按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
purpose here。
Looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the
principle of morality； we need not wonder why they all failed。 It
was seen that man was bound to laws by duty； but it was not observed
that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving；
though at the same time they are universal； and that he is only
bound to act in conformity with his own will； a will； however； which
is designed by nature to give universal laws。 For when one has
conceived man only as subject to a law （no matter what）； then this law
required some interest； either by way of attraction or constraint；
since it did not originate as a law from his own will； but this will
was according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain
manner。 Now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in
finding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost。 For men
never elicited duty； but only a necessity of acting from a certain
interest。 Whether this interest was private or otherwise； in any
case the imperative must be conditional and could not by any means
be capable of being a moral command。 I will therefore call this the
principle of autonomy of the will； in contrast with every other
which I accordingly reckon as heteronomy。
The conception of the will of every rational being as one which must
consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal
laws； so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view…
this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very
fruitful； namely that of a kingdom of ends。
By a kingdom I understand the union of different rational beings
in a system by common laws。 Now since it is by laws that ends are
determined as regards their universal validity； hence； if we
abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise
from all the content of their private ends； we shall be able to
conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole （including both
rational beings as ends in themselves； and also the special ends which
each may propose to himself）； that is to say； we can conceive a
kingdom of ends； which on the preceding principles is possible。
For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must
treat itself and all others never merely as means； but in every case
at the same time as ends in themselves。 Hence results a systematic
union of rational being by common objective laws； i。e。； a kingdom
which may be called a kingdom of ends； since what these laws have in
view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and
means。 It is certainly only an ideal。
A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when；
although giving universal laws in it； he is also himself subject to
these laws。 He belongs to it as sovereign when； while giving laws；
he is not subject to the will of any other。
A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as
member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible
by the freedom of will。 He cannot； however； maintain the latter
position merely by the maxims of his will； but only in case he is a
completely independent being without wants and with unrestricted power
adequate to his will。
Morality consists then in the reference of all action to the
legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible。 This
legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being and of
emanating from his will； so that the principle of this will is never
to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a
universal law and； accordingly； always so to act that the will could
at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws。
If now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature
coincident with this objective principle； then the necessity of acting
on it is called practical necessitation； i。e。； duty。 Duty does not
apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends； but it does to every
member of it and to all in the same degree。
The practical necessity of acting on this principle； i。e。； duty；
does not rest at all on feelings； impulses； or inclinations； but
solely on the relation of rational beings to one another； a relation
in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as
legislative； since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in
itself。 Reason then refers every maxim of the will； regarding it as
legislating universally； to every other will and also to every
action towards oneself； and this not on account of any other practical
motive or any future advantage； but from the idea of the dignity of
a rational being； obeying no law but that which he himself also gives。
In the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity。
Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is
equivalent； whatever； on the other hand； is above all value； and
therefore admits of no equivalent； has a dignity。
Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of
mankind has a market value； whatever； without presupposing a want；
corresponds to a certain taste； that is to a satisfaction in the
mere purposeless play of our faculties； has a fancy value； but that
which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an
end in itself； this has not merely a relative worth； i。e。； value；
but an intrinsic worth； that is； dignity。
Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can
be an end in himself； since by this alone is it possible that he
should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends。 Thus
morality； and humanity as capable of it； is that which alone has
dignity。 Skill and diligence in labour have a market value； wit；
lively imagination； and humour； have fancy value； on the other hand；
fidelity to promises； benevolence from principle （not from
instinct）； have an intrinsic worth。 Neither nature nor art contains
anything which in default of these it could put in their place； for
their worth consists not in the effects which spring from them； not in
the use and advantage which they secure； but in the disposition of
mind； that is； the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest
themselves in such actions； even though they should not have the
desired effect。 These actions also need no recommendation from any
subjective taste or sentiment； that they may be looked on with
immediate favour and satisfaction： they need no immediate propension
or feeling for them； they exhibit the will that performs them as an
object of an immediate respect； and nothing but reason is required
to impose them on the will； not to flatter it into them； which； in the
case of duties； would be a contradiction。 This estimation therefore
shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity； and places it
infinitely above all value； with which it cannot for a moment be
brought into comparison or competition without as it were violating
its sanctity。
What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good
disposition； in making such lofty claims？ It is nothing less than
the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the
giving of universal laws； by which it qualifies him to be a member
of a possible kingdom of ends； a privilege to which he was already
destined by his own nature as being an end in himself and； on that
account； legislating in the kingdom of ends； free as regards all
laws of physical nature； and obeying those only which he himself
gives； and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal
law； to which at the same time he submits himself。 For nothing has any
worth except what the law assigns it。 Now the legislation itself which
assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess
dignity； that is an unconditional incomparable worth； and the word
respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a
rational being must have for it。 Autonomy then is the basis of the
dignity of human and of every rational nature。
The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have
been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law；
and each of itself involves the other two。 There is； however； a
difference in them； but it is rather subjectively than objectively
practical； intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to
intuition （by means of a certain analogy） and thereby nearer to
feeling。 All maxims； in fact； have：
1。 A form； consisting in universality； and in this view the
formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus； that the maxims
must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of
nature。
2。 A matter； namely； an end； and here the formula says that the
rational being； as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end
in itself； must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all
merely relative and arbitrary ends。
3。 A complete characterization