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difference without a difference。 Self…consciousness is not dead identity； or non…Being； but the
object which is identical with me。 This is immediately certain； all else must be as certain to me；
inasmuch as it must be my relation to myself。 The content must be transformed into the ego； so that
in it I have my determination alone。 This principle is at first abstract and deficient； because in it no
difference； or a formal difference only is expressed； whereas the principle should possess a
content： a subject and a predicate are indeed distinguished in it； but only for us who reflect upon it；
i。e。 in itself there is no difference； and consequently no true content。 In the second place； this
principle is indeed the immediate certainty of self…consciousness； but self…consciousness is likewise
consciousness； and in it there is likewise the certainty that other things exist to which it stands in an
attitude of opposition。 In the third place； that principle has not the truth in it； for the very reason
that the certainty of itself possessed by the ego has no objectivity； it has not the form of the
differentiated content within it — or it stands in opposition to the consciousness of an “other。”
Now in order that determination should come to pass； i。e。 a content and difference； it is essential
for Fichte that a second principle should be established； which in regard to form is unconditioned；
but the content of which is conditioned； because it does not belong to the ego。 This second
principle； set forth under the first； is； “I assert a non…ego in opposition to the ego；” and in this
something other than absolute self…consciousness is set forth。（13） To this pertains the form therein
present； relation； but the content is the non…ego； another content from the ego。 We might say that
through this content the proposition is independent； since the negative therein is an absolute； as
truly as the reverse — that it is independent through the form of opposition which cannot be
derived from the original。 Here； then； we have no more to do with derivation； although this
derivation of opposition from the first proposition was all the same demanded。 Inasmuch as I posit
another in opposition to the ego； I posit myself as not posited； this non…ego is the object generally；
i。e。 that which is opposed to me。 This other is the negative of the ego； thus when Fichte called it
the non…ego he was expressing himself in a very happy； suitable； and consistent manner。 There has
been a good deal of ridicule cast on the ego and non…ego； the expression is new； and therefore to
us Germans it seems strange at first。 But the French say Moi and Non…moi； without finding
anything laughable in it。 In this principle the positing belongs； however； to the ego； but because the
non…ego is independent of the ego； we have two sides； and self…consciousness relates itself to
another。 This second proposition thus signifies that I posit myself as limited； as non…ego； but
non…ego is something quite new to be added。 On the one side we thus have before us a field which
is merely appropriated from the ego； and in this way we have before us the non…ego as our object。
To these is added yet a third proposition； in which I now make this division into ego and non…ego：
it is the synthetic principle； the proposition of ground； which in content is unconditioned； just as in
the second was the case in regard to form。 This third proposition is the determination of the first
two through one another； in such a way that the ego limits the non…ego。 “In and through the ego
both the ego and the non…ego are posited as capable of being mutually limited by means of one
another； i。e。 in such a way that the reality of the one abrogates the reality of the other。” In
limitation both are negated； but “only in part” ； only thus are synthesis and deduction possible。 I
posit the non…ego； which is for me； in myself； in my identity with myself； thus I take it from its
non…identity； its not…being…I； that is to say I limit it。 This limitation of the non…ego Fichte expresses
thus： “I place in opposition to the ego；” and indeed “to the divisible ego； a divisible non…ego。”
The non…ego I destroy as a complete sphere； which it was according to the second principle； and
posit it as divisible； I likewise posit the ego as divisible in so far as the non…ego is present in it。 The
whole sphere which I have before me is supposed indeed to be the ego； but in it I have not one
but two。 The proposition of ground is thus the relation of reality and negation； i。e。 it is limitation； it
contains the ego limited by the non…ego； and the non…ego limited by the ego。（14） Of this synthesis
there is nothing； properly speaking； contained in the two earlier propositions。 Even this first
presentation of the three principles does away with the immanence of real knowledge。 Thus the
presentation is here also subject to an opposite from the first； as it is with Kant； even if these are
two acts of the ego merely； and we remain entirely in the ego。
Now that limitation may take place for me in two different ways： at one time the one is passive； at
another time the other is so。 In this limitation the ego may posit the non…ego as limiting and itself as
limited； in such a way that the ego posits itself as requiring to have an object； I know myself indeed
as ego； but determined by the non…ego； non…ego is here active and ego passive。 Or； on the other
hand； the ego； as abrogating other…being； is that which limits； and non…ego is the limited。 I know
myself then as clearly determining the non…ego； as the absolute cause of the non…ego as such； for I
can think。 The first is the proposition of the theoretic reason； of intelligence： the second the
proposition of practical reason； of will。（15） The will is this； that I am conscious of myself as limiting
the object； thus I make myself exercise activity upon the object and maintain myself。 The theoretic
proposition is that the object is before me and it determines me。 The ego is； since I perceive； a
content； and I have this content in me； which is thus outside of me。 This is on the whole the same
thing as we meet with in the experience of Kant： it comes to the same thing whether it is by matter
or the non…ego that the ego is here determined。
b。 In the theoretic consciousness the ego； although the assertive generally； finds itself limited by the
non…ego。 But it is identical with itself； hence its infinite activity ever sets itself to abrogate the
non…ego and to bring forth itself。 Now the different methods whereby the ego sets forth itself are
the different methods of its activity； these we have to understand in their necessity。 But since
philosophic knowledge is the consideration of consciousness itself （supra； p。 483）； I can only
know knowledge； the act of the ego。 Fichte thus appeals to consciousness； postulates ego and
non…ego in their abstraction； and since philosophic knowledge is the consciousness of
consciousness； it is not sufficient that I should find its determinations in consciousness； for I
produce them with consciousness。 Common consciousness； indeed； likewise brings forth all the
determinations of the ordinary conception and of thought； but without — on the theoretic side at
least — having any knowledge of it； for it is the fact of being limited alone that is present to it。 Thus；
when I see a large square object； such as a wall； my ordinary consciousness accepts these
determinations as they are given to it； the object is。 In so doing I do not think of seeing； but of the
object； seeing； however； is my activity； the determinations of my faculty of sensation are thus
posited through me。（16） The ego as theoretic is； indeed； aware in philosophic consciousness that it
is the ego which posits； but here it posits that the non…ego posits somewhat in me。 The ego thus
posits itself as that which is limited by the non…ego。 I make this limitation mine； thus is it for me in
me； this passivity of the ego is itself the activity of the ego。 As a matter of fact； all reality which
appears in the object for the ego is a determination of the ego；（17） just as the categories and other
determinations were in Kant's case。 Thus it is here more especially that we should expect Fichte to
demonstrate the return of other…Being into absolute consciousness。 However； because after all the
other…Being was regarded as unconditioned； as implicit； this return does not come to pass。 The
ego determines the 'other；' indeed； but this unity is an altogether finite unity； non…ego has thus
immediately escaped from determination once more and gone forth from this unity。 What we find
is merely an alternation between self…consciousness and the consciousness of another； and the
constant progression of this alternation； which never reaches any end。（18）
The development of theoretic reason is the following…out of the manifold relationships between the
ego and non…ego； the forms of this limitation which Fichte now goes through are the determinations
of the object。 These particular thought…determinations he calls categories； and he seeks to
demonstrate them in their necessity； from the time of Aristotle onwards no one had thought of so
doing。 The first of t