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celerity； for the situation was critical and demanded every exertion。
The ascent and descent of the mountains was extremely exhausting； the
steep grades often rendering it necessary to drag up and let down by
hand both the transportation and artillery。 But at last we were in
conjunction with the main army； and my division breathed easier。
On the 17th I remained in line of battle all day and night in front
of McLamore's cove； the enemy making slight demonstrations against me
from the direction of Lafayette。 The main body of the army having
bodily moved to the left meanwhile； I followed it on the 18th；
encamping at Pond Spring。 On the 19th I resumed the march to the
left and went into line of battle at Crawfish Springs to cover our
right and rear。 Immediately after forming this line； I again became
isolated by the general movement to the left； and in consequence was
directed to advance and hold the ford of Chickamauga Creek at Lee and
Gordon's Mills； thus coming into close communication with the balance
of our forces。 I moved into this position rapidly； being compelled；
though； first to drive back the enemy's cavalry skirmishers； who；
having crossed to the west side of the creek； annoyed the right flank
of my column a good deal while en route。
Upon arrival at Lee and Gordon's Mills I found the ford over
Chickamauga Creek temporarily uncovered； through the hurried movement
of Wood to the assistance of Davis's division。 The enemy was already
present in small force； with the evident intention of taking
permanent possession； but my troops at once actively engaged him and
recovered the ford with some slight losses。 Scarcely had this been
done when I was directed to assist Crittenden。 Leaving Lytle's
brigade at the ford； I proceeded with Bradley's and Laiboldt's to
help Crittenden； whose main line was formed to the east of the
Chattanooga and Lafayette road； its right trending toward a point on
Chickamauga Creek about a mile and a half north of Lee and Gordon's
Mills。 By the time I had joined Crittenden with my two brigades；
Davis had been worsted in an attack Rosecrans had ordered him to make
on the left of that portion of the enemy's line which was located
along the west bank of the Chickamauga； the repulse being so severe
that one of Davis's batteries had to be abandoned。 Bradley's brigade
arrived on the ground first and was hastily formed and thrown into
the fight； which up to this moment had been very doubtful； fortune
inclining first to one side； then to the other。 Bradley's brigade
went in with steadiness； and charging across an open corn…field that
lay in front of the Lafayette road； recovered Davis's guns and forced
the enemy to retire。 Meanwhile Laiboldt's brigade had come on the
scene； and forming it on Bradley's right； I found myself at the end
of the contest holding the ground which was Davis's original
position。 It was an ugly fight and my loss was heavy； including
Bradley wounded。 The temporary success was cheering； and when
Lytle's brigade joined me a little later I suggested to Crittenden
that we attack； but investigation showed that his troops； having been
engaged all day； were not in condition； so the suggestion could not
be carried out。
The events of the day had indicated that Bragg's main object was to
turn Rosecrans's left； it was therefore still deemed necessary that
the army should continue its flank movement to the left； so orders
came to draw my troops in toward the widow Glenn's house。 By
strengthening the skirmish line and shifting my brigades in
succession from right to left until the point designated was reached；
I was able to effect the withdrawal without much difficulty； calling
in my skirmish line after the main force had retired。
My command having settled down for the night in this new line I rode
to army headquarters； to learn if possible the expectations for the
morrow and hear the result of the battle in General Thomas's front。
Nearly all the superior officers of the army were at headquarters；
and it struck me that much depression prevailed； notwithstanding the
fact that the enemy's attempts during the day to turn our left flank
and also envelop our right had been unsuccessful。 It was now
positively known； through prisoners and otherwise； that Bragg had
been reinforced to such an extent as to make him materially outnumber
us； consequently there was much apprehension for the future。
The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent； and the next
day the drifting in that direction was to be continued。 This
movement in the presence of the enemy； who at all points was actively
seeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a column
between its right and left； was most dangerous。 But the necessity
for shifting the army to the left was obvious； hence only the method
by which it was undertaken is open to question。 The move was made by
the flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers； and was
a violation of a simple and fundamental military principle。 Under
such circumstauces columns naturally stretch out into attenuated
lines； organizations become separated； and intervals occur； all of
which we experienced； and had the orders for the movement been
construed properly I doubt if it could have been executed without
serious danger。 Necessity knows no law； however； and when all the
circumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible that
justification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army was
thus drifted to the left。 We were in a bad strait unquestionably；
and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be applied
rather than the rule。
At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscured
everything； consequently both armies were passive so far as fighting
was concerned。 Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrange
his right； and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn's house to
a strong position； where I threw together some rails and logs as
barricades； but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by a
considerable interval。 Here I awaited the approach of the enemy； but
he did not disturb me； although about 9 o'clock in the forenoon he
had opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavy
cannonade。 Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that the
interval between the main army and me was widening； and he ordered me
to send Laiboldt's brigade to occupy a portion of the front that had
been covered by Negley's division。 Before getting this brigade into
place； however； two small brigades of Davis's division occupied the
ground； and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on the
crest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin's brigade； so as to prevent
Davis's right flank from being turned。 The enemy was now feeling
Davis strongly； and I was about sending for Lytle's and Bradley's
brigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to the；
extreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas。 I rode
hastily back toward their position； but in the meanwhile； they had
been notified by direct orders from McCook； and were moving out at a
double…quick toward the Lafayette road。 By this time the enemy had
assaulted Davis furiously in front and flank； and driven him from his
line； and as the confused mass came back； McCook ordered Laiboldt to
charge by deploying to the front。 This he did through Davis's broken
ranks； but failed to check the enemy's heavy lines； and finally
Laiboldt's brigade broke also and fell to the rear。 My remaining
troops； headed by Lytle； were now passing along the rear of the
ground where this disaster took placein column on the roaden
route to Thomas； and as the hundreds of fugitives rushed back； McCook
directed me to throw in Lytle's and Bradley's brigades。 This was
hastily done； they being formed to the front under a terrible fire。
Scarcely were they aligned when the same horde of Confederates that
had overwhelmed Davis and Laiboldt poured in upon them a deadly fire
and shivered the two brigades to pieces。 We succeeded in rallying
them； however； and by a counter attack regained the ridge that
Laiboldt had been driven from； where we captured the colors of the
Twenty…fourth Alabama。 We could not hold the ridge； though； and my
troops were driven back with heavy loss； including General Lytle
killed； past the widow Glenn's house； and till I managed to establish
them in line of battle on a range of low hills behind the Dry Valley
road。
During these occurrences General Rosecrans passed down the road
behind my line； and sent word that he wished to see me； but affairs
were too critical to admit of my going to him at once； and he rode on
to Chattanooga。 It is to be regretted that he did not wait till I
could join him； for the delay would have permitted him to see that
matters were not in quite such bad shape as he supposed； still； there
is no