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Alcibiades II
by Platonic Imitator
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
APPENDIX II。
The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not
mentioned by Aristotle； or by any early authority； and have no claim to be
ascribed to Plato。 They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be assigned
probably to the second or third generation after Plato； when his writings
were well known at Athens and Alexandria。 They exhibit considerable
originality； and are remarkable for containing several thoughts of the sort
which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient； and which therefore have
a peculiar interest for us。 The Second Alcibiades shows that the
difficulties about prayer which have perplexed Christian theologians were
not unknown among the followers of Plato。 The Eryxias was doubted by the
ancients themselves： yet it may claim the distinction of being； among all
Greek or Roman writings； the one which anticipates in the most striking
manner the modern science of political economy and gives an abstract form
to some of its principal doctrines。
For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend and
secretary； Mr。 Knight。
That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a
genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic； and
was hardly believed by the ancients themselves。 The dialectic is poor and
weak。 There is no power over language； or beauty of style； and there is a
certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation； which is very un…
Platonic。 The best passage is probably that about the poets：the remark
that the poet； who is of a reserved disposition； is uncommonly difficult to
understand； and the ridiculous interpretation of Homer； are entirely in the
spirit of Plato （compare Protag； Ion； Apol。）。 The characters are ill…
drawn。 Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and preaches too much； while
Alcibiades is stupid and heavy…in…hand。 There are traces of Stoic
influence in the general tone and phraseology of the Dialogue （compare opos
melesei tis。。。kaka： oti pas aphron mainetai）： and the writer seems to
have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato （compare Laws）。 An incident
from the Symposium is rather clumsily introduced； and two somewhat
hackneyed quotations （Symp。； Gorg。） recur。 The reference to the death of
Archelaus as having occurred 'quite lately' is only a fiction； probably
suggested by the Gorgias； where the story of Archelaus is told； and a
similar phrase occurs；ta gar echthes kai proen gegonota tauta； k。t。l。
There are several passages which are either corrupt or extremely ill…
expressed。 But there is a modern interest in the subject of the dialogue；
and it is a good example of a short spurious work； which may be attributed
to the second or third century before Christ。
ALCIBIADES II
by
Platonic Imitator （see Appendix II above）
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE： Socrates and Alcibiades。
SOCRATES： Are you going； Alcibiades； to offer prayer to Zeus？
ALCIBIADES： Yes； Socrates； I am。
SOCRATES： you seem to be troubled and to cast your eyes on the ground； as
though you were thinking about something。
ALCIBIADES： Of what do you suppose that I am thinking？
SOCRATES： Of the greatest of all things； as I believe。 Tell me； do you
not suppose that the Gods sometimes partly grant and partly reject the
requests which we make in public and private； and favour some persons and
not others？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Do you not imagine； then； that a man ought to be very careful；
lest perchance without knowing it he implore great evils for himself；
deeming that he is asking for good； especially if the Gods are in the mood
to grant whatever he may request？ There is the story of Oedipus； for
instance； who prayed that his children might divide their inheritance
between them by the sword： he did not； as he might have done； beg that his
present evils might be averted； but called down new ones。 And was not his
prayer accomplished； and did not many and terrible evils thence arise； upon
which I need not dilate？
ALCIBIADES： Yes； Socrates； but you are speaking of a madman： surely you
do not think that any one in his senses would venture to make such a
prayer？
SOCRATES： Madness； then； you consider to be the opposite of discretion？
ALCIBIADES： Of course。
SOCRATES： And some men seem to you to be discreet； and others the
contrary？
ALCIBIADES： They do。
SOCRATES： Well； then； let us discuss who these are。 We acknowledge that
some are discreet； some foolish； and that some are mad？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And again； there are some who are in health？
ALCIBIADES： There are。
SOCRATES： While others are ailing？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And they are not the same？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： Nor are there any who are in neither state？
ALCIBIADES： No。
SOCRATES： A man must either be sick or be well？
ALCIBIADES： That is my opinion。
SOCRATES： Very good： and do you think the same about discretion and want
of discretion？
ALCIBIADES： How do you mean？
SOCRATES： Do you believe that a man must be either in or out of his
senses； or is there some third or intermediate condition； in which he is
neither one nor the other？
ALCIBIADES： Decidedly not。
SOCRATES： He must be either sane or insane？
ALCIBIADES： So I suppose。
SOCRATES： Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of
discretion？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and
indiscretion？
ALCIBIADES： True。
SOCRATES： And there cannot be two opposites to one thing？
ALCIBIADES： There cannot。
SOCRATES： Then madness and want of sense are the same？
ALCIBIADES： That appears to be the case。
SOCRATES： We shall be in the right； therefore； Alcibiades； if we say that
all who are senseless are mad。 For example； if among persons of your own
age or older than yourself there are some who are senseless；as there
certainly are；they are mad。 For tell me； by heaven； do you not think
that in the city the wise are few； while the foolish； whom you call mad；
are many？
ALCIBIADES： I do。
SOCRATES： But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people？
Should we not long since have paid the penalty at their hands； and have
been struck and beaten and endured every other form of ill…usage which
madmen are wont to inflict？ Consider； my dear friend： may it not be quite
otherwise？
ALCIBIADES： Why； Socrates； how is that possible？ I must have been
mistaken。
SOCRATES： So it seems to me。 But perhaps we may consider the matter
thus：
ALCIBIADES： How？
SOCRATES： I will tell you。 We think that some are sick； do we not？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And must every sick person either have the gout； or be in a
fever； or suffer from ophthalmia？ Or do you believe that a man may labour
under some other disease； even although he has none of these complaints？
Surely； they are not the only maladies which exist？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly not。
SOCRATES： And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease？
ALCIBIADES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And every disease ophthalmia？
ALCIBIADES： Surely not。 But I scarcely understand what I mean myself。
SOCRATES： Perhaps； if you give me your best attention； 'two of us' looking
together； we may find what we seek。
ALCIBIADES： I am attending； Socrates； to the best of my power。
SOCRATES： We are agreed； then； that every form of ophthalmia is a disease；
but not every disease ophthalmia？
ALCIBIADES： We are。
SOCRATES： And so far we seem to be right。 For every one who suffers from
a fever is sick； but the sick； I conceive； do not all have fever or gout or
ophthalmia； although each of these is a disease； which； according to those
whom we call physicians； may require a different treatment。 They are not
all alike； nor do they produce the same result； but each has its own
effect； and yet they are all diseases。 May we not take an illustration
from the artizans？
ALCIBIADES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： There are cobblers and carpenters and sculptors and others of
all sorts and kinds； whom we need not stop to enumerate。 All have their
distinct employments and all are workmen； although they are not all of them
cobblers or carpenters or sculptors。
ALCIBIADES： No； indeed。
SOCRATES： And in like manner men differ in regard to want of sense。 Those
who are most out of their wits we call 'madmen；' while we term those who
are less far gone 'stupid' or 'idiotic；' or； if we prefer gentler language；
describe them as 'romantic' or 'simple…minded；' or； again； as 'innocent' or
'inexperienced'