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only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
should become a universal law。
Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one
imperative as from their principle； then； although it should remain
undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion； yet at
least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what
this notion means。
Since the universality of the law according to which effects are
produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most
general sense （as to form）； that is the existence of things so far
as it is determined by general laws； the imperative of duty may be
expressed thus： Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by
thy will a universal law of nature。
We will now enumerate a few duties； adopting the usual division of
them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others； and into
perfect and imperfect duties。*
*It must be noted here that I reserve the division of duties for a
future metaphysic of morals； so that I give it here only as an
arbitrary one （in order to arrange my examples）。 For the rest； I
understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of
inclination and then I have not merely external but also internal
perfect duties。 This is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the
schools； but I do not intend to justify there； as it is all one for my
purpose whether it is admitted or not。
1。 A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied
of life； but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can
ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to
take his own life。 Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action
could become a universal law of nature。 His maxim is： 〃From
self…love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer
duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction。〃 It is
asked then simply whether this principle founded on self…love can
become a universal law of nature。 Now we see at once that a system
of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of
the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the
improvement of life would contradict itself and； therefore； could
not exist as a system of nature； hence that maxim cannot possibly
exist as a universal law of nature and； consequently； would be
wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty。
2。 Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money。 He
knows that he will not be able to repay it； but sees also that nothing
will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a
definite time。 He desires to make this promise； but he has still so
much conscience as to ask himself： 〃Is it not unlawful and
inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way？〃
Suppose however that he resolves to do so： then the maxim of his
action would be expressed thus： 〃When I think myself in want of money；
I will borrow money and promise to repay it； although I know that I
never can do so。〃 Now this principle of self…love or of one's own
advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare；
but the question now is； 〃Is it right？〃 I change then the suggestion
of self…love into a universal law； and state the question thus： 〃How
would it be if my maxim were a universal law？〃 Then I see at once that
it could never hold as a universal law of nature； but would
necessarily contradict itself。 For supposing it to be a universal
law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
able to promise whatever he pleases； with the purpose of not keeping
his promise； the promise itself would become impossible； as well as
the end that one might have in view in it； since no one would consider
that anything was promised to him； but would ridicule all such
statements as vain pretences。
3。 A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some
culture might make him a useful man in many respects。 But he finds
himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in
pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his
happy natural capacities。 He asks； however； whether his maxim of
neglect of his natural gifts； besides agreeing with his inclination to
indulgence； agrees also with what is called duty。 He sees then that
a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law
although men （like the South Sea islanders） should let their talents
rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness；
amusement； and propagation of their species… in a word； to
enjoyment； but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal
law of nature； or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct。
For； as a rational being； he necessarily wills that his faculties be
developed； since they serve him and have been given him； for all sorts
of possible purposes。
4。 A fourth； who is in prosperity； while he sees that others have to
contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them； thinks：
〃What concern is it of mine？ Let everyone be as happy as Heaven
pleases； or as be can make himself； I will take nothing from him nor
even envy him； only I do not wish to contribute anything to his
welfare or to his assistance in distress！〃 Now no doubt if such a mode
of thinking were a universal law； the human race might very well
subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone
talks of sympathy and good…will； or even takes care occasionally to
put it into practice； but； on the other side； also cheats when he can；
betrays the rights of men； or otherwise violates them。 But although it
is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance
with that maxim； it is impossible to will that such a principle should
have the universal validity of a law of nature。 For a will which
resolved this would contradict itself； inasmuch as many cases might
occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others；
and in which； by such a law of nature； sprung from his own will； he
would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires。
These are a few of the many actual duties； or at least what we
regard as such； which obviously fall into two classes on the one
principle that we have laid down。 We must be able to will that a maxim
of our action should be a universal law。 This is the canon of the
moral appreciation of the action generally。 Some actions are of such a
character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even
conceived as a universal law of nature； far from it being possible
that we should will that it should be so。 In others this intrinsic
impossibility is not found； but still it is impossible to will that
their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature；
since such a will would contradict itself It is easily seen that the
former violate strict or rigorous （inflexible） duty； the latter only
laxer （meritorious） duty。 Thus it has been completely shown how all
duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation （not the
object of the action） on the same principle。
If now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of
duty； we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim
should be a universal law； for that is impossible for us； on the
contrary； we will that the opposite should remain a universal law；
only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or
（just for this time only） in favour of our inclination。 Consequently
if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view；
namely； that of reason； we should find a contradiction in our own
will； namely； that a certain principle should be objectively necessary
as a universal law； and yet subjectively should not be universal；
but admit of exceptions。 As however we at one moment regard our action
from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason； and
then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will
affected by inclination； there is not really any contradiction； but an
antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason； whereby the
universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality； so
that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half
way。 Now； although this cannot be justified in our own impartial
judgement； yet it proves that we do really recognise the validity of
the categorical imperative and （with all respect for it） only allow
ourselves a few exceptions； which we think unimportant and forced from
us。
We have thus established at least this much； that if duty is a
conception which is to have any import and real legislative
authority for our actions； it can only be expressed in categorical and
not at all in hypothetical imperatives。 We have also； which is of
great importance； exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical
application the content of the categorical imperative； which must