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application the content of the categorical imperative； which must
contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all。
We have not yet； however； advanced so far as to prove a priori that
there actually is such an imperative； that there is a practical law
which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse； and
that the following of this law is duty。
With the view of attaining to this； it is of extreme importance to
remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the
reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human
nature。 For duty is to be a practical； unconditional necessity of
action； it must therefore hold for all rational beings （to whom an
imperative can apply at all）； and for this reason only be also a law
for all human wills。 On the contrary； whatever is deduced from the
particular natural characteristics of humanity； from certain
feelings and propensions； nay； even； if possible； from any
particular tendency proper to human reason； and which need not
necessarily hold for the will of every rational being； this may indeed
supply us with a maxim； but not with a law； with a subjective
principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act；
but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined
to act； even though all our propensions； inclinations； and natural
dispositions were opposed to it。 In fact； the sublimity and
intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident；
the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose
it； without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the
obligation of the law or to diminish its validity。
Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position； since it
has to be firmly fixed； notwithstanding that it has nothing to support
it in heaven or earth。 Here it must show its purity as absolute
director of its own laws； not the herald of those which are
whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary
nature。 Although these may be better than nothing； yet they can
never afford principles dictated by reason； which must have their
source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority；
expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect
for it； nothing from inclination； or else condemning the man to
self…contempt and inward abhorrence。
Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an
aid to the principle of morality； but is even highly prejudicial to
the purity of morals； for the proper and inestimable worth of an
absolutely good will consists just in this； that the principle of
action is free from all influence of contingent grounds； which alone
experience can furnish。 We cannot too much or too often repeat our
warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks
for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws； for human reason
in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow； and in a dream of
sweet illusions （in which； instead of Juno； it embraces a cloud） it
substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various
derivation； which looks like anything one chooses to see in it； only
not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form。*
*To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to
contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of sensible things
and of every spurious ornament of reward or self…love。 How much she
then eclipses everything else that appears charming to the affections；
every one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his
reason； if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction。
The question then is this： 〃Is it a necessary law for all rational
beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of
which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal
laws？〃 If it is so； then it must be connected （altogether a priori）
with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally。
But in order to discover this connexion we must； however
reluctantly； take a step into metaphysic； although into a domain of it
which is distinct from speculative philosophy； namely； the
metaphysic of morals。 In a practical philosophy； where it is not the
reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain； but the laws of
what ought to happen； even although it never does； i。e。； objective
practical laws； there it is not necessary to inquire into the
reasons why anything pleases or displeases； how the pleasure of mere
sensation differs from taste； and whether the latter is distinct
from a general satisfaction of reason； on what the feeling of pleasure
or pain rests； and how from it desires and inclinations arise； and
from these again maxims by the co…operation of reason： for all this
belongs to an empirical psychology； which would constitute the
second part of physics； if we regard physics as the philosophy of
nature； so far as it is based on empirical laws。 But here we are
concerned with objective practical laws and； consequently； with the
relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason
alone； in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is
necessarily excluded； since if reason of itself alone determines the
conduct （and it is the possibility of this that we are now
investigating）； it must necessarily do so a priori。
The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to
action in accordance with the conception of certain laws。 And such a
faculty can be found only in rational beings。 Now that which serves
the will as the objective ground of its self…determination is the end；
and； if this is assigned by reason alone； it must hold for all
rational beings。 On the other hand； that which merely contains the
ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end；
this is called the means。 The subjective ground of the desire is the
spring； the objective ground of the volition is the motive； hence
the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs； and
objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being。
Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective
ends； they are material when they assume these； and therefore
particular springs of action。 The ends which a rational being proposes
to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions （material ends） are
all only relative； for it is only their relation to the particular
desires of the subject that gives them their worth； which therefore
cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational
beings and for every volition； that is to say practical laws。 Hence
all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical
imperatives。
Supposing； however； that there were something whose existence has in
itself an absolute worth； something which； being an end in itself；
could be a source of definite laws； then in this and this alone
would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative； i。e。； a
practical law。
Now I say： man and generally any rational being exists as an end
in himself； not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or
that will； but in all his actions； whether they concern himself or
other rational beings； must be always regarded at the same time as
an end。 All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth；
for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist；
then their object would be without value。 But the inclinations；
themselves being sources of want； are so far from having an absolute
worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be
the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from
them。 Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our
action is always conditional。 Beings whose existence depends not on
our will but on nature's； have nevertheless； if they are irrational
beings； only a relative value as means； and are therefore called
things； rational beings； on the contrary； are called persons；
because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves；
that is as something which must not be used merely as means； and so
far therefore restricts freedom of action （and is an object of
respect）。 These； therefore； are not merely subjective ends whose
existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action； but objective
ends； that is； things whose existence is an end in itself； an end
moreover for which no other can be substituted； which they should
subserve merely as means； for otherwise nothing whatever would possess
absolute worth； but if all worth were conditioned and therefore
contingent； then there would be no supreme practical principle of
reason whatever。
If then there is a supreme practical principle or； in respect of the
human will； a categorical imperative； it must be one which； being
drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for
everyone be