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the Union forces along the upper Potomac； but for a time the
authorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions。
The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt his
suggestions； and one measure which he deemed very importantthe
consolidation into a single command of the four geographical
districts into which； to relieve political pressure no doubt； the
territory had been dividedmet with serious opposition。 Despite
Grant's representations； he could not prevail on the Administration
to approve this measure； but finally the manoeuvres of Early and the
raid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance； though Grant had
somewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint a
commander for the forces in the field that were to operate against
Early。
On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander； and
in obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to his
headquarters at City Point。 In the interview that followed； he
detailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac； telling
me that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operate
against Early； but that General Hunter； who was at the head of the
geographical department； would be continued in his position for the
reason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct or
consolidate the different districts。 After informing me that one
division of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command； he
went on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as this
division arrived； and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I was
to pursue； but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south of
him and try to compass his destruction。 The interview having ended；
I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure； and on the
evening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Army
of the Potomac； but not from command of the cavalry as a corps
organization。
I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August； and the next day
received instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grant
at Monocacy Junction； whither he had gone direct from City Point； in
consequence of a characteristic despatch from the President
indicating his disgust with the confusion； disorder； and helplessness
prevailing along the upper Potomac； and intimating that Grant's
presence there was necessary。
In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President before
leaving Washington； and during a short conversation Mr。 Lincoln
candidly told me that Mr。 Stanton had objected to my assignment to
General Hunter's command； because he thought me too young； and that
he himself had concurred with the Secretary； but now； since General
Grant had 〃ploughed round〃 the difficulties of the situation by
picking me out to command the 〃boys in the field；〃 he felt satisfied
with what had been done； and 〃hoped for the best。〃 Mr。 Stanton
remained silent during these remarks； never once indicating whether
he； too； had become reconciled to my selection or not； and although；
after we left the White House； he conversed with me freely in regard
to the campaign I was expected to make； seeking to impress on me the
necessity for success from the political as well as from the military
point of view； yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any
part in disapproving the recommendation of the general…in…chief。
August 6； I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy； and he there
turned over to me the following instructions； which he had previously
prepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general would
continue to command the department：
〃HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD；
〃Monocacy Bridge； Md。； Aug。 5； 1864。
〃GENERAL： Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry； leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary。
〃Use in this concentration the railroad； if by so doing time can be
saved。 From Harper's Ferry； if it is found that the enemy has moved
north of the Potomac in large force； push north； following and
attacking him wherever found； following him； if driven south of the
Potomac； as long as it is safe to do so。 If it is ascertained that
the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac； then push south
the main force； detaching； under a competent commander； a sufficient
force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes。 In
detaching such a force； the brigade of cavalry now en route from
Washington via Rockville may be taken into account。
〃There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the
best of cavalry； numbering at least five thousand men and horses。
These will be instructed； in the absence of further orders； to join
you by the south side of the Potomac。 One brigade will probably
start to…morrow。
〃In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley； as it is expected you will have
to go first or last； it is desirable that nothing should be left to
invite the enemy to return。 Take all provisions； forage； and stock
wanted for the use of your command。 Such as cannot be consumed；
destroy。 It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed…
…they should； rather； be protected； but the people should be informed
that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these
raids must be expected； and we are determined to stop them at all
hazards。
〃Bear in mind； the object is to drive the enemy south； and to do this
you want to keep him always in sight。 Be guided in your course by
the course he takes。
〃Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds； giving regular
vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country
through which you march。
〃Very respectfully；
〃U。 S。 GRANT； Lieut。…General。〃
〃Major…General D。 HUNTER；
〃Commanding Department of West Virginia。〃
When I had read the letter addressed to Hunter； General Grant said I
would be expected to report directly to him； as Hunter had asked that
day to be wholly relieved； not from any chagrin at my assignment to
the control of the active forces of his command； but because he
thought that his fitness for the position he was filling was
distrusted by General Halleck； and he had no wish to cause
embarrassment by remaining where he could but remove me one degree
from the headquarters of the army。 The next day Hunter's unselfish
request was complied with； and an order was issued by the President；
consolidating the Middle Department； the Department of Washington；
the Department of the Susquehanna； and the Department of West
Virginia。
Under this order these four geographical districts constituted the
Middle Military Division； and I was temporarily assigned to command
it。 Hunter's men had been bivouacking for some days past in the
vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick； but before General
Grant's instructions were written out； Hunter had conformed to them
by directing the concentration at Halltown； about four miles in front
of Harper's Ferry； of all his force available for field service。
Therefore the different bodies of troops； with the exception of
Averell's cavalry； which had followed McCausland toward Moorefield
after the burning of Chambersburg； were all in motion toward Halltown
on August 6。
Affairs at Monocacy kept me but an hour or two； and these disposed
of； I continued on to Harper's Ferry by the special train which had
brought me from Washington； that point being intended as my
headquarters while making preparations to advance。 The enemy was
occupying Martinsburg； Williamsport； and Shepherdstown at the time；
sending occasional raiding parties into Maryland as far as
Hagerstown。 The concentration of my troops at Halltown being an
indication to Early that we intended to renew the offensive； however；
he immediately began counter preparations by drawing in all his
detached columns from the north side of the Potomac； abandoning a
contemplated raid into Maryland； which his success against Crook at
Kernstown had prompted him to project； and otherwise disposing
himself for defense。
At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of a
small and very dilapidated hotel； and as soon as settled sent for
Lieutenant John R。 Meigs； the chief engineer officer of the command；
to study with him the maps of my geographical division。 It always
came rather easy to me to learn the geography of a new section； and
its important topographical features as well； therefore I found that；
with the aid of Meigs； who was most intelligent in his profession；
the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my
mind。 Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream； and
with all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge； and was
particularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the Shenandoah
Valley； even down to the farmhouses。