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monies which they shall receive from the company； they are
allowed a sum not exceeding eight hundred pounds for the salaries
of their clerks and agents at London； Bristol； and Liverpool； the
house rent of their office at London； and all other expenses of
management； commission； and agency in England。 What remains of
this sum； after defraying these different expenses； they may
divide among themselves； as compensation for their trouble； in
what manner they think proper。 By this constitution； it might
have been expected that the spirit of monopoly would have been
effectually restrained； and the first of these purposes
sufficiently answered。 It would seem； however； that it had not。
Though by the 4th of George III； c。 20； the fort of Senegal； with
all its dependencies； had been vested in the company of merchants
trading to Africa； yet in the year following （by the 5th of
George III； c。 44） not only Senegal and its dependencies； but the
whole coast from the port of Sallee； in south Barbary； to Cape
Rouge； was exempted from the jurisdiction of that company； was
vested in the crown； and the trade to it declared free to all his
Majesty's subjects。 The company had been suspected of restraining
the trade； and of establishing some sort of improper monopoly。 It
is not； however； very easy to conceive how； under the regulations
of the 23rd of George II； they could do so。 In the printed
debates of the House of Commons； not always the most authentic
records of truth； I observe； however； that they have been accused
of this。 The members of the committee of nine； being all
merchants； and the governors and factors； in their different
forts and settlements； being all dependent upon them； it is not
unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to
the consignments and commissions of the former which would
establish a real monopoly。
For the second of these； purposes； the maintenance of the
forts and garrisons； an annual sum has been allotted to them by
Parliament； generally about L13；000。 For the proper application
of this sum； the committee is obliged to account annually to the
Cursitor Baron of Exchequer； which account is afterwards to be
laid before Parliament。 But Parliament； which gives so little
attention to the application of millions； is not likely to give
much to that of L13；000 a year； and the Cursitor Baron of
Exchequer； from his profession and education； is not likely to be
profoundly skilled in the proper expense of forts and garrisons。
The captains of his Majesty's navy； indeed； or any other
commissioned officers appointed by the Board of Admiralty； may
inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons； and report
their observations to that board。 But that board seems to have no
direct jurisdiction over the committee； nor any authority to
correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into； and the
captains of his Majesty's navy； besides； are not supposed to be
always deeply learned in the science of fortification。 Removal
from an office which can be enjoyed only for the term of three
years； and of which the lawful emoluments； even during that term；
are so very small； seems to be the utmost punishment to which any
committee…man is liable for any fault； except direct
malversation； or embezzlement； either of the public money； or of
that of the company； and the fear of that punishment can never be
a motive of sufficient weight to force a continual and careful
attention to a business to which he has no other interest to
attend。 The committee are accused of having sent out bricks and
stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle on
the coast of Guinea； a business for which Parliament had several
times granted an extraordinary sum of money。 These bricks and
stones too； which had thus been sent upon so long a voyage； were
said to have been of so bad a quality that it was necessary to
rebuild from the foundation the walls which had been repaired
with them。 The forts and garrisons which lie north of Cape Rouge
are not only maintained at the expense of the state； but are
under the immediate government of the executive power； and why
those which lie south of that Cape； and which are； in part at
least； maintained at the expense of the state； should be under a
different government； it seems not very easy even to imagine a
good reason。 The protection of the Mediterranean trade was the
original purpose of pretence of the garrisons of Gibraltar and
Minorca； and the maintenance and government of those garrisons
has always been； very properly； committed； not to the Turkey
Company； but to the executive power。 In the extent of its
dominion consists； in a great measure； the pride and dignity of
that power； and it is not very likely to fail in attention to
what is necessary for the defence of that dominion。 The garrisons
at Gibraltar and Minorca； accordingly； have never been neglected；
though Minorca has been twice taken； and is now probably lost for
ever； that disaster was never even imputed to any neglect in the
executive power。 I would not； however； be understood to insinuate
that either of those expensive garrisons was ever； even in the
smallest degree； necessary for the purpose for which they were
originally dismembered from the Spanish monarchy。 That
dismemberment； perhaps； never served any other real purpose than
to alienate from England her natural ally the King of Spain； and
to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a
much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood
could ever have united them。
Joint stock companies； established by Royal Charter or by
Act of Parliament； differ in several respects； not only from
regulated companies； but from private copartneries。
First； in a private copartnery； no partner； without the
consent of the company； can transfer his share to another person；
or introduce a new member into the company。 Each member； however；
may； upon proper warning； withdraw from the copartnery； and
demand payment from them of his share of the common stock。 In a
joint stock company； on the contrary； no member can demand
payment of his share from the company； but each member can；
without their consent； transfer his share to another person； and
thereby introduce a new member。 The value of a share in a joint
stock is always the price which it will bring in the market； and
this may be either greater or less； in any proportion； than the
sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of the
company。
Secondly； in a private copartnery； each partner is bound for
the debts contracted by the company to the whole extent of his
fortune。 In a joint stock company； on the contrary； each partner
is bound only to the extent of his share。
The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a
court of directors。 This court； indeed； is frequently subject； in
many respects； to the control of a general court of proprietors。
But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to
understand anything of the business of the company； and when the
spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them； give
themselves no trouble about it； but receive contentedly such
half…yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to
make to them。 This total exemption from trouble and from risk；
beyond a limited sum； encourages many people to become
adventurers in joint stock companies； who would； upon no account；
hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery。 Such companies；
therefore； commonly draw to themselves much greater stocks than
any private copartnery can boast of。 The trading stock of the
South Sea Company； at one time； amounted to upwards of
thirty…three millions eight hundred thousand pounds。 The divided
capital of the Bank of England amounts； at present； to ten
millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds。 The directors
of such companies； however； being the managers rather of other
people's money than of their own； it cannot well be expected that
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over
their own。 Like the stewards of a rich man； they are apt to
consider attention to small matters as not for their master's
honour； and very easily give themselves a dispensation from
having it。 Negligence and profusion； therefore； must always
prevail； more or less； in the management of the affairs of such a
company。 It is upon this account that joint stock companies for
foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition
against private adventurers。 They have； accordingly； very seldom
succeeded without an exclusive privilege； and frequently have not
succeeded with one。 Without an exclusive privilege they have
commonly mismanaged the trade。 With an exclusive privilege they
have both mismanaged and confined it。
The Royal African Company； the predecessors of