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To this context there also belongs the notorious maxim： 'The end justifies the means。' In itself and
prima facie this expression is trivial and pointless。 Quite so； one may retort in terms equally
general； a just end of course justifies the means； while an unjust end does not。 The phrase： so 'If
the end is right； so is the means' is a tautology； since the means is precisely that which is nothing in
itself but is for the sake of something else； and therein； i。e。 in the end； has its purpose and worth …
provided of course it be truly a means。
But when someone says that the end justifies the means； his purport is not confined to this bare
tautology； he understands by the words something more specific； namely that to use as means to a
good end something which in itself is simply not a means at all； to violate something in itself
sacrosanct； in short to commit a crime as a means to a good end； is permissible and even one's
bounden duty。 （i） There floats before the minds of those who say that the end justifies the means a
vague consciousness of the dialectic of the aforesaid 'positive' element in isolated legal or ethical
principles； or of such equally vague general maxims as： 'Thou shalt not kill'； or 'Thou shalt take
thought for thy welfare and the welfare of thy family'。 Executioners and soldiers have not merely
the right but the duty to kill men； though there it has been precisely laid down what kind of men
and what circumstances make the killing permissible and obligatory。 So also my welfare and the
welfare of my family must be subordinated to higher ends and so reduced to means to their
attainment。 （ii） And yet what bears the mark of crime is not a general maxim of that kind； left
vague and still subject to a dialectic； on the contrary； its specific character is already objectively
fixed。 Now what is set up against such a determinate crime； what is supposed to have deprived
the crime of its criminal nature； is the justifying end； and this is simply subjective opinion about
what is good and better。 What happens here is the same as what happens when the will stops at
willing good in the abstract； i。e。 the absolute and valid determinate character assigned to good and
evil； right and wrong； is entirely swept away and the determination of them is ascribed instead to
the individual's feeling； imagination； and caprice。
（e） Subjective opinion is at last expressly given out as the measuring…rod of right and duty and it is
supposed that the conviction which holds something to be right is to decide the ethical character of
an action。 Since the good we will to do is here still without content； the principle of conviction only
adds the information that the subsumption of an action under the category of good is purely a
personal matter。 If this be so； the very pretence of an ethical objectivity has totally disappeared。 A
doctrine like this is directly connected with the self…styled philosophy； often mentioned already；
which denies that the truth is knowable … and the truth of mind qua will； the rationality of mind in its
self…actualising process； is the laws of ethics。 Asserting； as such philosophising does； that the
knowledge of the true is an empty vanity； transcending the territory of science （which is supposed
to be mere appearance）； it must in the matter of action at once find its principle also in the
apparent； thereby ethics is reduced to the special theory of life held by the individual and to his
private conviction： The degradation into which philosophy has thus sunk appears doubtless at a
first glance to be only an affair of supreme indifference； an occurrence confined to the trivial field
of academic futilities； but the view necessarily makes itself a home in ethics； an essential part of
philosophy； and it is then that the true meaning of these theories makes its first appearance in and
is apprehended by the world of actuality。
The result of the dissemination of the view that subjective conviction； and it alone； decides the
ethical character of an action is that the charge of hypocrisy； once so frequent； is now rarely heard；
you can only qualify wickedness as hypocrisy on the assumption that certain actions are inherently
and actually misdeeds； vices and crimes； and that the defaulter is necessarily aware of them as
such； because he is aware of and recognises the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty
even in the pretence to which he misapplies them。 In other words； it was generally assumed as
regards evil that it is a duty to know the good and to be aware of its distinction from evil。 In any
case； however； it was an absolute injunction which forbade the commission of vicious and criminal
actions and which insisted on such actions being imputed to the agent； so far as he was a man and
not a beast。 But if a good heart； a good intention； a subjective conviction are set forth as the
sources from which conduct derives its worth； then there is no longer any hypocrisy or immorality
at all； for whatever a man does； he can always justify by the reflection on it of good intentions and
motives； and by the influence of that conviction it is good。
Footnote： 'That he feels completely convinced I have not the least doubt。 But how many men are led by
such feelings of conviction into the worst of misdeeds！ Besides； if everything may be excused on this ground；
then that terminates the rational judgement of good and wicked； honourable and shameful； resolutions。 Lunacy
in that case would have equal rights with reason； or in other words reason would have no rights whatever； its
judgement would cease to have any validity。 Its voice would be a minus quantity； truth would be the
possession of the man with no doubts！ I tremble at the results of such toleration； for it would be exclusively to
the advantage of unreason。' （Jacobi 1802。）
Thus there is no longer anything absolutely vicious or criminal； and instead of the abovementioned
frank and free； hardened and unperturbed sinner； we have the man who is conscious of being fully
justified by intention and conviction。 My good intention in my action and my conviction of its
goodness make it good。 We speak of judging and estimating an action； but on this principle it is
only the intention and conviction of the agent； his faith； by which he ought to be judged。 Not；
however； his faith in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective truth； so that on one who
has a false faith； i。e。 a conviction bad in its content； the judgement to be pronounced must be a
condemnation； i。e。 one in conformity with this content。 On the contrary； faith here means fidelity to
conviction； and the question to be asked about action is： 'Has the agent in his acting kept true to
his conviction Fidelity to formal subjective conviction is thus made the sole measuring…rod of duty。
This principle； under which conviction is expressly made something subjective； cannot but thrust
upon us the thought of possible error； with the further implied presupposition of an absolute law。
But the law is no agent； it is only the actual human being who acts。 And； on the aforesaid principle；
the only question； in estimating the worth of human actions； is how far he has taken up the law into
his conviction。 But if on this theory it is not actions which are to be judged； i。e。 measured generally；
by that law； it is impossible to see what the law is for and what end it is to serve。 Such a law is
degraded to a mere external letter； in fact to an empty word； if it is only my conviction which
makes it a law and invests it with obligatory force。
Such a law may claim its authority from God or the state。 It may even have behind it the authority
of tens of centuries during which it was the bond which gave men； with all their deeds and destiny；
coherence and subsistence。 And these are authorities which enshrine the convictions of countless
individuals。 Now if I set against these the authority of my single conviction … for as my subjective
conviction its sole validity is authority … that at first seems a piece of monstrous self…conceit； but in
virtue of the principle that subjective conviction is to be the measuring…rod； it is pronounced not to
be self…conceit at all。
Even if reason and conscience … which shallow science and bad sophistry can never altogether
expel … admit with a noble illogicality that error is possible； still by describing crime； and evil
generally； as only an error； we minimise the fault。 To err is human … who has not been mistaken on
one point or another； whether he had fresh or pickled cabbage for dinner yesterday； and about
innumerable other things of more or less importance？ But the difference between importance and
triviality vanishes if everything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistence in it。 The
said noble illogicality which admits the possibility of error is inevitable then in the nature of the
case； but when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an error； it only falls into a
further illogicality； the illogicality of dishonesty。 At one moment conviction is made the basis of
ethics and of man's supreme value； and is thus pronounced the supreme and the sacrosanct； at
another； all we ha