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by men — generally speaking — reason。 He whom the pure feelings of the beautiful and good； of
admiration and love； of respect and awe； do not convince that in and with these feelings he
perceives something to be present which is independent of them； and which is unattainable by the
outward senses or by an understanding directed upon their perceptions alone — such an one
cannot be argued with” （Jacobi's Werke； Vol。 II。 pp。 74； 76）。 But by faith Jacobi likewise
understands all that has immediacy of Being for me： “Through faith we know that we have a body；
we become aware of other actual things； and that indeed with the same certainty with which we
are aware of ourselves。 We obtain all conceptions through the qualities which we receive and
accept； and there is no other way of attaining real knowledge； for reason； when it begets objects；
begets phantoms of the brain。 Thus we have a revelation of nature。〃（11） Hence the expression
faith； which had a deep significance in religion； is made use of for different contents of every kind；
this in our own time is the point of view most commonly adopted。
Jacobi here brings faith into opposition with thought。 Let us compare the two； and discover
whether they are separated by so great a chasm as those who thus oppose them think。 On the one
hand absolute existence is to faith immediate； believing consciousness feels itself penetrated by this
as by its essence： that existence is its life； believing consciousness asserts itself to be in direct unity
with it。 Thought thinks the absolute existence； such existence is to it absolute thought； absolute
understanding； pure thought； but that signifies that it is likewise immediate itself。 On the other hand
to faith the immediacy of absolute existence has also the significance of a Being： it is； and is
another than 'I。' And the same is true of the thinker； to him it is absolute Being； actual in itself； and
different from self…consciousness or thought as finite understanding； to use the common term。 Now
what is the reason that faith and thought do not understand one another； and each recognize itself
in the other？ In the first place faith has no consciousness of being a thought； inasmuch as it asserts
absolute consciousness to be identical with it as self…consciousness； and has direct inward
knowledge of the same。 But it expresses this simple unity； in its consciousness it is only immediacy
so to speak in the signification of Being； a unity of its unconscious substance。 In the second place
Being…for…self is contained in thought； to this faith opposes the immediacy of Being。 Thought； on
the contrary； has the immediate as absolute potentiality； as absolutely a thing of thought： and the
immediacy belonging to this thing of thought is without the determination of Being； of life。 On the
heights of this abstraction the two stand opposed to each other； as the Aufkl？rung which asserts
absolute existence to be a Beyond of self…consciousness； and as the materialism which makes it so
to speak present matter （supra； pp。 382； 383）。 In the one case it is in faith and thought as positive
existence or thought； and in the other it is the negative of self…consciousness； which is thus either
only determined as negative； as a Beyond； or likewise as existent for self…consciousness。 Hence
faith and thought are both of them knowledge。 We call universal knowledge thought； particular
knowledge we call sensuous perception； and we term the introduction of external determinations
understanding。 The universal element in man is thought； but to it likewise appertains religious
feeling for instance； the animal does not possess it； for it has no human feeling； and in so far as this
feeling is religious； it is the feeling of a thinker； and what determines this feeling is not the
determination of natural desire； &c。； but a universal determination。 Thus God； even though He is
only felt and believed in； is yet the universal taken quite abstractly — even in His personality He is
the absolutely universal personality。
As thought and faith are thus one； the same is true of the antithesis between mediated and
immediate knowledge。 We must； it is true； keep before our eyes the fact that what is revealed in
immediate knowledge is the universal。 But abstract immediate knowledge is natural； sensuous
knowledge； the immediate man in his natural condition； in his desires； does not know this universal。
Children； the Esquimaux； &c。； know nothing of God； or what the natural man knows of Him is not
a real knowledge of Him。 Thus the intuitive knowledge of the Egyptians told them that God was an
ox or a cat； and the Indians still possess similar sorts of knowledge。 On the other hand when man
has come so far as to know God as merely an object of the mind； i。e。 as spiritual； it is easy to
perceive that this knowledge which is asserted to be immediate is really a result mediated through
instruction； through a long continued culture。 It is only by means of being elevated above nature
that man arrives at a consciousness of what is higher； and at a knowledge of the universal； there
indeed his knowledge is immediate； but he has only arrived at this through mediation。 I think； and
thus I know the universal immediately； but this very thought is just process in itself； movement and
life。 All life is process within itself； is mediated； and this is all the more true of spiritual life； for it is
the passing from one to the other； that is； from the merely natural and sensuous to the spiritual。 It
thus indicates a deficiency in the most simple reflection not to know that the universal is not in
immediate knowledge； but is a result of the culture； the education； and the self…revelation of the
human race。 If immediate knowledge is to be allowed； everyone will be responsible merely to
himself： this man knows this； another that； and consequently everything is justified and approved；
however contrary to right and religion。 This opposition between immediacy and mediacy is thus a
very barren and quite empty determination； it is a platitude of the extremest type to consider
anything like this to be a true opposition； it proceeds from a most wooden understanding； which
thinks that an immediacy can be something on its own account； without a mediation within itself。 If
Philosophy were to result in this it would be a poor affair； these determinations are merely forms；
none of which has intrinsic truth。 The form into which Philosophy has in Jacobi's case finally fallen；
which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute； manifests a lack of all critical faculty； of all logic。
The Kantian philosophy is critical philosophy； but from it the fact has been omitted that we cannot
constitute the infinite with finite categories — and immediacy is such an one。 When we regard this
opposition more closely all knowledge may be termed immediate； but all immediate knowledge is
likewise mediated in itself。 This we know within our consciousness； and we may see it in the most
general phenomena。 I know； for example； of America immediately； and yet this knowledge is very
much mediated。 If I stand in America and see its soil； I must first of all have journeyed to it；
Columbus must first have discovered it； ships must have been built； &c。； all these discoveries and
inventions pertain to it。 That which we now know immediately is consequently a result of infinitely
many mediations。 Likewise when I see a right…angled triangle I know that the squares of the two
sides are equal to the square of the hypotenuse： I know this immediately； and yet I have merely
learned it and am convinced of it through the mediation of proof。 Immediate knowledge is thus
everywhere mediated； and Philosophy does nothing but bring this to consciousness —
demonstrating the mediation which in point of fact is already present there； e。g。 in religion； &c。
The philosophy of Jacobi； inasmuch as it says： “Thought cannot proceed further than to the feeling
of God；” has been accepted utiliter； it was more easily arrived at than in the case of Kant。
Knowledge； however； is something very different from what Jacobi calls such； against finite
knowledge his arguments are quite correct。 Immediate knowledge is not knowledge；
comprehension； for that implies that the content is determined in itself； i。e。 is grasped as concrete。
But in immediate knowledge it is the case that the only fact known of God is that He exists。 For
should there be determinations respecting God； they must； according to Jacobi； be grasped as a
finite； and the knowledge of them would again merely be a progression from finite to finite。 There
thus remains only the indeterminate conception of God； an “Above me；” an indeterminate
Beyond。 This gives accordingly the same result as does the Aufkl？rung； viz。 that the highest
reality is ultimate： we find the same in French philosophy and in Kant — only here we still have the
opinion that this emptiness is the highest philosophy possible。 But if each standpoint has an aspect
wherein it is justified； there always rests in the proposition that the human mind knows God
immediately； the important consideration that we have here a recognition of the freedom of the
human spirit： in it we have the source