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in part historical in character。 And just for that reason； too； it is not in the least refuted if anyone
assures us on the contrary that this is not so； that the process instead is here so and so； if ideas we
are all used to； being truths accepted or settled and familiar to everyone； are brought to mind and
recounted； or； again； if something new is served up and Guaranteed as coming from the inner
sanctuaries of inspired intuition。
Such a view is bound to meet with opposition。 The first instinctive reaction on the part of knowing；
when offered something that was unfamiliar； is usually to resist it。 It seeks by that means to save
freedom and native insight； to secure its own inherent authority against alien authority — for that is
the way anything apprehended for the first time appears。 This attitude is adopted； too； in order to
do away with the semblance of a kind of disgrace which would lie in the fact that something has
had to be learnt。 In like manner； again； when the unfamiliar or unknown is received with applause；
the reaction is in the same way an exaltation of freedom and native authority。 It consists in
something analogous to ultra…revolutionary declamation and action。
15。 The demands of the study of philosophy
Hence the important thing for the student of science is to make himself undergo the strenuous toil
of conceptual reflection； of thinking in the form of the notion。 This demands concentrated attention
on the notion as such； on simple and ultimate determinations like being…in…itself； being…for…itself；
self…identity； and so on； for these are elemental； pure； self …determined functions of a kind we
might call souls； were it not that their conceptual nature denotes something higher than that term
contains。 The interruption by conceptual thought of the habit of always thinking in figurative ideas
（Vorstellungen） is as annoying and troublesome to this way of thinking as to that process of
formal intelligence which in its reasoning rambles about with no real thoughts to reason with。 The
former； the habit； may be called materialized thinking； a fortuitous mental state； one that is
absorbed in what is material； and hence finds it very distasteful at once to lift its self clear of this
matter and be with itself alone。 The latter； the process of raisonnement； is； on the other hand；
detachment from all content； and conceited superiority to it。 What is wanted here is the effort and
struggle to give up this kind of freedom； and instead of being a merely arbitrary principle directing
the content anyhow； this freedom should sink into and pervade the content； should let it be
directed and controlled by its own proper nature； i。e。 by the self as its own self。 and should
observe this process taking place。 We must abstain from interrupting the immanent rhythm of the
movement of conceptual thought； we must refrain from arbitrarily interfering with it； and
introducing ideas and reflections that have been obtained elsewhere。 Restraint of this sort is itself
an essential condition of attending to and getting at the real nature of the notion。
16。 Argumentative thinking in its negative attitude —
There are two aspects in the case of that ratiocinative procedure which mark its contrast from
conceptual thinking and call for further notice。 Raisonnement； in the first place； adopts a negative
attitude towards the content apprehended； knows how to refute it and reduce it to nothingness。 To
see what the content is not is merely a negative process； it is a dead halt； which does not of itself
go beyond itself； and proceed to a new content； it has to get hold of something else from
somewhere or other in order to have once more a content。 It is reflection upon and into the empty
ego； the vanity of its own knowledge。 Conceit of this kind brings out not only that this content is
vain and empty； but also that to see this is itself fatuity too： for it is negation with no perception of
the positive element within it。 In that this reflection does not even have its own negativity as its
content； it is not inside actual fact at all； but for ever away outside it。 On that account it imagines
that by asserting mere emptiness it is going much farther than insight that embraces and reveals a
wealth of content。 On the other hand； in the case of conceptual thinking； as was above indicated；
the negative aspect falls within the content itself； and is the positive substance of that content； as
well as being its inherent character and moving principle as by being the entirety of what these are。
Looked at as a result； it is determinate specific negation； the negative which is the outcome of this
process； and consequently is a positive content as well。
17。 — in its positive attitude； its subject
In view of the fact that ratiocinative thinking has a content； whether of images or thoughts or a
mixture of both； there is another side to its process which makes conceptual comprehension
difficult for it。 The peculiar nature of this aspect is closely connected with the essential meaning of
the idea above described； in fact； expresses the idea in the way this appears as the process of
thinking apprehension。 For just as ratiocinative thinking in its negative reference； which we have
been describing； is nothing but the self into which the content returns； in the same way； on the
other hand； in its positive cognitive process the self is an ideally presented subject to which the
content is related as an accident and predicate。 This subject constitutes the basis to which the
content is attached and on which the process moves to and fro。 Conceptual thinking goes on in
quite a different way。 Since the concept or notion is the very self of the object； manifesting itself as
the development of the object； it is not a quiescent subject； passively supporting accidents： it is a
self…determining active concept which takes up its determinations and makes them its own。 In the
course of this process that inert passive subject really disappears； it enters into the different
constituents and pervades the content； instead of remaining in inert antithesis to determinateness of
content； it constitutes； in fact； that very specificity； i。e。 the content as differentiated along with the
process of bringing this about。 Thus the solid basis； which ratiocination found in an inert subject； is
shaken to its foundations； and the only object is this very movement of the subject。 The subject
supplying the concrete filling to its own content ceases to be something transcending。 this content；
and cannot have further predicates or accidents。 Conversely； again； the scattered diversity of the
content is brought under the control of the self； and so bound together； the content is not a
universal that can be detached from the subject； and adapted to several indifferently。 Consequently
the content is in truth no longer predicate of the subject； it is the very substance； is the inmost
reality； and the very principle of what is being considered。 Ideational thinking （vorstellen）； since its
nature consists in dealing with accidents or predicates； and in exercising the right to transcend them
because they are nothing more than predicates and accidents — this way of thinking is checked in
its course； since that which has in the proposition the form of a predicate is itself the substance of
the statement。 It is met by a counter…thrust； as we may say。 Starting from the subject； as if this
were a permanent base on which to proceed； it discovers； by the predicate being in reality the
substance； that the subject has passed into the predicate； and has thereby ceased to be subject：
and since in this way what seems to be predicate has become the entire mass of the content；
whole and complete； thinking cannot wander and ramble about at will； but is restrained and
controlled by this weight of content。
Usually the subject is first set down as the fixed and objective self； from this fixed position the
necessary process passes on to the multiplicity of determinations or predicates。 Here the knowing
ego takes the place of that subject and is the function of knitting or combining the predicates one
with another； and is the subject holding them fast。 But since the former subject enters into the
determinate constituents themselves； and is their very life； the subject in the second case — viz。 the
knowing subject…finds that the former； which it is supposed to be done with and which it wants to
transcend； in order to return into itself； — is still there in the predicate： and instead of being able to
be the determining agency in the process of resolving the predicate…reflectively deciding whether
this or that predicate should be attached to the former subject — it has really to deal with the self
of the content； is not allowed to be something on its own account （für sich）； but has to exist along
with this content。
What has been said can be expressed in a formal manner by saying that the nature of judgment or
the proposition in general； which involves the distinction of subject and predicate； is subverted and
destroyed by the speculative judgment； and the identical propositio