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in order to give him confidence in regard to what is no more as yet than a matter for himself singly
and alone； and in order to find his assurance； which in the first instance merely belongs to a
particular individual； realized as something universal。 In this connection； however； it is very often
necessary to distinguish the public from those who take upon themselves to be its representatives
and spokesmen。 The public takes up an attitude in many respects quite different from the latter；
indeed； even opposed to them。 Whereas the public good…naturedly and generously will rather take
the blame upon itself when a philosophical work is not quite acceptable or intelligible to it； these
〃representatives〃； on the contrary； convinced of their own competence； put all the blame on the
authors。 The influence of the work on the public is more silent than the action of those
〃representatives〃； who are like the dead burying their dead。 While the general level of insight at the
present time is in the main more highly cultivated； its curiosity more quickened and alert； and its
judgment more swiftly made up and pronounced； so that the feet of those who will carry you out
are already at the door： at the same time we have often to distinguish from all this the slower and
more gradual effect which rectifies the direction of attention caught and compelled by imposing
assurances； corrects； too； contemptuous censure； and after a little provides a contemporary
audience for one part； while another after a temporary vogue finds no audience with posterity any
longer。
For the rest； at a time when the universal nature of spiritual life has become so very much
emphasized and strengthened； and the mere individual aspect has become； as it should be；
correspondingly a matter of indifference； when； too； that universal aspect holds； by the entire range
of its substance； the full measure of the wealth it has built up； and lays claim to it all； the share in
the total work of mind that falls to the activity of any particular individual can only be very small。
Because this is so； the individual must all the more forget himself； as in fact the very nature of
science implies and requires that he should； and he must； moreover； become and do what he can。
But all the less must be demanded of him； just as he can expect the less from himself； and may ask
the less for himself。
INTRODUCTION
§ 1
It is natural to suppose that； before philosophy enters upon its subject proper…namely； the actual
knowledge of what trulv is…it is necessary to come first to an understanding concerning knowledge；
which is looked upon as the instrument by which to take possession of the Absolute； or as the
means through which to get a sight of it。 The apprehension seems legitimate； on the one hand that
there may be various kinds of knowledge； among which one might be better adapted than another
for the attainment of our purpose…and thus a wrong choice is possible： on the other hand again
that； since knowing is a faculty of a definite kind and with a determinate range； without the more
precise determination of its nature and limits we might take hold on clouds of error instead of the
heaven of truth。
§ 2
This apprehensiveness is sure to pass even into the conviction that the whole enterprise which sets
out to secure for consciousness by means of knowledge what exists per se； is in its very nature
absurd； and that between knowledge and the Absolute there lies a boundary which completely
cuts off the one from the other。 For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of
absolute Reality； the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to
anything does not leave it as it is for itself； but rather entails in the process； and has in view； a
moulding and alteration of it。 Or； again； if knowledge is not an instrument which we actively
employ； but a kind of passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us； then here；
too； we do not receive it as it is in itself 。 but as it is through and in this medium。 In either case we
employ a means which immediately brings about the very opposite of its own end； or； rather； the
absurdity lies in making use of any means at all。 It seems indeed open to us to find in the
knowledge of the way in which the instrument operates； a remedy for this parlous state； for
thereby it becomes possible to remove from the result the part which； in our idea of the Absolute
received through that instrument； belongs to the instrument； and thus to get the truth in its purity。
But this improvement would； as a matter of fact； only bring us back to the point where we were
before。 If we take away again from a definitely formed thing that which the instrument has done in
the shaping of it； then the thing （in this case the Absolute） stands before us once more just as it
was previous to all this trouble； which； as we now see； was superfluous。 If the Absolute were only
to be brought on the whole nearer to us by this agency； without any change being wrought in it；
like a bird caught by a limestick； it would certainly scorn a trick of that sort； if it were not in its
very nature； and did it not wish to be； beside us from the start。 For a trick is what knowledge in
such a case would be； since by all its busy toil and trouble it gives itself the air of doing something
quite different from bringing about a relation that is merely immediate； and so a waste of time to
establish。 Or； again； if the examination of knowledge； which we represent as a medium； makes us
acquainted with the law of its refraction； it is likewise useless to eliminate this refraction from the
result。 For knowledge is not the divergence of the ray； but the ray itself by which the truth comes
in contact with us； and if this be removed； the bare direction or the empty place would alone be
indicated。
§ 3
Meanwhile； if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of distrust into science； which
without any scruples of that sort goes to work and actually does know； it is not easy to understand
why； conversely； a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust； and why we should not take
care lest the fear of error is not just the initial error。 As a matter of fact； this fear presupposes
something； indeed a great deal； as truth； and supports its scruples and consequences on what
should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth。 It starts with ideas of knowledge as
an instrument； and as a medium； and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge。
More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side； and that knowledge on
the other side； by itself and cut off from the Absolute； is still something real； in other words； that
knowledge； which； by being outside the Absolute； is certainly also outside truth； is nevertheless
true…a position which； while calling itself fear of error； makes itself known rather as fear of the
truth。
§ 4
This conclusion comes from the fact that the Absolute alone is true or that the True is alone
absolute； It may be set aside by making the distinction that a know ledge which does not indeed
know the Absolute as science wants to do； is none the less true too； and that knowledge in
general； though it may possibly be incapable of grasping the Absolute； can still be capable of truth
of another kind。 But we shall see as we proceed that random talk like this leads in the long run to a
confused distinction between the absolute truth and a truth of some other sort； and that 〃absolute〃；
〃knowledge〃； and so on； are words which presuppose a meaning that has first to be got at。
§ 5
With suchlike useless ideas and expressions about knowledge； as an instrument to take hold of the
Absolute； or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth； and so on （relations to which
all these ideas of a knowledge which is divided from the Absolute and an Absolute divided from
knowledge in the last resort lead）； we need not concern ourselves。 Nor need we trouble about the
evasive pretexts which create the incapacity of science out of the presupposition of such relations；
in order at once to be rid of the toil of science； and to assume the air of serious and zealous effort
about it。 Instead of being troubled with giving answers to all these； they may be straightway
rejected as adventitious and arbitrary ideas； and the use which is here made of words like
〃absolute〃；〃knowledge〃； as also 〃objective〃 and 〃subjective〃； and innumerable others； whose
meaning is assumed to be familiar to everyone； might well be regarded as so much deception。 For
to give out that their significance is universally familiar and that everyone indeed possesses their
notion； rather looks like an attempt to dispense with the only important matter； which is just to give
this notion。 With better right； on the contrary； we might spare ourselves the trouble of talking any
notice at all of such ideas and ways of talking which would have the effect of warding off sci