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necessary for supporting that higher dignity。 We naturally expect
more splendour in the court of a king than in the mansion…house
of a doge or burgomaster。
CONCLUSION
The expense of defending the society； and that of supporting
the dignity of the chief magistrate； are both laid out for the
general benefit of the whole society。 It is reasonable；
therefore； that they should be defrayed by the general
contribution of the whole society； all the different members
contributing； as nearly as possible； in proportion to their
respective abilities。
The expense of the administration of justice； too； may； no
doubt； be considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole
society。 There is no impropriety； therefore； in its being
defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society。 The
persons； however； who gave occasion to this expense are those
who； by their injustice in one way or another； make it necessary
to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice。 The
persons again most immediately benefited by this expense are
those whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights
or maintain in their rights。 The expense of the administration of
justice； therefore； may very properly be defrayed by the
particular contribution of one or other； or both； of those two
different sets of persons； according as different occasions may
require； that is； by the fees of court。 It cannot be necessary to
have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society；
except for the conviction of those criminals who have not
themselves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees。
Those local or provincial expenses of which the benefit is
local or provincial （what is laid out； for example； upon the
police of a particular town or district） ought to be defrayed by
a local or provincial revenue； and ought to be no burden upon the
general revenue of the society。 It is unjust that the whole
society should contribute towards an expense of which the benefit
is confined to a part of the society。
The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is；
no doubt； beneficial to the whole society； and may； therefore；
without any injustice。 be defrayed by the general contribution of
the whole society。 This expense； however； is most immediately and
directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods from one
place to another； and to those who consume such goods。 The
turnpike tolls in England； and the duties called peages in other
countries； lay it altogether upon those two different sets of
people； and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society
from a very considerable burden。
The expense of the institutions for education and religious
instruction is likewise； no doubt； beneficial to the whole
society； and may； therefore； without injustice； be defrayed by
the general contribution of the whole society。 This expense；
however； might perhaps with equal propriety； and even with some
advantage； be defrayed altogether by those who receive the
immediate benefit of such education and instruction； or by the
voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for
either the one or the other。
When the institutions or public works which are beneficial
to the whole society either cannot be maintained altogether； or
are not maintained altogether by the contribution of such
particular members of the society as are most immediately
benefited by them； the deficiency must in most cases be made up
by the general contribution of the whole society。 The general
revenue of the society； over and above defraying the expense of
defending the society； and of supporting the dignity of the chief
magistrate； must make up for the deficiency of many particular
branches of revenue。 The sources of this general or public
revenue I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter。
CHAPTER II Of the Sources of the
General or Public Revenue of the Society
THE revenue which must defray； not only the expense of
defending the society and of supporting the dignity of the chief
magistrate； but all the other necessary expenses of government
for which the constitution of the state has not provided any
particular revenue； may be drawn either； first； from some fund
which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth； and
which is independent of the revenue of the people； or； secondly；
from the revenue of the people。
PART 1
Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may peculiarly
belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth
THE funds or sources of revenue which may peculiarly belong
to the sovereign or commonwealth must consist either in stock or
in land。
The sovereign； like any other owner of stock； may derive a
revenue from it； either by employing it himself； or by lending
it。 His revenue is in the one case profit； in the other interest。
The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit。
It arises principally from the milk and increase of his own herds
and flocks； of which he himself superintends the management； and
is the principal shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe。
It is； however； in this earliest and rudest state of civil
government only that profit has ever made the principal part of
the public revenue of a monarchial state。
Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable
revenue from the profit of mercantile projects。 The republic of
Hamburg is said to do so from the profits of a public wine cellar
and apothecary's shop。 The state cannot be very great of which
the sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine
merchant or apothecary。 The profit of a public bank has been a
source of revenue to more considerable states。 It has been so not
only to Hamburg； but to Venice and Amsterdam。 A revenue of this
kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention
of so great an empire as that of Great Britain。 Reckoning the
ordinary dividend of the Bank of England at five and a half per
cent and its capital at ten millions seven hundred and eighty
thousand pounds； the net annual profit； after paying the expense
of management； must amount； it is said； to five hundred and
ninety…two thousand nine hundred pounds。 Government； it is
pretended； could borrow this capital at three per cent interest；
and by taking the management of the bank into its own hands；
might make a clear profit of two hundred and sixty…nine thousand
five hundred pounds a year。 The orderly； vigilant； and
parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of
Venice and Amsterdam is extremely proper； it appears from
experience； for the management of a mercantile project of this
kind。 But whether such a government as that of England… which；
whatever may be its virtues； has never been famous for good
economy； which； in time of peace； has generally conducted itself
with the slothful and negligent profusion that is perhaps natural
to monarchies； and in time of war has constantly acted with all
the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall
into… could be safely trusted with the management of such a
project； must at least be good deal more doubtful。
The post office is properly a mercantile project。 The
government advances the expense of establishing the different
offices； and of buying or hiring the necessary horses or
carriages； and is repaid with a large profit by the duties upon
what is carried。 It is perhaps the only mercantile project which
has been successfully managed by； I believe； every sort of
government。 The capital to be advanced is not very considerable。
There is no mystery in the business。 The returns are not only
certain； but immediate。
Princes； however； have frequently engaged in many other
mercantile projects； and have been willing； like private persons；
to mend their fortunes by becoming adventurers in the common
branches of trade。 They have scarce ever succeeded。 The profusion
with which the affairs of princes are always managed renders it
almost impossible that they should。 The agents of a prince regard
the wealth of their master as inexhaustible； are careless at what
price they buy； are careless at what price they sell； are
careless at what expense they transport his goods from one place
to another。 Those agents frequently live with the profusion of
princes； and sometimes too； in spite of that profusion； and by a
proper method of making up their accounts； acquire the fortunes
of princes。 It was thus； as we are told by Machiavel； that the
agents of Lorenzo of Medicis； not a prince of mean abilities；
carried on his trade。 The republic of Florence was several times
obliged to pay the debt into which their extravagance had
involved him。 He found it convenient； accordingly； to give up the
business of merchant； the business to which