按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
of the disposition to act from pure duty。 Although many things are
done in conformity with what duty prescribes； it is nevertheless
always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty； so as to
have a moral worth。 Hence there have at all times been philosophers
who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at
all in human actions； and have ascribed everything to a more or less
refined self…love。 Not that they have on that account questioned the
soundness of the conception of morality； on the contrary； they spoke
with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature；
which； though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of
respect； is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to
give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest
of the inclinations； whether singly or at the best in the greatest
possible harmony with one another。
In fact； it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience
with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action；
however right in itself； rested simply on moral grounds and on the
conception of duty。 Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest
self…examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of
duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or
that action and to so great a sacrifice； yet we cannot from this infer
with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of
self…love； under the false appearance of duty； that was the actual
determining cause of the will。 We like them to flatter ourselves by
falsely taking credit for a more noble motive； whereas in fact we
can never； even by the strictest examination； get completely behind
the secret springs of action； since； when the question is of moral
worth； it is not with the actions which we see that we are
concerned； but with those inward principles of them which we do not
see。
Moreover； we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule
all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping
itself from vanity； than by conceding to them that notions of duty
must be drawn only from experience （as from indolence； people are
ready to think is also the case with all other notions）； for or is
to prepare for them a certain triumph。 I am willing to admit out of
love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct； but if
we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which
is always prominent； and it is this they have in view and not the
strict command of duty which would often require self…denial。
Without being an enemy of virtue； a cool observer； one that does not
mistake the wish for good； however lively； for its reality； may
sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in
the world； and this especially as years increase and the judgement
is partly made wiser by experience and partly； also； more acute in
observation。 This being so； nothing can secure us from falling away
altogether from our ideas of duty； or maintain in the soul a
well…grounded respect for its law； but the clear conviction that
although there should never have been actions which really sprang from
such pure sources； yet whether this or that takes place is not at
all the question； but that reason of itself； independent on all
experience； ordains what ought to take place； that accordingly actions
of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example； the
feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds
everything on experience； are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by
reason； that； e。g。； even though there might never yet have been a
sincere friend； yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in
friendship required of every man； because； prior to all experience；
this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining
the will by a priori principles。
When we add further that； unless we deny that the notion of morality
has any truth or reference to any possible object； we must admit
that its law must be valid； not merely for men but for all rational
creatures generally； not merely under certain contingent conditions or
with exceptions but with absolute necessity； then it is clear that
no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such
apodeictic laws。 For with what right could we bring into unbounded
respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which
perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity？ Or how
could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the
determination of the will of rational beings generally； and for us
only as such； if they were merely empirical and did not take their
origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason？
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should
wish to derive it from examples。 For every example of it that is set
before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality；
whether it is worthy to serve as an original example； i。e。； as a
pattern； but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception
of morality。 Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared
with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise Him as
such； and so He says of Himself； 〃Why call ye Me （whom you see）
good； none is good （the model of good） but God only （whom ye do not
see）？〃 But whence have we the conception of God as the supreme good？
Simply from the idea of moral perfection； which reason frames a priori
and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will。 Imitation
finds no place at all in morality； and examples serve only for
encouragement； i。e。； they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the
law commands； they make visible that which the practical rule
expresses more generally； but they can never authorize us to set aside
the true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by
examples。
If then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what
must rest simply on pure reason； independent of all experience； I
think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is
good to exhibit these concepts in their generality （in abstracto） as
they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to
them； if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to
be called philosophical。
In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary； for if we
collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from
everything empirical； that is to say； metaphysic of morals； or whether
popular practical philosophy is to be preferred； it is easy to guess
which side would preponderate。
This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable； if
the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place
and been satisfactorily accomplished。 This implies that we first found
ethics on metaphysics； and then； when it is firmly established；
procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character。 But it is
quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry； on which the
soundness of the principles depends。 It is not only that this
proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true
philosophical popularity； since there is no art in being
intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight； but also it
produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and
half…reasoned principles。 Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be
used for every…day chat； but the sagacious find in it only
confusion； and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves； they
turn away their eyes； while philosophers； who see quite well through
this delusion； are little listened to when they call men off for a
time from this pretended popularity； in order that they might be
rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight。
We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite
fashion； and we shall find at one time the special constitution of
human nature （including； however； the idea of a rational nature
generally）； at one time perfection； at another happiness； here moral
sense； there fear of God。 a little of this； and a little of that； in
marvellous mixture； without its occurring to them to ask whether the
principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human
nature at all （which we can have only from experience）； or； if this is
not so； if these principles are to be found altogether a priori；
free from everything empirical； in pure rational concepts only and
nowhere else； not even in the smallest degree； then rather to adopt
the method of making this a separate inquiry； as pure practical
philosophy； or （if one may use a name so decried） as metaphysic of
morals；* to bring it by itself to completeness； and to require the
public； which wishes for popular treatment； to await the issue of this
undertaking。
*Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied