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instead of being coined into five shillings and twopence； been
coined either into pieces which bore so low a denomination as two
shillings and sevenpence； or into pieces which bore so high a one
as ten shillings and fourpence； it would in the one case have
hurt the revenue of the proprietor； in the other that of the
sovereign。
In circumstances； therefore； somewhat different from those
which have actually taken place； this constancy of valuation
might have been a very great inconveniency； either to the
contributors； or to the commonwealth。 In the course of ages such
circumstances； however； must； at some time or other； happen。 But
though empires； like all the other works of men； have all
hitherto proved mortal； yet every empire aims at immortality。
Every constitution； therefore； which it is meant should be as
permanent as the empire itself； ought to be convenient； not in
certain circumstances only； but in all circumstances； or ought to
be suited； not to those circumstances which are transitory；
occasional； or accidental； but to those which are necessary and
therefore always the same。
A tax upon the rent of land which varies with every
variation of the rent； or which rises and falls according to the
improvement or neglect of cultivation； is recommended by that
sect of men of letters in France who call themselves The
Economists as the most equitable of all taxes。 All taxes； they
pretend； fall ultimately upon the rent of land； and ought
therefore to be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally
pay them。 That all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible
upon the fund which must finally pay them is certainly true。 But
without entering into the disagreeable discussion of the
metaphysical arguments by which they support their very ingenious
theory； it will sufficiently appear； from the following review；
what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land；
and what are those which fall finally upon some other fund。
In the Venetian territory all the arable lands which are
given in lease to farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent。 The
leases are recorded in a public register which is kept by the
officers of revenue in each province or district。 When the
proprietor cultivates his own lands； they are valued according to
an equitable estimation； and he is allowed a deduction of
one…fifth of the tax； so that for such lands he pays only eight
instead of ten per cent of the supposed rent。
A land…tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the
land…tax of England。 It might not； perhaps； be altogether so
certain； and the assessment of the tax might frequently occasion
a good deal more trouble to the landlord。 It might； too； be a
good deal more expensive in the levying。
Such a system of administration； however； might perhaps be
contrived as would； in a great measure； both prevent this
uncertainty and moderate this expense。
The landlord and tenant； for example； might jointly be
obliged to record their lease in a public register。 Proper
penalties might be enacted against concealing or misrepresenting
any of the conditions； and if part of those penalties were to be
paid to either of the two parties who informed against and
convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation； it
would effectually deter them from combining together in order to
defraud the public revenue。 All the conditions of the lease might
be sufficiently known from such a record。
Some landlords； instead of raising the rent； take a fine for
the renewal of the lease。 This practice is in most cases the
expedient of a spendthrift； who for a sum of ready money sells a
future revenue of much greater value。 It is in most cases；
therefore； hurtful to the landlords。 It is frequently hurtful to
the tenant； and it is always hurtful to the community。 It
frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital；
and thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land；
that he finds it more difficult to pay a small rent than it would
otherwise have been to pay a great one。 Whatever diminishes his
ability to cultivate； necessarily keeps down； below what it would
otherwise have been； the most important part of the revenue of
the community。 By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal
heavier than upon the ordinary rent； this hurtful practice might
be discouraged； to the no small advantage of all the different
parties concerned； of the landlord； of the tenant； of the
sovereign； and of the whole community。
Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of
cultivation and a certain succession of crops during the whole
continuance of the lease。 This condition； which is generally the
effect of the landlord's conceit of his own superior knowledge （a
conceit in most cases very ill founded）； ought always to be
considered as an additional rent； as a rent in service instead of
a rent in money。 In order to discourage the practice； which is
generally a foolish one； this species of rent might be valued
rather high； and consequently taxed somewhat higher than common
money rents。
Some landlords； instead of a rent in money； require a rent
in kind； in corn； cattle； poultry； wine； oil； etc。； others；
again； require a rent in service。 Such rents are always more
hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord。 They
either take more or keep more out of the pocket of the former
than they put into that of the latter。 In every country where
they take place the tenants are poor and beggarly； pretty much
according to the degree in which they take place。 By valuing； in
the same manner； such rents rather high； and consequently taxing
them somewhat higher than common money rents； a practice which is
hurtful to the whole community might perhaps be sufficiently
discouraged。
When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own
lands； the rent might be valued according to an equitable
arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood；
and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him； in
the same manner as in the Venetian territory； provided the rent
of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum。 It
is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to
cultivate a part of his own land。 His capital is generally
greater than that of the tenant； and with less skill he can
frequently raise a greater produce。 The landlord can afford to
try experiments； and is generally disposed to do so。 His
unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to
himself。 His successful ones contribute to the improvement and
better cultivation of the whole country。 It might be of
importance； however； that the abatement of the tax should
encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only。 If the
landlords should； the greater part of them； be tempted to farm
the whole of their own lands； the country （instead of sober and
industrious tenants； who are bound by their own interest to
cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them）
would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs； whose abusive
management would soon degrade the cultivation and reduce the
annual produce of the land； to the diminution； not only of the
revenue of their masters； but of the most important part of that
of the whole society。
Such a system of administration might； perhaps； free a tax
of this kind from any degree of uncertainty which could occasion
either oppression or inconveniency of the contributor； and might
at the same time serve to introduce into the common management of
land such a plan or policy as might contribute a good deal to the
general improvement and good cultivation of the country。
The expense of levying a land…tax which varied with every
variation of the rent would no doubt be somewhat greater than
that of levying one which was already rated according to a fixed
valuation。 Some additional expense would necessarily be incurred
both by the different register offices which it would be proper
to establish in the different districts of the country； and by
the different valuations which might occasionally be made of the
lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself。 The expense
of all this； however； might be very moderate； and much below what
is incurred in the levying of many other taxes which afford a
very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be
drawn from a tax of this kind。
The discouragement which a variable land…tax of this kind
might give to the improvement of land seems to be the most
important objection which can be made to it。 The landlord would
certainly be less disposed to improve when the sovereign； who
contributed nothing to the expense； was to share in the profit of
the improvement。 Even this objection might perhaps be obviated by
allowing the landlord； before he began his improvement； to
ascertain； in conjunction with the