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whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families。
Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which
principally set one man above another。 They are the two great
sources of personal distinction； and are therefore the principal
causes which naturally establish authority and subordination
among men。 Among nations of shepherds both those causes operate
with their full force。 The great shepherd or herdsman； respected
on account of his great wealth； and of the great number of those
who depend upon him for subsistence； and revered on account of
the nobleness of his birth； and of the immemorial antiquity of
his illustrious family； has a natural authority over all the
inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde or clan。 He can
command the united force of a greater number of people than any
of them。 His military power is greater than that of any of them。
In time of war they are all of them naturally disposed to muster
themselves under his banner； rather than under that of any other
person； and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him
some sort of executive power。 By commanding； too； the united
force of a greater number of people than any of them； he is best
able to compel any one of them who may have injured another to
compensate the wrong。 He is the person； therefore； to whom all
those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up for
protection。 It is to him that they naturally complain of the
injuries which they imagine have been done to them； and his
interposition in such cases is more easily submitted to； even by
the person complained of； than that of any other person would be。
His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him some sort of
judicial authority。
It is in the age of shepherds； in the second period of
society； that the inequality of fortune first begins to take
place； and introduces among men a degree of authority and
subordination which could not possibly exist before。 It thereby
introduces some degree of that civil government which is
indispensably necessary for its own preservation： and it seems to
do this naturally； and even independent of the consideration of
that necessity。 The consideration of that necessity comes no
doubt afterwards to contribute very much to maintain and secure
that authority and subordination。 The rich； in particular； are
necessarily interested to support that order of things which can
alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages。 Men
of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in
the possession of their property； in order that men of superior
wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of theirs。
All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel that the security of
their own herds and flocks depends upon the security of those of
the great shepherd or herdsman； that the maintenance of their
lesser authority depends upon that of his greater authority； and
that upon their subordination to him depends his power of keeping
their inferiors in subordination to them。 They constitute a sort
of little nobility； who feel themselves interested to defend the
property and to support the authority of their own little
sovereign in order that he may be able to defend their property
and to support their authority。 Civil government； so far as it is
instituted for the security of property； is in reality instituted
for the defence of the rich against the poor； or of those who
have some property against those who have none at all。
The judicial authority of such a sovereign； however； far
from being a cause of expense； was for a long time a source of
revenue to him。 The persons who applied to him for justice were
always willing to pay for it； and a present never failed to
accompany a petition。 After the authority of the sovereign； too；
was thoroughly established； the person found guilty； over and
above the satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party；
was likewise forced to pay an amercement to the sovereign。 He had
given trouble； he had disturbed； he had broke the peace of his
lord the king； and for those offences an amercement was thought
due。 In the Tartar governments of Asia； in the governments of
Europe which were founded by the German and Scythian nations who
overturned the Roman empire； the administration of justice was a
considerable source of revenue； both to the sovereign and to all
the lesser chiefs or lords who exercised under him any particular
jurisdiction； either over some particular tribe or clan； or over
some particular territory or district。 Originally both the
sovereign and the inferior chiefs used to exercise this
jurisdiction in their own persons。 Afterwards they universally
found it convenient to delegate it to some substitute； bailiff；
or judge。 This substitute； however； was still obliged to account
to his principal or constituent for the profits of the
jurisdiction。 Whoever reads the instructions which were given to
the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II will see
clearly that those judges were a sort of itinerant factors； sent
round the country for the purpose of levying certain branches of
the king's revenue。 In those days the administration of justice
not only afforded a certain revenue to the sovereign； but to
procure this revenue seems to have been one of the principal
advantages which he proposed to obtain by the administration of
justice。
This scheme of making the administration of justice
subservient to the purposes of revenue could scarce fail to be
productive of several very gross abuses。 The person who applied
for justice with a large present in his hand was likely to get
something more than justice； while he who applied for it with a
small one was likely to get something less。 Justice； too； might
frequently be delayed in order that this present might be
repeated。 The amercement； besides； of the person complained of；
might frequently suggest a very strong reason for finding him in
the wrong； even when he had not really been so。 That such abuses
were far from being uncommon the ancient history of every country
in Europe bears witness。
When the sovereign or chief exercised his judicial authority
in his own person； how much soever he might abuse it； it must
have been scarce possible to get any redress； because there could
seldom be anybody powerful enough to call him to account。 When he
exercised it by a bailiff； indeed； redress might sometimes be
had。 If it was for his own benefit only that the bailiff had been
guilty of any act of injustice； the sovereign himself might not
always be unwilling to punish him； or to oblige him to repair the
wrong。 But if it was for the benefit of his sovereign； if it was
in order to make court to the person who appointed him and who
might prefer him； that he had committed any act of oppression；
redress would upon most occasions be as impossible as if the
sovereign had committed it himself。 In all barbarous governments；
accordingly； in all those ancient governments of Europe in
particular which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire；
the administration of justice appears for a long time to have
been extremely corrupt； far from being quite equal and impartial
even under the best monarchs； and altogether profligate under the
worst。
Among nations of shepherds； where the sovereign or chief is
only the greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan； he
is maintained in the same manner as any of his vassals or
subjects； by the increase of his own herds or flocks。 Among those
nations of husbandmen who are but just come out of the shepherd
state； and who are not much advanced beyond that state； such as
the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan
war； and our German and Scythian ancestors when they first
settled upon the ruins of the western empire； the sovereign or
chief is； in the same manner； only the greatest landlord of the
country； and is maintained； in the same manner as any other
landlord； by a revenue derived from his own private estate； or
from what； in modern Europe； was called the demesne of the crown。
His subjects； upon ordinary occasions； contributed nothing to his
support； except when； in order to protect them from the
oppression of some of their fellow…subjects； they stand in need
of his authority。 The presents which they make him upon such
occasions constitute the whole ordinary revenue； the whole of the
emoluments which； except perhaps upon some very extraordinary
emergencies； he derives from his dominion over them。 When
Agamemnon； in Homer； offers to Achilles for his friendship the
sovereignty of seven Greek cities； the sole advantage which he
mentions as likely to be derived from it was that the people
would honour him with presents。 As long as such presents； as long
as the emoluments of justice； or what may be called the fees of
court； constituted in this manner the w