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merely relative and arbitrary ends。
3。 A complete characterization of all maxims by means of that
formula； namely； that all maxims ought by their own legislation to
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of
nature。* There is a progress here in the order of the categories of
unity of the form of the will （its universality）； plurality of the
matter （the objects； i。e。； the ends）； and totality of the system of
these。 In forming our moral judgement of actions； it is better to
proceed always on the strict method and start from the general formula
of the categorical imperative： Act according to a maxim which can at
the same time make itself a universal law。 If； however； we wish to
gain an entrance for the moral law； it is very useful to bring one and
the same action under the three specified conceptions； and thereby
as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition。
*Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends； ethics regards a
possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature。 In the first case； the
kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea； adopted to explain what
actually is。 In the latter it is a practical idea； adopted to bring
about that which is not yet； but which can be realized by our conduct；
namely； if it conforms to this idea。
We can now end where we started at the beginning； namely； with the
conception of a will unconditionally good。 That will is absolutely
good which cannot be evil… in other words； whose maxim； if made a
universal law； could never contradict itself。 This principle； then； is
its supreme law： 〃Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same
time will to be a universal law〃； this is the sole condition under
which a will can never contradict itself； and such an imperative is
categorical。 Since the validity of the will as a universal law for
possible actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the
existence of things by general laws； which is the formal notion of
nature in general； the categorical imperative can also be expressed
thus： Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object
themselves as universal laws of nature。 Such then is the formula of an
absolutely good will。
Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this；
that it sets before itself an end。 This end would be the matter of
every good will。 But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely
good without being limited by any condition （of attaining this or that
end） we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected （since this
would make every will only relatively good）； it follows that in this
case the end must be conceived； not as an end to be effected； but as
an independently existing end。 Consequently it is conceived only
negatively； i。e。； as that which we must never act against and which；
therefore； must never be regarded merely as means； but must in every
volition be esteemed as an end likewise。 Now this end can be nothing
but the subject of all possible ends； since this is also the subject
of a possible absolutely good will； for such a will cannot without
contradiction be postponed to any other object。 The principle： 〃So act
in regard to every rational being （thyself and others）； that he may
always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself；〃 is accordingly
essentially identical with this other： 〃Act upon a maxim which； at the
same time； involves its own universal validity for every rational
being。〃 For that in using means for every end I should limit my
maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject；
this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of
all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends； i。e。； the
rational being himself； be never employed merely as means； but as
the supreme condition restricting the use of all means； that is in
every case as an end likewise。
It follows incontestably that； to whatever laws any rational being
may be subject； he being an end in himself must be able to regard
himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws；
since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal
legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself； also it
follows that this implies his dignity （prerogative） above all mere
physical beings； that he must always take his maxims from the point of
view which regards himself and； likewise； every other rational being
as law…giving beings （on which account they are called persons）。 In
this way a world of rational beings （mundus intelligibilis） is
possible as a kingdom of ends； and this by virtue of the legislation
proper to all persons as members。 Therefore every rational being
must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating
member in the universal kingdom of ends。 The formal principle of these
maxims is： 〃So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the
universal law （of all rational beings）。〃 A kingdom of ends is thus
only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature； the former
however only by maxims； that is self…imposed rules； the latter only by
the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from
without。 Nevertheless； although the system of nature is looked upon as
a machine； yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its
ends； it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature。 Now
such a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by means of maxims
conforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to
all rational beings； if they were universally followed。 But although a
rational being； even if he punctually follows this maxim himself；
cannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same； nor
expect that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall
be in harmony with him as a fitting member； so as to form a kingdom of
ends to which he himself contributes； that is to say； that it shall
favour his expectation of happiness； still that law： 〃Act according to
the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends
legislating in it universally；〃 remains in its full force； inasmuch as
it commands categorically。 And it is just in this that the paradox
lies； that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature； without any
other end or advantage to be attained thereby； in other words； respect
for a mere idea； should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the
will； and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on
all such springs of action that its sublimity consists； and it is this
that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in
the kingdom of ends： for otherwise he would have to be conceived
only as subject to the physical law of his wants。 And although we
should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be
united under one sovereign； so that the latter kingdom thereby
ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality； then it would no
doubt gain the accession of a strong spring； but by no means any
increase of its intrinsic worth。 For this sole absolute lawgiver must；
notwithstanding this； be always conceived as estimating the worth of
rational beings only by their disinterested behaviour； as prescribed
to themselves from that idea ＇the dignity of man＇ alone。 The essence
of things is not altered by their external relations； and that
which； abstracting from these； alone constitutes the absolute worth of
man； is also that by which he must be judged； whoever the judge may
be； and even by the Supreme Being。 Morality； then； is the relation
of actions to the relation of actions will； that is； to the autonomy
of potential universal legislation by its maxims。 An action that is
consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted； one that does
not agree therewith is forbidden。 A will whose maxims necessarily
coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will； good absolutely。
The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of
autonomy （moral necessitation） is obligation。 This； then； cannot be
applied to a holy being。 The objective necessity of actions from
obligation is called duty。
From what has just been said； it is easy to see how it happens that；
although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law； we
yet ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who
fulfils all his duties。 There is not； indeed； any sublimity in him； so
far as he is subject to the moral law； but inasmuch as in regard to
that very law he is likewise a legislator； and on that account alone
subject to it； he has sublimity。 We have also shown above that neither
fear nor inclination； but simply respect for the law； is the spring
which can give actions a moral worth。 Our own will； so far as we
suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are
potentially universal laws； this ideal will which is possible to us is
the proper object of respect； and the dignity of humanity consists
just in this capa