the fact that Kant really derives the starting point of his philosophy from Hume。
David Hume was born in 1711 at Edinburgh and died there in 1776。 He held a librarian's post in
that town for some time； then he became secretary to the Embassy in Paris； for quite a long
period； indeed； he moved in diplomatic circles。 In Paris he came to know Jean Jacques Rousseau
and invited him to England； but Rousseau's terribly distrustful and suspicious nature very soon
estranged the two。 （1） Hume is more celebrated as a writer of history than through his philosophic
works。 He wrote： “A Treatise of human nature；” 3 vols。； 1739； translated into German by Jacob；
Halle； 1790； 8vo； likewise “Essays and Treatises on several subjects；” 2 vols。 （Vol。 1。 containing
“Essays moral； political and literary；” printed for the first time in Edinburgh； 1742； Vol。 II。
containing an “Inquiry concerning human understanding” a further development of the Treatise；
and first printed separately in London； 1748； 8vo）。 In his “Essays；” which contributed most to his
fame as far as the philosophic side is concerned； he treated philosophic subjects as an educated；
thoughtful man of the world would do — not in a systematic connection； nor showing the wide
range which his thoughts should properly have been able to attain； in fact in some of his treatises
he merely dealt with particular points of view。
We must shortly deal with the main aspects of Hume's philosophy。 He starts directly from the
philosophic standpoint of Locke and Bacon； which derives our conceptions from experience； and
his scepticism has the idealism of Berkeley as its object。 The sequence of thought is this： Berkeley
allows all ideas to hold good as they are； in Hume the antithesis of the sensuous and universal has
cleared and more sharply defined itself； sense being pronounced by him to be devoid of
universality。 Berkeley does not make any distinction as to whether in his sensations there is a
necessary connection or not。 Formerly experience was a mixture of the two elements。 Hume tells
us that all perceptions of the mind may be divided into two classes or species； that of impressions；
i。e。 sensuous perceptions； and thoughts or ideas； the latter are similar in content to the former； but
less forcible and lively。 All objects of reason are consequently either relations of thoughts such as
mathematical axioms； or facts of experience。 （2） Since Hume makes these into the content he
naturally rejects innate ideas。 （3）
Now when Hume goes on to consider more closely what is subsumed under experience； he finds
categories of the understanding present there； and more especially the determination of the
universal and of universal necessity； he took under his consideration more particularly the category
of cause and effect； and in it set forth the rational element； inasmuch as in this causal relationship
necessity is especially contained。 Here Hume really completed the system of Locke； since he
consistently drew attention to the fact that if this point of view be adhered to； experience is indeed
the principle of whatever one knows； or perception itself contains everything that happens； but
nevertheless the determination of universality and necessity are not contained in； nor were they
given us by experience。 Hume has thus destroyed the objectivity or absolute nature of
thought…determinations。 “Our conviction of the truth of a fact rests on feeling； memory； and the
reasonings founded on the causal connection； i。e。 on the relation of cause and effect。 The
knowledge of this relation is not attained by reasonings a priori； but arises entirely from
experience； and we draw inferences； since we expect similar results to follow from similar causes；
by reason of the principle of the custom or habit of conjoining different manifestations； i。e。 by
reason of the principle of the association of ideas。 Hence there is no knowledge and no
metaphysics beyond experience。” （4）
The simple thought we have here is exactly what Locke says； that we must receive the conception
of cause and effect； and thus of a necessary connection； from experience； but experience； as
sensuous perception； contains no necessity； has no causal connection。 For in what we term such；
that which we properly speaking perceive is merely the fact that something first of all happens and
that then something else follows。 Immediate perception relates only to a content of conditions or
things which are present alongside of and in succession to one another； but not to what we call
cause and effect； in time…succession there is thus no relation of cause and effect； and consequently
no necessity either。 （5） When we say the pressure of the water is the cause of the destruction of
this house； that is no pure experience。 We have merely seen the water pressing or moving along in
this direction； and subsequently the house falling down； and so with other examples。 Necessity is
thus not justified by experience； but we carry it into experience； it is accidentally arrived at by us
and is subjective merely。 This kind of universality which we connect with necessity； Hume calls
custom。 Because we have often seen results to follow we are accustomed to regard the
connection as a necessary one； the necessity to him is thus a quite contingent association of ideas；
which is custom。
It is the same thing in respect of the universal。 What we perceive are individual phenomena and
sensations in which we see that this is now one thing and now another。 It may likewise be that we
perceive the same determination frequently repeated and in manifold ways。 But this is still far
removed from universality； universality is a determination which is not given to us through
experience。 It may be said that this is quite a correct remark on Hume's part； if by experience we
understand outward experience。 Experience is sensible that something exists； but nevertheless the
universal is not as yet present in it。 Indeed； sensuous existence as such is something which is set
forth as indifferent； not differentiated from anything else； but sensuous existence is likewise
universal in itself； or the indifference of its determinateness is not its only determinateness。 But
since Hume regards necessity； the unity of opposites； as resting quite subjectively on custom； we
cannot get any deeper in thought。 Custom is indeed so far a necessity in consciousness； and to this
extent we really see the principle of this idealism in it； but in the second place this necessity is
represented as something quite devoid of thought or Notion。
This custom obtains both in our perception which relates to sensuous nature； and in relation to law
and morality。 The ideas of justice and morality rest upon an instinct； on a subjective； but very often
deceptive moral feeling。 （6） From a sceptical point of view the opposite may likewise be
demonstrated。 From this side Hume considers justice； morality； religious determinations； and
disputes their absolute validity。 That is to say when it is assumed that our knowledge arises from
experience； and that we must consider only what we obtain thereby to be the truth； we find indeed
in our feeling； the sentiment e。g。 that the murderer； the thief； &c。； must be punished； and because
this is likewise felt by others it is universally allowed。 But Hume； like the sceptics of former days；
appeals to the various opinions of various nations： amongst different nations and in different times
various standards of right have been held。 （7） There are those who in this case do not have the
feeling of wrongdoing in respect of stealing； e。g。 the Laced？monians or the so…called innocent
inhabitants of the South Sea Islands。 What is by one nation called immoral； shameful and
irreligious； is by another not considered so at all。 Thus because such matters rest upon experience；
one subject has such and such an experience； finds； for instance； in his religious feelings th