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lineaments； and places its real nature in the work done。 Herein it contradicts the relationship which
the instinct of reason； engaged in observing self…conscious individuality； establishes in regard to
what its inner and outer should be。 This point of view brings us to the special idea at the basis of
the science of physiognomy…if we care to call it a 〃science〃。 The opposition this form of
observation comes upon is in form the opposition of practical and theoretical； both falling inside
the practical aspect itself — the opposition of individuality； making itself real in action （in the most
general sense of action）； and individuality as being in this action at the same time reflected thence
into self； and taking the action for its object。 Observation apprehends and accepts this opposition
in the same inverted form in which it is when it makes its appearance。 To observation； the deed
itself and the performance； whether it be that of speech or a more solid reality； stand for the
nonessential outer； while the individuality's existence within itself passes for the essential inner。 Of
the two aspects which the practical mind involves； intention and act （the 〃meaning〃 regarding the
action and the action itself）； observation selects the former as the true inner； this （i。e。 the intention
or true inner） is supposed to have its more or less unessential externalization in the act； while its
true outer expression is to be had in the form in which the individual is embodied。 This latter
expression is a sensuous immediate presence of the individual mind： the inwardness； which is
intended to be the true internal aspect； is the particular point of the intention； and the singleness of
self…existence： both together the mind subjectively 〃meant〃 Thus； what observation takes for its
objects is an existence that is 〃meant〃； and within this sphere it looks for laws。
The primary way of making conjectures （meinen） regarding the 〃presumptive〃 presence of mind is
everyday （natürlich） physiognomy； hasty judgment formed at a glance about the inner nature and
the character of its outer form and shape。 The object of this guesswork thinking （4） is of such a
kind that its very essence involves its being in truth something else than merely sensuous and
immediate。 Certainly what is really present is just this condition of being in sensuous form reflected
out of sense into self； it is the visible as a sensuous presentment of the invisible； which constitutes
the object of observation。 But this very sensuous immediate presence is the mind's reality〃 as that
reality is approved by mere conjecture （Meinung）； and observation from this point of view
occupies itself with its 〃presumed〃 （gemeint） existence； with physiognomy； handwriting； sound of
voice； etc。
Observation relates such and such a sensuous fact to just such a supposed or presumed
（gemeintes） inner。 It is not the murderer； the thief； that is to be known； it is the capacity to be a
murderer； a thief。 The definitely marked abstract attribute is thereby lost in the concrete indefinite
characteristic nature of the particular individual； which now demands more skilful delineations than
the former qualifications supply。 Such skilful delineations no doubt say more than the qualification；
〃murderer〃； 〃thief〃； or 〃good…hearted〃； 〃unspoiled〃； and so on； but are a long way short of their
aim； which is to express the being that is 〃meant〃； the single individuality； as far short as the
delineations of the form and shape； which go further than a 〃flat brow〃； a 〃long nose〃； etc。 For the
individual shape and form； like the individual self…consciousness； is qua something 〃meant〃；
inexpressible。 The 〃science of knowing men〃； （5） which is concerned about the supposed human
being； like the 〃science〃 of physiognomy； which deals with his presumed reality and seeks to raise
to the level of knowledge uncritical assertions of everday （natürlich） physiognomy； （6） is therefore
something with neither foundation nor finality； it cannot manage to say what it 〃means〃 because it
merely 〃means〃； and its content is merely what is 〃presumed〃 or 〃meant〃。
The so…called 〃laws〃； this kind of science sets out to find； are relations holding between these two
presumed or supposed aspects； and hence can amount to no more than an empty 〃fancying〃
（meinen）。 Again since this presumed knowledge； which takes upon itself to deal with the reality of
mind； finds its object to be just the fact that mind is reflected from sense existence back into self；
and that； for mind； a specific bodily expression is an indifferent accident； it is therefore bound to be
aware at once that by the so…called 〃laws〃 discovered it really says nothing at all； but that； strictly
speaking； this is mere chatter； or merely giving out a 〃fancy〃 or 〃opinion〃 （Meinung） of its own —
（an assertion which has this amount of truth that to state one's 〃opinion〃； one's 〃fancy〃； and not to
convey thereby the fact itself； but merely a 〃fancy of one's own〃； are one and the same thing）。 In
content； however； such observations cannot differ in value from these： 〃It always rains at our
annual fair； says the dealer； 〃And every time； too；〃 says the housewife； 〃when I am drying my
washing。〃
Lichtenberg； who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way； adds this remark： 〃If any
one said； 'You act； certainly； like an honest man； but I can see from your face you are forcing
yourself to do so； and are a rogue at heart；' without a doubt every brave fellow to the end of time
when accosted in that fashion will retort with a box on the ear。〃
This retort is to the point； for the reason that it refutes the fundamental assumption of such a
〃science〃 of conjecture （meinen）； viz。 that the reality of a man is his face； etc。
The true being of a man is； on the contrary； his act； individuality is real in the deed； and a deed it is
which cancels both the aspects of what is 〃meant〃 or 〃presumed〃 to be。 In the one aspect where
what is 〃presumed〃 or 〃imagined〃 takes the form of a passive bodily being； individuality puts itself
forward in action as the negative essence which only is so far as it cancels bring。 Then
furthermore the act does away with the inexpressibleness of what self…conscious individuality really
〃means〃； in regard to such 〃meaning〃； individuality is endlessly determined and determinable。 This
false infinite； this endless determining； is abolished in the completed act。 The act is something
simply determinate； universal； to be grasped as an abstract； distinctive whole； it is murder； theft； a
benefit； a deed of bravery； and so on； and what it is can be said of it。
It is such and such； and its being is not merely a symbol； it is the fact itself。 It is this； and the
individual human being is what the act is。 In the simple fact that the act is； the individual is for
others what he really is and with a certain general nature； and ceases to be merely something that
is 〃meant〃 or 〃presumed〃 to be this or that。 No doubt he is not put there in the form of mind； but
when it is a question of his being qua being； and the twofold being of bodily shape and act are
pitted against one another； each claiming to be his true reality； the deed alone； is to be affirmed as
his genuine being — not his figure or shape； which would express what he 〃means〃 to convey by
his acts； or what any one might 〃conjecture〃 he merely could do。 In the same way； on the other
hand； when his performance and his inner possibility； capacity； or intention are opposed； the
former alone is to be regarded as his true reality； even if he deceives himself on the point and；
after he has turned from his action into himself；。 means to be something else in his 〃inner mind〃 than
what he is in the act。 Individuality； which commits itself to the objective element； when it passes
over into a deed no doubt puts itself to the risk of being altered and perverted。 But what settles the
character of the act is just this — whether the deed is a real thing that holds together； or whether it
is merely a pretended or 〃supposed〃 performance； which is in itself null and void and passes away。
Objectification does not alter the act itself； it merely shows what the deed is； i。e。 whether it is or
whether it is nothing。
The breaking up of this real being into intentions； and subtleties of that sort； by which the real man；
i。e。 his deed； is to be reduced again to； and explained in terms of； a 〃conjectured〃 being； as even
the individual himself may produce out of himself particular intentions concerning his reality — all
this must be left to idle 〃fancying and presuming〃 to furnish at its leisure。 If this idle thinking will set
its ineffective wisdom to work； and will deny the agent the character of reason； and use him so
badly as to want to declare his figure and his lineaments to be his real being instead of his act； then
it may expect to get the retort above spoken of； a retort which shows that figure is not the inherent
being； but is on the contrary an object sufficiently on the surface to be roughly handled。
If we look now at the range of relations as a whole in which self…conscious individuality can be
observed standing towards its outer aspect； there will be one