the ultimate standard of value-第6章

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lity；　usually　bring　in　a　wages　that　is　not　only　no　higher；　but　is　ofttimes　lower；　than　that　paid　in　more　pleasant　occupations。　　　　　　（e）　Under　normal　wages　I　include　the　wages　in　all　those　occupations　that　do　not　require　any　rare　or　exceptional　qualities。　This；　of　course；　include　the　great　mass　of　all　occupations。　With　this　understood；　it　become　clear　that　the　disutility　of　labor　has　but　an　indirect；　and　in　one　sense　crude　influence　upon　the　absolute　height　of　the　normal　wages。　It　undoubtedly　prevents　the　introduction　of　an　eighteen…hour　labor　day　or　even　of　a　fifteen…hour　day；　but　it　has　not　been　able　to　prevent　the　introduction　of　a　thirteen　or　fourteen…hour　day；　as　is　shown　by　the　history　of　the　condition　of　the　laboring　classes。　No　one　would　claim　that　the　progress　of　humanity　from　a　thirteen　to　an　eight…hour　labor　day　has　corresponded　step　for　step　with　a　similar　progressive　movement　in　the　subjective　feelings　of　the　laborer。　Nor　will　any　one　claim　that　the　laborer　will　find　in　his　wages　an　exact　equivalent　or　recompense　for　the　pain　or　disutility　of　his　labor　when　he　works　thirteen　hours　per　day。　Again；　when　he　works　twelve　hours　per　day；　and　so　on　for　eleven；　ten；　nine　and　finally　for　eight　hours　per　day。　It　is　no　nice　variation　in　the　point　of　equilibrium　between　utility　and　disutility　that　determines　the　length　of　the　working　day。　It　is　the　changing　of　the　relative　strengths　of　the　various　social　factors　that　plays　the　principal　part　in　this　determination。　This；　within　certain　limits；　which　we　cannot　here　stop　to　discuss；　it　will　probably　continue　to　do　in　the　future。　　　　　　（f）　Finally　the　absolute　height　of　the　wages　of　skilled　labor　is　manifestly　still　more　independent　of　the　disutility　or　pain　of　such　labor。　I　take　it　that　no　economist　would　urge　that　this　is　the　element　which　finally　determine　the　salary　of　the　higher　officials；　great　actors　or　singers；　specially　skilled　workmen；　managers　of　factories；　lawyers；　doctors；　etc。　　　　　　These　various　points　taken　together　certainly　justify　the　assertion　made　above；　viz。；　that　the　actual　conditions　which　make　possible　an　equilibrium　of　wages　and　pain；　or　of　value　and　pain　（so　far　as　the　value　of　the　product　is　dependent　upon　the　height　of　the　wage）；　do　not　obtain　in　our　industrial　life。　On　the　contrary；　these　conditions　are　only　found　in　a　relatively　limited　number　of　unimportant　and　exceptional　cases。　　　　　This　alone　would　be　sufficient　to　show　that　in　tracing　the　influence　of　disutility　upon　the　value　of　goods；　we　have　quite　a　different　and　indeed　much　narrower　trail　to　follow；　than　that　which　leads　to　the　great　empirical　law　of　cost。　This　may　be　shown　in　the　clearest　and　most　convincing　way　from　several　different　standpoints；　and　with　this　we　are　brought　to　the　second　proposition　advanced　at　the　end　of　the　preceding　section。　First；　it　may　be　shown　that　in　many　instance　the　correspondence　of　the　value　of　goods　with　their　cost；　in　the　sense　of　the　great　empirical　law　of　cost；　not　only　does　not　imply　that　the　value　of　the　goods　corresponds　to　the　disutility　or　pain　of　labor；　but　actually　exclude　this　assumption。　Exclude　it　not　merely　by　chance　or　temporarily；　but　of　necessity　and　permanently。　　　　　　In　order　to　avoid　needless　repetition；　we　will　take　an　example　that　is　sufficiently　comprehensive　to　include　nearly　all　possible　cases。　In　the　production　of　nearly　all　ware　there　come　into　play；　beside　the　commoner　sorts　of　labor；　some　better　paid　skilled　labor。　In　the　making　of　a　common　cloth　coat；　we　will　have　the　labor　of　some　skilled　cutter；　or　of　a　manager　with　a　higher　standard　of　life。　Again；　in　the　weaving　of　the　cloth；　we　find　the　better　paid　labor　of　factory　bookkeeper；　manager；　etc。　If　we　go　back　to　still　earlier　stage…the　manufacture　of　the　machine　or　looms；　the　mining　or　preparation　of　the　steel；　etc。　　it　is　clear　that　the　better　paid　labor　of　the　engineer；　foreman　and　manager　will　enter　into　the　cost。　　　　　　Let　us　now　assume　that　the　production　of　a　cloth　coat；　including　all　stage；　costs　three　days　of　common　labor　at　eighty　cents　and　one　day　of　skilled　labor　at　one　dollar　and　sixty　cents。　Let　us　also　assume；　for　the　sake　of　the　argument；　that　the　wages　of　eighty　cents　is　an　exact　equivalent　or　recompense　for　the　pain　of　a　day's　labor。　If　the　amount　of　this　pain　of　labor　is　to　figure　as　the　regulator　of　price；　then　under　the　above　assumptions；　the　price　of　the　coat　should　not　exceed　three　dollars　and　twenty　cents；　for　the　skilled　labor　of　the　engineer　or　bookkeeper　is　not　more　painful　than　that　of　the　common　miner　or　tailor。　Hence；　if　we　take　the　pain　as　the　standard；　we　cannot　reckon　the　former　as　greater　than　the　latter。　