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held on contract； and contractual forms are fixed and determinate。 Now we may have an antipathy
to formalities of this kind and we may suppose that they only exist to bring in money to the
authorities； we may even regard them as something offensive and a sign of mistrust because they
impair the validity of the saying： ‘A man is as good as his word。’ But the formality is essential
because what is inherently right must also be posited as right。 My will is a rational will； it has
validity； and its validity should be recognised by others。 At this point； then； my subjectivity and that
of others must be set aside and the will must achieve the security； stability； and objectivity which
can be attained only through such formalities。
§ 218。
Since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil society；
wrongdoing now becomes an infringement； not merely of what is subjectively
infinite； but of the universal thing which is existent with inherent stability and
strength。 Hence a new attitude arises： the action is seen as a danger to society and
thereby the magnitude of the wrongdoing is increased。 On the other hand；
however； the fact that society has become strong and sure of itself diminishes the
external importance of the injury and so leads to a mitigation of its punishment。
Remark： The fact that an injury to one member of society is an injury to all others does not alter
the conception of wrongdoing； but it does alter it in respect of its outward existence as an injury
done； an injury which now affects the mind and consciousness of civil society as a whole； not
merely the external embodiment of the person directly injured。 In heroic times； as we see in the
tragedy of the ancients； the citizens did not feel themselves injured by wrongs which members of
the royal houses did to one another。
Implicitly； crime is an infinite； injury； but as an existent fact it must be measured in quantity and
quality （see § 96）； and since its field of existence here has the essential character of affecting an
idea and consciousness of the validity of the laws； its danger to civil society is a determinant of the
magnitude of a crime； or even one of its qualitative characteristics。
Now this quality or magnitude varies with the state of civil society； and this is the justification for
sometimes attaching the penalty of death to a theft of a few pence or a turnip； and at other times a
light penalty to a theft of a hundred or more times that amount。 If we consider its danger to
society； this seems at first sight to aggravate the crime； but in fact it is just this which has been the
prime cause of the mitigation of its punishment。 A penal code； then； is primarily the child of its age
and the state of civil society at the time。
Addition： It seems to be a contradiction that a crime committed in society appears more
heinous and yet is punished more leniently。 But while it would be impossible for society to leave a
crime unpunished； since that would be to posit it as right； still since society is sure of itself； a crime
must always be something idiosyncratic in comparison； something unstable and exceptional。 The
very stability of society gives a crime the status of something purely subjective which seems to be
the product rather of natural impulse than of a prudent will。 In this light； crime acquires a milder
status； and for this reason its punishment too becomes milder。 If society is still internally weak； then
an example must be made by inflicting punishments； since punishment is itself an example over
against the example of crime。 But in a society which is internally strong； the commission of crime is
something so feeble that its annulment must be commensurable with its feebleness。 Harsh
punishments； therefore； are not unjust in and by themselves； they are related to contemporary
conditions。 A criminal code cannot hold good for all time； and crimes are only shows of reality
which may draw on themselves a greater or lesser degree of disavowal。
（c） The Court of Justice
§ 219。
By taking the form of law； right steps into a determinate mode of being。 It is then
something on its own account； and in contrast with particular willing and opining
of the right； it is self…subsistent and has to vindicate itself as something universal。；
This is achieved by recognising it and making it actual in a particular case without
the subjective feeling of private interest； and this is the business of a public
authority — the court of justice。
Remark： The historical origin of the judge and his court may have had the form of a patriarch’s
gift to his people or of force or free choice； but this makes no difference to the concept of the
thing。 To regard the introduction of a legal system as no more than an optional act of grace or
favour on the part of monarchs and governments （as Herr von Haller does in his Restauration der
Staatswissenschaft） is a piece of the mere thoughtlessness which has no inkling of the point at
issue in a discussion of law and the state。 The point is that legal and political institutions are rational
in principle and therefore absolutely necessary； and the question of the form in which they arose or
were introduced is entirely irrelevant to a consideration of their rational basis。
At the other extreme from Herr von Haller’s point of view is the barbarous nation that the
administration of justice is now； as it was in the days when might was right； an improper exercise
of force； a suppression of freedom； and a despotism。 The administration of justice must be
regarded as the fulfilment of a duty by the public authority； no less than as the exercise of a right；
and so far as it is a right； it does not depend upon an optional delegation to one authority by the
individual members of society。
§ 220。
When the right against crime has the form of revenge （see § 102）； it is only right
implicit； not right in the form of right； i。e。 no act of revenge is justified。 Instead of
the injured party； the injured universal now comes on the scene； and this has its
proper actuality in the court of law。 It takes over the pursuit and the avenging of
crime； and this pursuit consequently ceases to be the subjective and contingent
retribution of revenge and is transformed into the genuine reconciliation of right
with itself； i。e。 into punishment。 Objectively； this is the reconciliation of the law
with itself； by the annulment of the crime； the law is restored and its authority is
thereby actualised。 Subjectively； it is the reconciliation of the criminal with
himself； i。e。 with the law known by him as his own and as valid for him and his
protection； when this law is executed upon him； he himself finds in this process
the satisfaction of justice and nothing save his own act。
§ 221。
A member of civil society has the right in judicio stare and； correspondingly； the
duty of acknowledging the jurisdiction of the court and accepting its decision as
final when his own rights are in dispute。
Addition： Since any individual has the right in judicio stare； he must also know what the law is
or otherwise this privilege would be useless to him。 But it is also his duty to stand his trial。 Under
the feudal system； the nobles often refused to stand their trial。 They defied the court and alleged
that the court was wrong to demand their appearance。 Feudal conditions； however； contravened
the very idea of a court。 Nowadays monarchs have to recognise the jurisdiction of the court in
their private affairs； and in free states they commonly lose their case。
§ 222。
In court the specific character which rightness acquires is that it must be
demonstrable。 When parties go to law； they are put in the position of having to
make good their evidence and their claims and to make the judge acquainted with
the facts。 These steps in a legal process are themselves rights； and their course
must therefore be fixed by law。 They also constitute an essential part of
jurisprudence。
Addition： A man may be indignant if a right which he knows he has is refused him because he
cannot prove it。 But if I have a right； it must at the same time be a right posited in law。 I must be
able to explain and prove it； and its validity can only be recognised in society if its rightness in
principle is also made a posited rightness in law。
§ 223。
These steps in a legal process are subdivided continually within no fixed limits
into more and more actions； each being distinct in itself and a right。 Hence a legal
process； in； itself in any case a means； now begins to be something external to its
end and contrasted with it。 This long course of formalities is a right of the parties
at law and they have the right to traverse it from beginning to end。 Still； it may be
turned into an evil； and even an instrument of wrong； and for this reason it is by
law made the duty of the parties to submit themselves to the simple process of
arbitration （before a tribunal of ar