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cognitions are altogether a priori。 For the metaphysic of morals has
to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will； and
not the acts and conditions of human volition generally； which for the
most part are drawn from psychology。 It is true that moral laws and
duty are spoken of in the general moral philosophy （contrary indeed to
all fitness）。 But this is no objection； for in this respect also the
authors of that science remain true to their idea of it； they do not
distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone
altogether a priori； and which are properly moral； from the
empirical motives which the understanding raises to general
conceptions merely by comparison of experiences； but； without noticing
the difference of their sources； and looking on them all as
homogeneous； they consider only their greater or less amount。 It is in
this way they frame their notion of obligation； which； though anything
but moral； is all that can be attained in a philosophy which passes no
judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts；
whether they are a priori； or only a posteriori。
Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals； I issue in
the first instance these fundamental principles。 Indeed there is
properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a
pure practical Reason； just as that of metaphysics is the critical
examination of the pure speculative reason； already published。 But
in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the
latter； because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought
to a high degree of correctness and completeness； even in the
commonest understanding； while on the contrary in its theoretic but
pure use it is wholly dialectical； and in the second place if the
critique of a pure practical reason is to be complete； it must be
possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative
reason in a common principle； for it can ultimately be only one and
the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its
application。 I could not； however； bring it to such completeness here；
without introducing considerations of a wholly different kind； which
would be perplexing to the reader。 On this account I have adopted
the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical
reason。
But in the third place； since a metaphysic of morals； in spite of
the discouraging title； is yet capable of being presented in popular
form； and one adapted to the common understanding； I find it useful to
separate from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental
principles； in order that I may not hereafter have need to introduce
these necessarily subtle discussions into a book of a more simple
character。
The present treatise is； however； nothing more than the
investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of
morality； and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself and
one which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation。
No doubt my conclusions on this weighty question； which has hitherto
been very unsatisfactorily examined； would receive much light from the
application of the same principle to the whole system； and would be
greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout； but
I must forego this advantage； which indeed would be after all more
gratifying than useful； since the easy applicability of a principle
and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness；
but rather inspire a certain partiality； which prevents us from
examining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to
consequences。
I have adopted in this work the method which I think most
suitable； proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the
determination of its ultimate principle； and again descending
synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources
to the common knowledge in which we find it employed。 The division
will； therefore； be as follows：
1 FIRST SECTION。 Transition from the common rational knowledge of
morality to the philosophical。
2 SECOND SECTION。 Transition from popular moral philosophy to the
metaphysic of morals。
3 THIRD SECTION。 Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the
critique of the pure practical reason。
FIRST SECTION
TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF MORALITY TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world； or even out of it；
which can be called good； without qualification； except a good will。
Intelligence； wit； judgement； and the other talents of the mind；
however they may be named； or courage； resolution； perseverance； as
qualities of temperament； are undoubtedly good and desirable in many
respects； but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad
and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them； and which；
therefore； constitutes what is called character； is not good。 It is
the same with the gifts of fortune。 Power； riches； honour； even
health； and the general well…being and contentment with one's
condition which is called happiness； inspire pride； and often
presumption； if there is not a good will to correct the influence of
these on the mind； and with this also to rectify the whole principle
of acting and adapt it to its end。 The sight of a being who is not
adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will； enjoying
unbroken prosperity； can never give pleasure to an impartial
rational spectator。 Thus a good will appears to constitute the
indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness。
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will
itself and may facilitate its action； yet which have no intrinsic
unconditional value； but always presuppose a good will； and this
qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not
permit us to regard them as absolutely good。 Moderation in the
affections and passions； self…control； and calm deliberation are not
only good in many respects； but even seem to constitute part of the
intrinsic worth of the person； but they are far from deserving to be
called good without qualification； although they have been so
unconditionally praised by the ancients。 For without the principles of
a good will； they may become extremely bad； and the coolness of a
villain not only makes him far more dangerous； but also directly makes
him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it。
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects；
not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end； but simply
by virtue of the volition； that is； it is good in itself； and
considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can
be brought about by it in favour of any inclination； nay even of the
sum total of all inclinations。 Even if it should happen that； owing to
special disfavour of fortune； or the niggardly provision of a
step…motherly nature； this will should wholly lack power to accomplish
its purpose； if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve
nothing； and there should remain only the good will （not； to be
sure； a mere wish； but the summoning of all means in our power）； then；
like a jewel； it would still shine by its own light； as a thing
which has its whole value in itself。 Its usefulness or fruitfulness
can neither add nor take away anything from this value。 It would be；
as it were； only the setting to enable us to handle it the more
conveniently in common commerce； or to attract to it the attention
of those who are not yet connoisseurs； but not to recommend it to true
connoisseurs； or to determine its value。
There is； however； something so strange in this idea of the absolute
value of the mere will； in which no account is taken of its utility；
that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to
the idea； yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the
product of mere high…flown fancy； and that we may have misunderstood
the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will。
Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view。
In the physical constitution of an organized being； that is； a being
adapted suitably to the purposes of life； we assume it as a
fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found
but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose。 Now in
a being which has reason and a will； if the proper object of nature
were its conservation； its welfare； in a word； its happiness； then
nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the
reason of the creature to carry out this purpose。 For all the
actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose；
and the whole rule of its conduct； would be far more surely p