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and as a moral entity。 But the position with private persons is that they are under the jurisdiction of
a court which gives effect to what is right in principle。 Now a relation between states ought also to
be right in principle； but in mundane affairs a principle ought also to have power。 Now since there
is no power in existence which decides in face of the state what is right in principle and actualises
this decision； it follows that so far as international relations are concerned we can never get
beyond an 'ought'。 The relation between states is a relation between autonomous entities which
make mutual stipulations but which at the same time are superior to these stipulations。
§ 331。
The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and
is therefore the absolute power on earth。 It follows that every state is sovereign
and autonomous against its neighbours。 It is entitled in the first place and without
qualification to be sovereign from their point of view； i。e。 to be recognised by
them as sovereign。 At the same time； however； this title is purely formal； and the
demand for this recognition of the state； merely on the ground that it is a state； is
abstract。 Whether a state is in fact something absolute depends on its content； i。e。
on its constitution and general situation； and recognition； implying as it does an
identity of both form and content； is conditional on the neighbouring state's
judgement and will。
Remark： A state is as little an actual individual without relations to other states （see § 322） as
an individual is actually a person without rapport with other persons （see § 71 and elsewhere）。
The authority of a state and； more particularly； so far as its foreign relations are concerned； of its
monarch also； is partly a purely domestic matter （one state should not meddle with the domestic
affairs of another）。 On the other hand； however； it is no less essential that this authority should
receive its full and final legitimation through its recognition by other states； although this recognition
requires to be safeguarded by the proviso that where a state is to be recognised by others； it shall
likewise recognise them； i。e。 respect their autonomy； and so it comes about that they cannot be
indifferent to each other's domestic affairs。
The question arises how far a nomadic people； for instance； or any people on a low level of
civilisation； can be regarded as a state。 As once was the case with the Jews and the Mohammedan
peoples； religious views may entail an opposition at a higher level between one people and its
neighbours and so preclude the general identity which is requisite for recognition。
Addition： When Napoleon said before the Peace of Campoformio that 'the French Republic
needs recognition as little as the sun requires it'； what his words implied was simply the thing's
strength which carries with it； without any verbal expression； the guarantee of recognition。
§ 332。
The immediate actuality which any state possesses from the point of view of
other states is particularised into a multiplicity of relations which are determined
by the arbitrary will of both autonomous parties and which therefore possess the
formal nature of contracts pure and simple。 The subject…matter of these contracts；
however； is infinitely less varied than it is in civil society； because in civil society
individuals are reciprocally interdependent in the most numerous respects； while
autonomous states are principally wholes whose needs are met within their own
borders。
§ 333。
The fundamental proposition of international law （i。e。 the universal law which
ought to be absolutely valid between states； as distinguished from the particular
content of positive treaties） is that treaties； as the ground of obligations between
states； ought to be kept。 But since the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its
relations to others； states are to that extent in a state of nature in relation to each
other。 Their rights are actualised only in their particular wills and not in a
universal will with constitutional powers over them。 This universal proviso of
international law therefore does not go beyond an ought…to…be； and what really
happens is that international relations in accordance with treaty alternate with the
severance of these relations。
Remark： There is no Praetor to judge between states； at best there may be an arbitrator or a
mediator； and even he exercises his functions contingently only； i。e。 in dependence on the
particular wills of the disputants。 Kant had an idea for securing 'perpetual peace' by a League of
Nations to adjust every dispute。 It was to be a power recognised by each individual state； and
was to arbitrate in all cases of dissension in order to make it impossible for disputants to resort to
war in order to settle them。 This idea presupposes an accord between states； this would rest on
moral or religious or other grounds and considerations； but in any case would always depend
ultimately on a particular sovereign will and for that reason would remain infected with
contingency。
§ 334。
It follows that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonised；
the matter can only be settled by war。 A state through its subjects has widespread
connections and many…sided interests； and these may be readily and considerably
injured； but it remains inherently indeterminable which of these injuries is to be
regarded as a specific breach of treaty or as an injury to the honour and
autonomy of the state。 The reason for this is that a state may regard its infinity
and honour as at stake in each of its concerns； however minute； and it is all the
more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is
impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity
abroad。
§ 335。
Apart from this； the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to
stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred。 On the
contrary； there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury as
the idea of a danger threatening from another state； together with calculations of
degrees of probability on this side and that； guessing at intentions； &c。； &c。
§ 336。
Since states are related to one another as autonomous entities and so as particular
wills on which the very validity of treaties depends； and since the particular will of
the whole is in content a will for its own welfare pure and simple； it follows that
welfare is the highest law governing the relation of one state to another。 This is all
the more the case since the Idea of the state is precisely the supersession of the
clash between right （i。e。 empty abstract freedom） and welfare （i。e。 the particular
content which fills that void）； and it is when states become concrete wholes that
they first attain recognition （see § 331）。
§ 337。
The substantial welfare of the state is its welfare as a particular state in its specific
interest and situation and its no less special foreign affairs； including its particular
treaty relations。。 Its government therefore is a matter of particular wisdom； not of
universal Providence （compare Remark to § 324）。 Similarly； its aim in relation to
other states and its principle for justifying wars and treaties is not a universal
thought （the thought of philanthropy） but only its actually injured or threatened
welfare as something specific。 and peculiar to itself。
Remark： At one time the opposition between morals and politics； and the demand that the latter
should conform to the former； were much canvassed。 On this point only a general remark is
required here。 The welfare of a state has claims to recognition totally different from those of the
welfare of the individual。 The ethical substance； the state； has its determinate being； i。e。 its right；
directly embodied in something existent； something not abstract but concrete； and the principle of
its conduct and behaviour can only be this concrete existent and not one of the many universal
thoughts supposed to be moral commands。 When politics is alleged to clash with morals and so to
be always wrong； the doctrine propounded rests on superficial ideas about morality； the nature of
the state； and the state's relation to the moral point of view。
§ 338。
The fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states remains； even in
war — the state of affairs when rights disappear and force and chance hold sway
— a bond wherein each counts to the rest as something absolute。 Hence in war；
war itself is characterised as something which ought to pass away。 It implies
therefore the proviso of； the jus gentium — that the possibility of peace be
retained （and so； for example； that envoys must be respected）； and； in general；
that war be not waged against domestic institutions； against the peace of fami