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judges indeed might； in this case； be under the temptation of
multiplying unnecessarily the proceedings upon every cause； in
order to increase； as much as possible； the produce of such a
stamp…duty。 It has been the custom in modern Europe to regulate；
upon most occasions； the payment of the attorneys and clerks of
court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to
write； the court； however； requiring that each page should
contain so many lines； and each line so many words。 In order to
increase their payment； the attorneys and clerks have contrived
to multiply words beyond all necessity； to the corruption of the
law language of； I believe； every court of justice in Europe。 A
like temptation might perhaps occasion a like corruption in the
form of law proceedings。
But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as
to defray its own expense； or whether the judges be maintained by
fixed salaries paid to them from some other fund； it does not
seem necessary that the person or persons entrusted with the
executive power should be charged with the management of that
fund； or with the payment of those salaries。 That fund might
arise from the rent of landed estates； the management of each
estate being entrusted to the particular court which was to be
maintained by it。 That fund might arise even from the interest of
a sum of money； the lending out of which might； in the same
manner； be entrusted to the court which was to be maintained by
it。 A part； though indeed but a small part； of the salary of the
judges of the Court of Session in Scotland arises from the
interest of a sum of money。 The necessary instability of such a
fund seems； however； to render it an improper one for the
maintenance of an institution which ought to last for ever。
The separation of the judicial from the executive power
seems originally to have arisen from the increasing business of
the society； in consequence of its increasing improvement。 The
administration of justice became so laborious and so complicated
a duty as to require the undivided attention of the persons to
whom it was entrusted。 The person entrusted with the executive
power not having leisure to attend to the decision of private
causes himself； a deputy was appointed to decide them in his
stead。 In the progress of the Roman greatness； the consul was too
much occupied with the political affairs of the state to attend
to the administration of justice。 A praetor； therefore； was
appointed to administer it in his stead。 In the progress of the
European monarchies which were founded upon the ruins of the
Roman empire； the sovereigns and the great lords came universally
to consider the administration of justice as an office both too
laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own
persons。 They universally； therefore； discharged themselves of it
by appointing a deputy； bailiff； or judge。
When the judicial is united to the executive power； it is
scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed
to what is vulgarly called polities。 The persons entrusted with
the great interests of the state may； even without any corrupt
views； sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to those
interests the rights of a private man。 But upon the impartial
administration of justice depends the liberty of every
individual； the sense which he has of his own security。 In order
to make every individual feel himself perfectly secure in the
possession of every right which belongs to him； it is not only
necessary that the judicial should be separated from the
executive power； but that it should be rendered as much as
possible independent of that power。 The judge should not be
liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of
that power。 The regular the good…will or even upon the good
economy payment of his salary should not depend upon of that
power。
PART 3
Of the Expense of Public Works and Public Institutions
THE third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is
that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and
those public works； which； though they may be in the highest
degree advantageous to a great society； are； however； of such a
nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any
individual or small number of individuals； and which it therefore
cannot be expected that any individual or small number of
individuals should erect or maintain。 The performance of this
duty requires； too； very different degrees of expense in the
different periods of society。
After the public institutions and public works necessary for
the defence of the society； and for the administration of
justice； both of which have already been mentioned； the other
works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for
facilitating the commerce of the society； and those for promoting
the instruction of the people。 The institutions for instruction
are of two kinds： those for the education of youth； and those for
the instruction of people of all ages。 The consideration of the
manner in which the expense of those different sorts of public；
works and institutions may be most properly defrayed will divide
this third part of the present chapter into three different
articles。
ARTICLE 1
Of the Public Works and Institutions for facilitating the
Commerce of the Society
And； first； of those which are necessary for facilitating
Commerce in general。
That the erection and maintenance of the public works which
facilitate the commerce of any country； such as good roads；
bridges； navigable canals； harbours； etc。； must require very
different degrees of expense in the different periods of society
is evident without any proof。 The expense of making and
maintaining the public roads of any country must evidently
increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that
country； or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it
becomes necessary to fetch and carry upon those roads。 The
strength of a bridge must be suited to the number and weight of
the carriages which are likely to pass over it。 The depth and the
supply of water for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the
number and tonnage of the lighters which are likely to carry
goods upon it； the extent of a harbour to the number of the
shipping which are likely to take shelter in it。
It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public
works should be defrayed from that public revenue； as it is
commonly called； of which the collection and application is in
most countries assigned to the executive power。 The greater part
of such public works may easily be so managed as to afford a
particular revenue sufficient for defraying their own expense；
without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the
society。
A highway； a bridge； a navigable canal； for example； may in
most cases be both made and maintained by a small toll upon the
carriages which make use of them： a harbour； by a moderate
port…duty upon the tonnage of the shipping which load or unload
in it。 The coinage； another institution for facilitating
commerce； in many countries； not only defrays its own expense；
but affords a small revenue or seignorage to the sovereign。 The
post…office； another institution for the same purpose； over and
above defraying its own expense； affords in almost all countries
a very considerable revenue to the sovereign。
When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge；
and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal； pay toll in
proportion to their weight or their tonnage； they pay for the
maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the
wear and tear which they occasion of them。 It seems scarce
possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such
works。 This tax or toll too； though it is advanced by the
carrier； is finally paid by the consumer； to whom it must always
be charged in the price of the goods。 As the expense of carriage；
however； is very much reduced by means of such public works； the
goods； notwithstanding the toll come cheaper to the consumer than
the； could otherwise have done； their price not being so much
raised by the toll as it is lowered by the cheapness of the
carriage。 The person who finally pays this tax； therefore； gains
by the application more than he loses by the payment of it。 His
payment is exactly in proportion to his gain。 It is in reality no
more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up in
order to get the rest。 It seems impossible to imagine a more
equitable method of raising a tax。
When the toll upon carriages of luxury upon coaches；
post…chaises； etc。； is made somewhat higher in proportion to
their weight than upon carriages of necessary use； such as carts；