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absolutely identical； that which in itself is neither subjective nor objective； and if for such； which；”
however； “can be an intellectual intuition only； one could appeal to immediate experience；” the
question would be： “How can this intuition be again made objective； i。e。 how can it be asserted
without doubt that it does not rest on a subjective deception； if there is not a universal objectivity
in that intuition； which is recognized by all？” This intellectual principle in itself should thus be given
in an experience so that men may be able to appeal to it。 “The objectivity of intellectual intuition is
art。 The work of art alone reflects to me what is otherwise reflected through nothing — that
absolute identical which has already separated itself in the ego itself。” The objectivity of identity
and the knowledge of the same is art； in one and the same intuition the ego is here conscious of
itself and unconscious。（13） This intellectual intuition which has become objective is objective
sensuous intuition — but the Notion； the comprehended necessity； is a very different objectivity。
Thus a principle is presupposed both for the content of philosophy and for subjective
philosophizing： on the one hand it is demanded that the attitude adopted should be one of
intellectual intuition； and； on the other hand； this principle has to be authenticated； and this takes
place in the work of art。 This is the highest form of the objectification of reason； because in it
sensuous conception is united with intellectuality； sensuous existence is merely the expression of
spirituality。 The highest objectivity； which the subject attains； the highest identity of subjective and
objective； is that which Schelling terms the power of imagination。 Art is thus comprehended as
what is inmost and highest； that which produces the intellectual and real in one； and philosophizing
is conceived as this genius of art。 But art and power of imagination are not supreme。 For the Idea；
spirit； cannot be truly given expression to in the manner in which art expresses its Idea。 This last is
always a method pertaining to intuitive perception； and on account of this sensuous form of
existence the work of art cannot correspond to the spirit。 Thus because the point last arrived at is
designated as the faculty of imagination； as art； even in the subject this is a subordinate point of
view； and thus in itself this point is not the absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity。 In
subjective thought； rational； speculative thought is thus indeed demanded； but if this appears false
to you nothing further can be said than that you do not possess intellectual intuition。 The proving of
anything； the making it comprehensible； is thus abandoned； a correct apprehension of it is directly
demanded； and the Idea is thus assertorically pre…established as principle。 The Absolute is the
absolute identity of subjective and objective； the absolute indifference of real and ideal； of form
and essence； of universal and particular； in this identity of the two there is neither the one nor the
other。 But the unity is not abstract； empty； and dry； that would signify logical identity； classification
according to something common to both； in which the difference remains all the while outside。 The
identity is concrete： it is subjectivity as well as objectivity； the two are present therein as abrogated
and ideal。 This identity may easily be shown in the ordinary conception： the conception； we may
for example say； is subjective； it has； too； the determinate content of exclusion in reference to
other conceptions； nevertheless； the conception is simple — it is one act； one unity。
What is lacking in Schelling's philosophy is thus the fact that the point of indifference of subjectivity
and objectivity； or the Notion of reason； is absolutely pre…supposed； without any attempt being
made at showing that this is the truth。 Schelling often uses Spinoza's form of procedure； and sets
up axioms。 In philosophy； when we desire to establish it position； we demand proof。 But if we
begin with intellectual intuition； that constitutes an oracle to which we have to give way； since the
existence of intellectual intuition was made our postulate。 The true proof that this identity of
subjective and objective is the truth； could only be brought about by means of each of the two
being investigated in its logical； i。e。 essential determinations； and in regard to them； it must then be
shown that the subjective signifies the transformation of itself into the objective； and that the
objective signifies its not remaining such； but making itself subjective。 Similarly in the finite； it would
have to be shown that it contained a contradiction in itself； and made itself infinite； in this way we
should have the unity of finite and infinite。 In so doing； this unity of opposites is not asserted
beforehand； but in the opposites themselves it is shown that their truth is their unity； but that each
taken by itself is one…sided — that their difference veers round； casting itself headlong into this unity
— while the understanding all the time thinks that in these differences it possesses something fixed
and secure。 The result of thinking contemplation would in this former case be that each moment
would secretly make itself into its opposite； the identity of both being alone the truth。 The
understanding certainly calls this transformation sophistry； humbug； juggling； and what…not。 As a
result； this identity would； according to Jacobi； be one which was no doubt conditioned and of set
purpose produced。 But we must remark that a one…sided point of view is involved in apprehending
the result of development merely as a result； it is a process which is likewise mediation within itself；
of such a nature that this mediation is again abrogated and asserted as immediate。 Schelling；
indeed； had this conception in a general way； but he did not follow it out in a definite logical
method； for with him it remained an immediate truth； which can only be verified by means of
intellectual intuition。 That is the great difficulty in the philosophy of Schelling。 And then it was
misunderstood and all interest taken from it。 It is easy enough to show that subjective and
objective are different。 Were they not different； nothing could be made of them any more than of
A = A； but they are in opposition as one。 In all that is finite； an identity is present； and this alone is
actual； but besides the fact that the finite is this identity； it is also true that it is the absence of
harmony between subjectivity and objectivity； Notion and reality； and it is in this that finitude
consists。 To this principle of Schelling's； form； or necessity； is thus lacking； it is only asserted。
Schelling appears to have this in common with Plato and the Neo…Platonists； that knowledge is to
be found in the inward intuition of eternal Ideas wherein knowledge is unmediated in the Absolute。
But when Plato speaks of this intuition of the soul； which has freed itself from all knowledge that is
finite； empirical； or reflected； and the Neo…Platonists tell of the ecstasy of thought in which
knowledge is the immediate knowledge of the Absolute； this definite distinction must be noticed；
viz。； that with Plato's knowledge of the universal； or with his intellectuality； wherein all opposition
as a reality is abrogated； dialectic is associated； or the recognized necessity for the abrogation of
these opposites； Plato does not begin with this； for with him the movement in which they abrogate
themselves is present。 The Absolute is itself to be looked at as this movement of self…abrogation；
this is the only actual knowledge and knowledge of the Absolute。 With Schelling this idea has；
however； no dialectic present in it whereby those opposites may determine themselves to pass
over into their unity； and in so doing to be comprehended。
2。 Schelling begins with the idea of the Absolute as identity of the subjective and objective； and
accordingly there evinced itself in the presentations of his system which followed； the further
necessity of proving this idea； this he attempted to do in the two Journals of Speculative Physics。
But if that method be once adopted； the procedure is not immanent development from the
speculative Idea； but it follows the mode of external reflection。 Schelling's proofs are adduced in
such an exceedingly formal manner that they really invariably presuppose the very thing that was to
be proved。 The axiom assumes the main point in question； and all the rest follows as a matter of
course。 Here is an instance： “The innermost essence of the Absolute can only be thought of as
identity absolute； altogether pure and undisturbed。 For the Absolute is only absolute； and what is
thought in it is necessarily and invariably the same； or in other words； is necessarily and invariably
absolute。 If the idea of the Absolute were a general Notion” （or conception）； “this would not
prevent a difference being met with in it； notwithstanding this unity of the absolute。 For things the
most different are yet in the Notion always one and identical； just as a rectangle； a polygon and a
circle are all figures。 The possibilit