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negation。 The indefinite will is thus quite as much one…sided as the will； which continues merely in
the definite。
§ 7。
＇c＇ The will is the unity of these two elements。 It is particularity turned back
within itself and thus led back to universality； it is individuality； it is the
self…direction of the I。 Thus at one and the same time it establishes itself as its
own negation； that is to say； as definite and limited； and it also abides by itself； in
its self…identity and universality； and in this position remains purely self…enclosed。
The I determines itself in so far as it is the reference of negativity to itself ； and
yet in this self…reference it is indifferent to its own definite character。 This it
knows as its own； that is； as an ideal or a mere possibility； by which it is not
bound； but rather exists in it merely because it establishes itself there。 This is the
freedom of the will； constituting its conception or substantive reality。 It is its
gravity； as it were； just as gravity is the substantive reality of a body。
Remark： Every self…consciousness knows itself as at once universal； or the possibility of
abstracting itself from everything definite； and as particular； with a fixed object； content or aim。
These two elements； however； are only abstractions。 The concrete and true； and all that is true is
concrete； is the universality； to which the particular is at first opposed； but； when it has been turned
back into itself； is in the end made equal。 This unity is individuality； but it is not a simple unit as is
the individuality of imaginative thought； but a unit in terms of the conception （Encyclopaedia of
the Philosophical Sciences； §§ 112…114）。 In other words； this individuality is properly nothing
else than the conception。 The first two elements of the will； that it can abstract itself from
everything； and that it is definite through either its own activity or something else； are easily
admitted and comprehended； because in their separation they are untrue； and characteristic of the
mere understanding。 But into the third； the true and speculative … and all truth； as far as it is
conceived； must be thought speculatively … the understanding declines to venture； always calling
the conception the inconceivable。 The proof and more detailed explanation of this inmost reserve
of speculation； of infinitude as the negativity which refers itself to itself； and of this ultimate source
of all activity； life and consciousness； belong to logic； as the purely speculative philosophy。 Here it
can be noticed only in passing that； in the sentences； 〃The will is universal。 。。。 The will directs
itself；〃 the will is already regarded as presupposed subject or substratum； but it is not something
finished and universal before it determines itself； nor yet before this determination is superseded
and idealised。 It is will only when its activity is self…occasioned； and it has returned into itself。
Addition。 What we properly call will contains the two above…mentioned elements。 The I is； first
of all； as such； pure activity； the universal which is by itself。 Next this universal determines itself；
and so far is no longer by itself； but establishes itself as another； and ceases to be the universal。
The third step is that the will； while in this limitation； i。e。； in this other； is by itself。 While it limits
itself； it yet remains with itself； and does not lose its hold of the universal。 This is； then； the concrete
conception of freedom； while the other two elements have been thoroughly abstract and
one…sided。 But this concrete freedom we already have in the form of perception； as in friendship
and love； Here a man is not one…sided； but limits himself willingly in reference to another； and yet
in this limitation knows himself as himself。 In this determination he does not feel himself determined；
but in the contemplation of the other as another has the feeling of himself。 Freedom also lies neither
in indeterminateness nor in determinateness； but in both。 。 The wilful man has a will which limits
itself wholly to a particular object； and if he has not this will； be supposes himself not to be free。
But the will is not bound to a particular object； but must go further； for the nature of the will is not
to be one…sided and confined。 Free will consists in willing a definite object； but in so doing to be
by itself and to return again into the universal。
§ 8。
If we define this particularising （＇b＇ § 6） further； we reach a distinction in the
forms of the will。 （a） In so far as the definite character of the will consists in the
formal opposition of the subjective to the objective or external direct existence；
we have the formal will as a self consciousness which finds an outer world before
it。 The process by which individuality turns back in its definiteness into itself； is
the translation of the subjective end； through the intervention of an activity and a
means； into objectivity。 In the absolute spirit； in which all definite character is
thoroughly its own and true （Encyclopaedia。 § 363）； consciousness is only one
side； namely； the manifestation or appearance of the will； a phase which does not
require detailed consideration here。
Addition。 The consideration of the definite nature of the will belongs to the understanding； and
is not in the first instance speculative。 The will as a whole； not only in the sense of its content； but
also in the sense of its form； is determined。 Determinate character on the side of form is the end；
and the execution of the end。 The end is at first merely something internal to me and subjective； but
it is to be also objective and to cast away the defect of mere subjectivity。 It may be asked； why it
has this defect。 When that which is deficient does not at the same time transcend its defect； the
defect is for it not a defect at all。 The animal is to us defective； but not for itself。 The end； in so far
as it is at first merely ours； is for us a defect； since freedom and will are for us the unity of
subjective and objective。 The end must also be established as objective； but does not in that way
attain a new one…sided character； but rather its realisation。
§ 9
（b）。 In so far as the definite phases of will are its own peculiar property or its
particularisation turned back into itself； they are content。 This content； as content
of the will； is for it； by virtue of the form given in （a）； an end； which exists on its
inner or subjective side as the imaginative will； but by the operation of the
activity； which converts the subjective into the objective； it is realised； completed
end。
§ 10。
The content or determinate phase of will is in the first instance direct or
immediate。 Then the will is free only in itself or for us； i。e。； it is the will in its
conception。 Only when it has itself as an object is it also for itself； and its implicit
freedom becomes realised。
Remark： At this standpoint the finite implies that whatever is in itself； or according to its
conception； has an existence or manifestation different from what it is for itself。 For example the
abstract separateness of nature is in itself space； but for itself time。 Here； two things are to be
observed；
1。that because the truth is the idea； when any object or phase is apprehended only as it is in
itself or in conception； it is not as yet apprehended in its truth； and yet
2。that； whatever exists as conception or in itself； at the same time exists； and this existence is a
peculiar form of the object； as e。g。 space。
The separation of existence in…itself or implicit existence from existence…for…itself or explicit
existence is a characteristic of the finite； and constitutes its appearance or merely external reality。
An example of this is to hand in the separation of the natural will from formal right。 The
understanding adheres to mere implicit existence； and in accordance with this position calls
freedom a capacity； since it is at this point only a possibility。 But the understanding； regards this
phase as absolute and perennial； and considers the relation of the will to what it wills or reality as
an application to a given material； which does not belong to the essence of freedom。 In this way
the understanding occupies itself with mere abstractions； and not with the idea and truth。
Addition。 The will； which is will only according to the conception； is free implicitly； but is at the
same time not free。 To be truly free。 it must have a truly fixed content； then it is explicitly free； has
freedom for its object； and is freedom。 What is at first merely in conception； i。e。； implicit； is only
direct and natural； We are familiar with this in pictorial thought also。 The child is implicitly a man； at
first has reason implicitly； and is at first the possibility of reason and freedom。 He is thus free
merely according to the conception。 That which is only implicit does not yet exist in actuality。 A
man； who is implicitly rational； must create himself by working through and out of himself and by
reconstructing him