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merely the semblance of a distinction； and consequently it is a notion in its very nature。
This is exactly； however； the way self…consciousness is constituted。 It distinguishes itself in like
manner from itself； without any distinction being thereby established。 Hence it is that it finds in
observation of organic nature nothing else than this kind of reality； it finds itself in the form of a
thing； as a life； and yet； between what it is itself and what it has found； draws a distinction which
is； however； no distinction。 Just as the instinct of an animal is to seek and consume food； but
thereby elicits nothing except itself； similarly too the instinct of reason in its search merely finds
reason itself。 An animal ends with self…feeling。 The instinct of reason； on the other hand； is at the
same time； self…consciousness。 But because it is merely instinct； it is put on one side as against
consciousness； and in the latter finds its opposite。 Its satisfaction is； therefore； broken in two by
this opposite； it finds itself； viz。 the purpose； and also finds this purpose in the shape of a thing。 But
the purpose is seen to lie； in the first instance； apart from the thing presenting itself as a purpose。 In
the second place； this purpose qua purpose is at the same time objective； it is taken to fall； there。
fore； not within the observing consciousness； but within another intelligence。
Looked at more closely； this character lies also just as much in the notion of the thingthat of
being in itself purpose。 It preserves itself； this means at one and the same time it is its nature to
conceal the controlling necessity and to present that necessity in the form of a contingent relation。
For its freedom； its being on its own account； means just that it behaves towards its necessary
condition as something indifferent。 It thus presents itself as if it were something whose notion falls
apart from its existence。 In this way reason is compelled to look on its own proper notion as falling
outside it； to look at it as a thing； as that towards which it is indifferent； and which in consequence
is reciprocally indifferent towards it ＇reason＇ and towards its own notion。 Qua instinct it continues
to remain within this state of being； this condition of indifference； and the thing expressing the
notion remains for it something other than this notion； and the notion other than the thing。 Thus for
reason the thing organized is only per se a purpose in the sense that the necessity； which is
presented as concealed within the action of the thingfor the active agency there takes up the
attitude of being indifferent and independentfalls outside the organism itself。
Since； however； the organic qua purpose per se can not behave in any other way than as organic；
the fact of its being per se a purpose is also apparent and sensibly present； and as such it is
observed。 What is organic shows itself when observed to be something self…preserving； returning
and returned into itself。 But in this state of being； observation does not recognize the concept of
purpose； or does not know that the notion of purpose is not in an intelligence anywhere else； but
just exists here and in the form of a thing。 Observation makes a distinction between the concept of
purpose and self…existence and self…preservation； which is not a distinction at all。 That it is no
distinction is something of which it is not aware； what it is aware of is an activity which appears
contingent and indifferent towards what is brought about by that activity； and towards the unity
which is all the while the principle connecting both； that activity and this purpose are taken to fall
asunder。
On this view the special function of the organic is the inner operating activity lying between its first
and last stage； so far as this activity implies the character of singleness。 So far； however； as the
activity has the character of universality； and the active agent is equated with what is the outcome
of its operation； this purposive activity as such would not belong to organic beings。 That single
activity； which is merely a means； comes； owing to its individual form； to be determined by an
entirely individual or contingent necessity。 What an organic being does for the preservation of itself
as an individual； or of itself qua genus； is； therefore； quite lawless as regards this immediate
content： for notion and universal fall outside it。 Its activity would accordingly be empty functioning
without any content in it； it would not even be the functioning of a machine； for this has a purpose
and its activity in consequence a definite content。 If it were deserted in this way by the universal； it
would be an activity of a mere being qua being； i。e。 would be an activity like that of an acid or a
base； not forthwith reflected into itself…a function which could not be cut off from its immediate
existence； nor give up this existence （which gets lost in the relation to its opposite）； but could
preserve itself。 The kind of being whose functioning is here under consideration is； however； set
down as a thing preserving itself in its relation to its opposite。 The activity as such is nothing but the
bare insubstantial form of its independent existence on its own account； and the purpose of the
activity； its substancessubstance； which is not simply a determinate being； but the universal…does
not fall outside the activity。 It is an activity reverting into itself by its own nature； and is not turned
back into itself by any alien； external agency。
This union of universality and activity； however； is not a matter for this attitude of observation；
because that unity is essentially the inner movement of what is organic； and can only be
apprehended conceptually。 Observation； however； seeks the moments in the form of existence
and duration； and because the organic whole consists essentially in not containing the moments in
that form； and in not letting them be found within it in that way； this observing consciousness； by its
way of looking at the matter； transforms the opposition into one which conforms and is adapted to
its own point of view。
An organism comes before the observing consciousness in this manner as a relation of two fixed
and existing momentsas a relation of elements in an opposition； whose two factors seem in one
respect really given in observation； while in another respect； as regards their content； they express
the opposition of the organic concept of purpose and actual reality。 But because the notion as such
is there effaced； this takes place in an obscure and superficial way； where thought sinks to the level
of mere ideal presentation。 Thus we see the notion taken much in the sense of what is inner； reality
in the sense of what is outer； and their relation gives rise to the law that 〃the outer is the expression
of the inner〃。
Let us consider more closely this inner with its opposite and their relation to one another。 In the
first place we find that the two factors of the law no longer have such an import as we found in the
case of previous laws； where the elements appeared as independent things； each being a particular
body； nor； again； in the second place； do we find that the universal is to have its existence
somewhere else outside what actually is。 On the contrary； the organic being is； in undivided
oneness and as a whole； the fundamental fact； it is the content of inner and outer； and is the same
for both。 The opposition is on that account of a purely formal character； its real sides have the
same ultimate principle inherently constituting them what they are。 At the same time； however；
since inner and outer are also opposite realities and each is a distinct being for observation； they
each seem to observation to have a peculiar content of their own。 This peculiar content； since it
consists of the same substance； or the same organic unity； can； however； in point of fact； be only a
different form of that unity； of that substance； and this is indicated by observation when it says that
the outer is merely the expression of the inner。
We have seen in the case of the concept of purpose the same characteristic features of the
relation； viz。 the indifferent independence of the diverse factors； and their unity in that
independence； a unity in which they disappear。
We have now to see what shape and embodiment inner and outer assume in actually existing。 The
inner as such must have an outer being and an embodiment； just as much as the outer as such； for
the inner is an object； or is affirmed as being； and as present for observation to deal with。
The organic substance qua inner is the Soul simply； the pure notion of purpose or the universal
which in dividing into its discrete elements remains all the same a universal fluent continuity； and
hence in its being appears as activity or the movement of vanishing reality； while； on the other
hand； the outer； opposed to that existing inner； subsists in the passive being of the organic。 The
law； as the relation of that inner to this outer； consequently expresses it content； now by setting
forth universal moments； or simple essential elements； and again by setting forth the realized
essentia