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the rule that God is our highest good … in other words； that the knowledge
and love of God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be
directed。 （36） The worldling cannot understand these things； they appear
foolishness to him。 because he has too meager a knowledge of God； and also
because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or
eat； or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights； for
it consists solely in thought and the pure reason。 （37） They； on the other
hand； who know that they possess no greater gift than intellect and sound
reason； will doubtless accept what I have said without question。
（38） We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists； and
what are human laws； namely； all those which have a different aim
unless they have been ratified by revelation； for in this respect also
things are referred to God （as we have shown above） and in this sense the
law of Moses； although it was not universal； but entirely adapted to the
disposition and particular preservation of a single people； may yet be
called a law of God or Divine law； inasmuch as we believe that it was
ratified by prophetic insight。 （39） If we consider the nature of natural
Divine law as we have just explained it； we shall see：
（40） I。… That it is universal or common to all men； for we have deduced it from universal human
nature。
（41） II。 That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative
whatsoever； for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely
by the consideration of human nature； it is plain that we can conceive it as
existing as well in Adam as in any other man； as well in a man living among
his fellows； as in a man who lives by himself。
（42） The truth of a historical narrative； however assured； cannot give us
the knowledge nor consequently the love of God； for love of God springs from
knowledge of Him； and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas；
in themselves certain and known； so that the truth of a historical narrative
is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest
good。
（43） Still； though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and
love of God； I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to
life in the world； for the more we have observed and known of men's customs
and circumstances； which are best revealed by their actions； the more warily
we shall be able to order our lives among them； and so far as reason
dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions。
（44） III。 We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the
performance of ceremonies … that is； actions in themselves indifferent；
which are called good from the fact of their institution； or actions
symbolizing something profitable for salvation； or （if one prefers this
definition） actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding。 （45）
The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself
unable to supply； but only such as it can very clearly show to be good； or a
means to our blessedness。 （46） Such things as are good simply because they
have been commanded or instituted； or as being symbols of something good；
are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the
offsprings as it were； or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect。 （47） There
is no need for me to go into this now in more detail。
（48） IV。 Lastly； we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law
itself； namely； to know God and to love Him of our free choice； and with an
undivided and fruitful spirit； while its penalty is the absence of these
things； and being in bondage to the flesh … that is； having an inconstant
and wavering spirit。
（49） These points being noted； I must now inquire：
（50） I。 Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of
God as a law…giver or potentate ordaining laws for men？
（51） II。 What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this
natural light of reason and natural law？
（52） III。 With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted？
（53） IV。 Lastly； what is the good gained by knowing the
sacred histories and believing them？
（54） Of the first two I will treat in this chapter； of the remaining two in the following one。
（55） Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of
God's will； which is only distinguished from His understanding in relation
to our intellect … that is； the will and the understanding of God are in
reality one and the same； and are only distinguished in relation to
our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding。 （56） For
instance； if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle
is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal verity； we say
that God possesses the idea of a triangle； or that He understands the
nature of a triangle； but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature
of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine nature； solely by the
necessity of the Divine nature； and not by the necessity of the nature and
essence of a triangle … in fact； that the necessity of a triangle's essence
and nature； in so far as they are conceived of as eternal verities； depends
solely on the necessity of the Divine nature and intellect； we then style
God's will or decree； that which before we styled His intellect。 （57）
Wherefore we make one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say
that He has from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right angles； as when we say that He has understood it。
（58） Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve
necessity or truth； so that； for example； if God said to Adam that He did
not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil； it would have
involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it； and
would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten； for the
Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and truth。 （59） But
since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this command to
Adam； and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree； we must perforce say
that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should
eat of the tree； but did not disclose that such evil would of necessity
come to pass。 （60） Thus it was that Adam took the revelation to be not an
eternal and necessary truth； but a law … that is； an ordinance followed by
gain or loss； not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed；
but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate； so that the
revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam； and solely through
his lack of knowledge a law； and God was； as it were； a lawgiver and
potentate。 （61） From the same cause； namely； from lack of knowledge； the
Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law； for since they knew not the
existence of God as an eternal truth； they must have taken as a law that
which was revealed to them in the Decalogue； namely； that God exists； and
that God only should be worshipped。 （62） But if God had spoken to them
without the intervention of any bodily means； immediately they would have
perceived it not as a law； but as an eternal truth。
（63） What we have said about the Israelites and Adam； applies also to all
the prophets who wrote laws in God's name … they did not adequately conceive
God's decrees as eternal truths。 （64） For instance； we must say of Moses
that from revelation； from the basis of what was revealed to him； he
perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be united in
a particular territory； and could form a body politic or state； and further
that he perceived the method by which that nation could best be constrained
to obedience； but he did not perceive； nor was it revealed to him； that this
method was absolutely the best； nor that the obedience of the people in a
certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he had in view。
（65） Wherefore he perceived these things not as eternal truths； but as
precepts and ordinances； and he ordained them as laws of God； and thus it
came to be that he conceived God as a ruler； a legislator； a king； as
merciful； just； &c。； whereas such qualities are simply attributes of human
nature； and utterly alien from the nature of the Deity。 （66）Thus much we may
affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in the name of God； but we must not
affirm it of Christ； for Christ； although He too seems to have written laws
in the name of God； must be taken to have had a clear and adequate
perception； for Christ was not so muc