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relation of contrast to the right of the world； or the right of the idea。 Here；
however； the idea exists only implicitly。 This is the sphere of morality。
C。 The unity and truth of these two abstract elements。 The thought idea of the
good is realised both in the will turned back into itself； and also in the external
world。 Thus freedom exists as real substance； which is quite as much actuality
and necessity as it is subjective will。 The idea here is its absolutely universal
existence； viz。； ethical life。 This ethical substance is again；
a。 Natural spirit； the family；
b。 The civil society； or spirit in its dual existence and mere appearance；
c。 The state； or freedom； which； while established in the free
self…dependence of the particular will is also universal and objective。 This
actual and organic spirit ＇a＇ is the spirit of a nation； ＇b＇ is found in the
relation to one another of national spirits； and ＇c＇ passing through and
beyond this relation is actualised and revealed in world history as the
universal world…spirit； whose right is the highest。
Note。 It is to be found in the speculative logic； and here is presupposed； that a thing or content；
which is established first of all according to its conception； or implicitly； has the form of direct
existence。 The conception； however； when it has the form of the conception is explicit； and no
longer is a direct existence。 So； too； the principle； upon which the division of this work proceeds；
is presupposed。 The divisions might be regarded as already settled by history； since the different
stages must be viewed as elements in the development of the idea； and therefore as springing from
the nature of the content itself。 A philosophic division is not an external classification of any given
material； such a classification as would be made according to one or several schemes picked up at
random； but the inherent distinctions of the conception itself。 Morality and ethical life； which are
usually supposed to mean the same thing； are here taken in essentially different meanings。
Meanwhile even imaginative thought seems to make a distinction between them。 In the usage of
Kant the preference is given to the term morality； and the practical principles of his philosophy limit
themselves wholly to this standpoint； making impossible the standpoint of ethical life； and indeed
expressly destroying and abolishing it。 Although morality and ethics have the same meaning
according to their etymology； yet these different words may be used for different conceptions。
Addition。 When we speak of right； we mean not only civil right； which is the usual significance
of the word； but also morality； ethical life and world…history。 These belong to this realm； because
the conception taking them in their truth； brings them all together。 Free will； in order not to remain
abstract； must in the first instance give itself reality； the sensible materials of this reality are objects；
i。e。； external things。 This first phase of freedom we shall know as property。 This is the sphere of
formal and abstract right； to which belong property in the more developed form of contract and
also the injury of right； i。e。； crime and punishment。 The freedom； we have here； we name person；
or； in other words； the subject who is free； and indeed free independently； and gives himself a
reality in things。 But this direct reality is not adequate to freedom； and the negation of this phase is
morality。 In morality I am beyond the freedom found directly in this thing； and have a freedom in
which this directness is superseded。 I am free in myself； i。e。； in the subjective。 In this sphere we
come upon my insight； intention； and end； and externality is established as indifferent。 The good is
now the universal end； which is not to remain merely internal to me； but to realise itself。 The
subjective will demands that its inward character； or purpose； shall receive external reality； and
also that the good shall be brought to completion in external existence。 Morality； like formal right；
is also an abstraction； whose truth is reached only in ethical life。 Hence ethical life is the unity of the
will in its conception with the will of the individual or subject。 The primary reality of ethical life is in
its turn natural； taking the form of love and feeling。 This is the family。 In it the individual has
transcended his prudish personality； and finds himself with his consciousness in a totality。 In the
next stage is seen the loss of this peculiar ethical existence and substantive unity。 Here the family
falls asunder； and the members become independent one of another； being now held together
merely by the bond of mutual need。 This is the stage of the civil society； which has frequently been
taken for the state。 But the state does not arise until we reach the third stage； that stage of ethical
life or spirit； in which both individual independence and universal substantivity are found in gigantic
union。 The right of the state is； therefore； higher than that of the other stages。 It is freedom in its
most concrete embodiment； which yields to nothing but the highest absolute truth of the
world…spirit。
First Part： Abstract Right
§ 34。
The absolutely free will； at the stage when its concept is abstract； has the
determinate character of immediacy。 Accordingly this stage is its negative
actuality； an actuality contrasted with the real world； only an abstractly
self…related actuality — the inherently single will of a subject。 Pursuant to the
moment of the particularity of the will； it has in addition a content consisting of
determinate aims and； as exclusive individuality； it has this content at the same
time as an external world directly confronting it。
Addition： When I say that 'the absolutely free will at the stage when its concept is abstract has
the determinate character of immediacy'； what I mean is this： when the concept had fully realised
itself and when the embodiment of the concept had become nothing but the unfolding of its own
self； then that state of affairs would be the fully developed Idea of the will。 But at the start the
concept is abstract； which means that all its determinations are contained within it； but still only
contained within it； they are only implicit and not yet developed to be a totality in themselves。 If I
say 'I am free'； the ego is still this inwardness； not confronted by an opposite。 In morality； on the
other hand； there is opposition from the start； since I stand in the moral sphere as a single will
while the good is the universal even though it is within myself。 Thus at that level； the will has in
itself the different factors of singularity and universality； and this gives it its specific character。 But；
to begin with； no such difference is present； since at the first stage； that of abstract unity； there is
no advance and no mediation and so the will has the form of immediacy； of mere being。 The
essential point of view to be taken here then is that this original indeterminacy is itself a
determinacy。 The indeterminacy lies in the fact that there is as yet no difference between the will
and its content； but indeterminacy； opposed to the determinate； acquires the character of being
something determinate。 It is abstract identity which here constitutes determinacy； the will therefore
becomes a single will； a person。
§ 35。
The universality of this consciously free will is abstract universality； the
self…conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of itself to itself in its
individuality； and from this point of view the subject is a person。 Personality
implies that as this person： （i） I am completely determined on every side （in my
inner caprice； impulse； and desire； as well as by immediate external facts） and so
finite； yet （ii） none the less I am simply and solely self…relation； and therefore in
finitude I know myself as something infinite； — universal； and free。
Remark： Personality begins not with the subject's mere general consciousness of himself as an
ego concretely determined in some way or other； but rather with his consciousness of himself as a
completely abstract ego in which every concrete restriction and value is negated and without
validity。 In personality； therefore； knowledge is knowledge of oneself as an object； but an object
raised by thinking to the level of simple infinity and so an object purely self…identical。 Individuals
and nations have no personality until they have achieved this pure thought and knowledge of
themselves。 Mind fully explicit differs from the phenomenal mind in this； that at the same level at
which the latter is only self…consciousness — a consciousness of self but only one pursuant to the
natural will and its still external oppositions — the former has itself； as the abstract and free ego； for
its object and aim； and so is personality。
Addition： The abstract will； consciously self…contained； is personality。 Man's chief glory is to be
a person； and yet in spite of that the bare abstraction； 'person'； is somewhat contemptuous in its
very expression。 'Perso