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which takes the form：〃because moral action is the absolute purpose； the absolute purpose
isthat moral action do not take place at all〃。
If we put these moments together； through which consciousness has moved in presenting its ideas
of its moral life； we see that it cancels each one again in its opposite。 It starts from the position
that； for it； morality and reality do not make a harmony； but it is not in earnest with that； for in the
moral act it is conscious of the presence of this harmony。 But neither is it in earnest with this
action； since the action is something individual； for it has such a high purpose； the highest good。
This； however； is once more merely a dissemblance of the actual fact； for thereby all action and all
morality would fall to the ground。 In other words； it is not strictly in earnest with moral action； on
the contrary； it really feels that； what is most to be wished for； the absolutely desirable； is that the
highest good were carried out and moral action superfluous。
From this result consciousness must go on still further in its contradictory process； and must of
necessity again dissemble the abolition of moral action。 Morality is the inherently essential
（Ansich）； in order that it may have place； the final end of the world cannot be carried out； rather；
the moral consciousness must exist for itself； and must find lying before it a nature opposing it。 But
it must per se； be completed。 This leads to the second postulate of the harmony of itself and
sensibility； the 〃nature〃 immediately within it。 Moral self…consciousness sets up its purpose as pure
purpose； as independent of inclinations and impulses； so that this bare purpose has abolished
within itself the ends of sensibility。 But this cancelling of the element of sense is no sooner set up
than it is again dissembled。 The moral consciousness acts； it brings its purpose into reality； and
self…conscious sensibility； which should be done away with； is precisely the mediating element
between pure consciousness and realityis the instrument used by the former for the realization of
itself； or is the organ； and what is called impulse； inclinations。 It is thus not really in earnest in
cancelling inclinations and impulses； for these are just self…consciousness making itself actual。
Moreover； they ought not to be suppressed； but merely to be in conformity with reason。 They are；
too； in conformity with it； for moral action is nothing else than self…realizing
consciousnessconsciousness taking on the form of an impulse； i。e。 it is immediately the realized
actually present harmony of impulse and morality。 But； in point of fact； impulse is not only this
empty conscious form； which might possibly have within itself a spring of action other than the
impulse in question； and be driven on by that。 For sensibility is a kind of nature； which contains
within itself its own laws and springs of action： consequently； morality cannot seriously mean to be
the inciting motive （Triebfeder） for impulses （Triebe）； the angle of inclination for inclinations。 For；
since these latter have their own fixed character and peculiar content； the consciousness； to which
they were to conform； would rather be in conformity with thema conformity which moral
self…consciousness declines to adopt。 The harmony between the two is thus merely implicit and
postulated。
In moral action the realized or present harmony of morality and sensibility was set up just now；
and is now again 〃displaced〃。 The harmony is in a misty distance beyond consciousness； where
nothing can any more be accurately distinguished or grasped； for； to grasp this unity； which we
have just tried to do； has proved impossible。
In this merely immanent or implicit harmony； however； consciousness gives up itself altogether。
This immanent state is its moral completion； where the struggle of morality and sensibility has
ceased； and the latter is in conformity to the former in a way which cannot be made out。 On that
account this completion is again merely a dissemblance of the actual case； for in point of fact
morality would be really giving up itself in that completion； because it is only consciousness of the
absolute purpose qua pure purpose； i。e。 in opposition to all other purposes。 Morality is both the
activity of this pure purpose； and at the same time the consciousness of rising above sensibility； of
being mixed up with sensibility and of opposing and struggling with it。 That this moral completion is
not taken seriously is directly expressed by consciousness itself in the fact that it shifts this
completion away into infinity； i。e。 asserts that the completion is never completed。
Thus it is really only the middle state of being incomplete that is admitted to have any value： a state
nevertheless which at least is supposed to be one of progress towards completion。 Yet it cannot
be so； for advancing in morality would really mean approaching its disappearance。 For the goal
would be the nothingness above mentioned； the abolition of morality and consciousness itself： but
to come ever nearer and nearer to nothing means to decrease。 Besides； 〃advancing〃 would； in
general； in the same way as 〃decreasing；〃 assume distinctions of quantity in morality： but these are
quite inadmissible in such a sphere。 In morality as the consciousness which takes the ethical end to
be pure duty； we cannot think at all of difference； least of all of the superficial difference of
quantity： there is only one virtue； only one pure duty； only one morality。
Since； then； it is not moral completion that is taken seriously； but rather the middle state； i。e。 as just
explained； the condition of no morality； we thus come by another way back to the content of the
first postulate。 For we cannot perceive how happiness is to be demanded for this moral
consciousness on the ground of its worthiness to be happy。 It is well aware of its not being
complete； and cannot； therefore； in point of fact； demand happiness as a desert； as something of
which it is worthy。 It can ask happiness to be given merely as an act of free grace； i。e。 it can only
ask for happiness as such and as a substantive element by itself； it cannot expect it except as the
result of chance and caprice； not because there is any absolute reason of the above sort。 The
condition of non…morality herein expresses just what it isthat it is concerned； not about morality；
but about happiness alone； without reference to morality。
By this second aspect of the moral point of view； the assertion of the first aspect； wherein
disharmony between morality and happiness is presupposed； is also cancelled。 One may pretend
to have found by experience that in the actual present the man who is moral often fares badly；
while the man who is not； often comes off happily。 Yet the middle state of incomplete morality； the
condition which has proved to be the essential one； shows clearly that this perception that morality
fares badly； this supposed experience of it； is merely a dissemblance of the real facts of the case。
For； since morality is not completed； i。e。 since morality in point of fact is not； what can there be in
the 〃experience〃 that morality fares badly？
Since； at the same time； it has turned out that the point at issue concerns happiness alone； it is
manifest that； in making the criticism； 〃the man without morality comes off well；〃 there was no
intention to convey thereby that there is something wrong in such a case。。 The designation of an
individual as one devoid of morality necessarily falls to the ground； when morality in general is
incomplete； such a characterization rests； indeed； on pure caprice。 Hence the sense and content of
that judgment of experience is simply this； that happiness as such should not have fallen to some
who have got it； i。e。 the judgment is an expression of envy； which covers itself up in the cloak of
morality。 The reason； however； why we think good luck； as we call it； should fall to the lot of
others is good friendship； which ungrudgingly grants and wishes them； and wishes itself too； this
favour； this accident of good fortune。
（2） The Resolution of Morality into its Opposite
Morality； then； in the moral consciousness； is not completed。 This is what is now established。 But
its essence consists in being only what is complete； and so pure morality： incomplete morality is；
therefore； impure in other words； is Immorality。 Morality itself thus exists in another being than the
actual concrete consciousness。 This other is a holy moral legislator。
Morality which is not completed in consciousness the morality which is the reason for making
those postulates； means； in the first instance； that morality； when it is set up as actual in
consciousness； stands in relation to something else； to an existence； and thus itself acquires
otherness or distinction； whence arises a manifold plurality of moral commands。 The moral
self…consciousness at the same time； however； looks on these many duties as unessential； for it is
concerned with merely the one pure duty； and this plurality of duties； so far as they are determinate
duties； has no true reality for self…consciousness。 They can thus have their real tru