And　yet　we　all　know　that　under　the　above　assumptions；　a　cloth　coat　could　not；　for　any　long　time；　be　put　upon　the　market　for　less　than　four　dollars　（not　including　interest）。　This　is　manifestly　out　of　proportion　with　the　disutility　of　the　labor。　And　yet；　according　to　the　law　of　cost；　the　price　of　the　coat　in　the　long　run；　and　under　conditions　of　free　competition；　should　tend　or　gravitate　toward　this　disutility。（20*）　　　　　The　lack　of　agreement　of　the　cost；　in　the　sense　of　the　classical　law　of　cost；　with　the　disutility　of　labor；　may　be　shown　by　approaching　the　question　from　an　entirely　different　point　of　view。　This　brings　us　to　an　interesting　counter　test；　which；　if　I　am　not　greatly　mistaken；　has　hitherto　entirely　escaped　the　attention　of　economists。　　　　　　We　have　occasionally　remarked　that　the　wages　of　skilled　laborers；　as　a　rule；　are　determined　upon　other　grounds　than　the　amount　of　pain　which　these　persons　endure。　In　particular　case；　it　is　possible　to　find　a　justification　for　the　casuistical　assumption　which　regards　utility　and　disutility　as　exercising　an　equal　influence；　both　upon　the　remuneration　of　labor　and　the　value　of　the　goods　produced。　This　is　just　as　true　as　regards　the　ordinary　carpenter；　or　locksmith；　as　in　the　case　of　some　famous　artist；　such　as　Titian　or　Van　Dyck。　In　short；　it　is　true　of　all　men　who；　because　of　the　scarcity　of　their　talents；　possess　a　sort　of　monopoly　in　the　production　of　certain　goods。　How　long　they　will　work　per　day　will　depend；　in　part　at　least；　upon　the　degree　of　fatigue　that　they　must　undergo。　This；　however；　does　not　give　us　a　fixed　limit。　How　long　a　great　artist　will　work　depends；　as　in　the　case　of　the　common　laborer；　upon　several　conditions。　Among　others　upon　the　rate　of　pay　that　he　can　obtain　for　the　product　of　his　more　prolonged　effort。　An　artist　may　not　be　willing　to　work　overtime　to　paint　a　picture；　for　which　he　will　receive　forty　dollars。　He　might；　however；　not　only　willingly　but　gladly　prolong　his　working　day　if　he　were　offered　four　thousand　dollars　for　the　completed　picture。　　　　　　In　short；　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the　producer　of　a　monopoly　good　from　so　prolonging　his　day's　labor；　and　thereby　the　daily　supply　of　his　monopoly　ware；（21*）　until　the　marginal　utility；　of　the　money　received　for　the　last　unit　of　labor　time；　is　in　exact　equilibrium　with　the　disutility　of　this　last　unit　of　labor　time。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　under　such　circumstance　the　disutility　exercises　a　determining　or　co…determining　influence　upon　the　amount　of　the　supply；　the　height　of　the　marginal　utility；　and　the　price　of　the　product。　This；　too；　is　done　in　just　the　same　way　as　in　the　frustration　given　in　the　last　chapter；　in　which　the　ware　was　the　product　of　common　labor。　At　the　same　time；　economists　are　agreed　that　such　monopoly　prices　do　not　come　under　the　classic　law　of　cost。　Here　again；　as　I　believe；　we　are　brought　to　the　conclusion；　that　the　disutility　which　we　are　investigating　is　something　different　from　the　cost　which　is　operative　in　the　empirical　law　of　cost；　and；　therefore；　that　those　economists　are　on　the　wrong　path　who　think　that　the　occasional　agreement　of　value　and　disutility　may　be　explained　as　a　manifestation　of　the　great　empirical　law　of　cost；　and　vice　versa。　　　　　　This　erroneous　confounding　of　two　quite　different　phenomena　has　been；　as　it　were；　in　the　air　of　theoretic　economics　since　the　time　of　Adam　Smith。　The　latter；　according　to　the　very　apt　and　ingenious　observation　of　Wieser；（22*）　really　give　two　parallel　explanations　of　the　phenomenon　of　value；　viz。：　a　philosophical　explanation；　which　is　especially　applicable　to　primitive　conditions；　and　an　empirical　explanation；　which　is　better　sited　to　the　more　fully　developed　conditions　of　our　present　industrial　life。　Adam　Smith　also　gives　us　two　similarly　related　explanations　of　cost。　According　to　the　philosophical；　he　puts　the　personal　pain　associated　with　labor；　〃the　toil　and　trouble；〃　as　the　cost　which　really　determine　the　price　of　the　product。　Later；　in　explaining　his　famous　law　of　cost；　which　belongs　to　the　empirical　part　of　his　theory　of　value；　he　holds　that　the　〃natural　price〃　of　the　product　gravitate　toward　the　empirical　cost。　This；　he　declare　to　be　wages　of　labor　and　interest。（23*）　To　the　mind　of　Adam　Smith；　of　course；　there　was　no　opposition　between　these　two　explanations；　and　accordingly　it　was　impossible　to　escape　the　conclusion；　that；　at　least　so　far　as　labor　is　concerned；　they　really　have　to　do　with　the　same　thing。　By　eliminating　the　modern　economic　conditions；　as　modified　by　exchange；　we　get　the　real　kernel　of　the　matter。　And　this　kernel；　according　to　the　empirical　law　of　cost；　i