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No； just that。
But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or
want of knowledge of justice？
Certainly not。
The one is medicine； and the other is politics； whereas that of which we
are speaking is knowledge pure and simple。
Very true。
And if a man knows only； and has only knowledge of knowledge； and has no
further knowledge of health and justice； the probability is that he will
only know that he knows something； and has a certain knowledge； whether
concerning himself or other men。
True。
Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows？
Say that he knows health；not wisdom or temperance； but the art of
medicine has taught it to him；and he has learned harmony from the art of
music； and building from the art of building；neither； from wisdom or
temperance： and the same of other things。
That is evident。
How will wisdom； regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of
science； ever teach him that he knows health； or that he knows building？
It is impossible。
Then he who is ignorant of these things will only know that he knows； but
not what he knows？
True。
Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things
which we do or do not know； but only the knowledge that we know or do not
know？
That is the inference。
Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a
pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows： he will
only know that he has a knowledge of some kind； but wisdom will not show
him of what the knowledge is？
Plainly not。
Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the
true physician； nor between any other true and false professor of
knowledge。 Let us consider the matter in this way： If the wise man or any
other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false； how will
he proceed？ He will not talk to him about medicine； and that； as we were
saying； is the only thing which the physician understands。
True。
And； on the other hand； the physician knows nothing of science； for this
has been assumed to be the province of wisdom。
True。
And further； since medicine is science； we must infer that he does not know
anything of medicine。
Exactly。
Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of
science or knowledge； but when he wants to discover the nature of this he
will ask； What is the subject…matter？ For the several sciences are
distinguished not by the mere fact that they are sciences； but by the
nature of their subjects。 Is not that true？
Quite true。
And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject…
matter of health and disease？
Yes。
And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the
enquiry into health and disease； and not into what is extraneous？
True。
And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in
what relates to these？
He will。
He will consider whether what he says is true； and whether what he does is
right； in relation to health and disease？
He will。
But can any one attain the knowledge of either unless he have a knowledge
of medicine？
He cannot。
No one at all； it would seem； except the physician can have this knowledge；
and therefore not the wise man； he would have to be a physician as well as
a wise man。
Very true。
Then； assuredly； wisdom or temperance； if only a science of science； and of
the absence of science or knowledge； will not be able to distinguish the
physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that
he knows； or any other professor of anything at all； like any other artist；
he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom； and no one else。
That is evident； he said。
But then what profit； Critias； I said； is there any longer in wisdom or
temperance which yet remains； if this is wisdom？ If； indeed； as we were
supposing at first； the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew
and did not know； and that he knew the one and did not know the other； and
to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others； there would
certainly have been a great advantage in being wise； for then we should
never have made a mistake； but have passed through life the unerring guides
of ourselves and of those who are under us； and we should not have
attempted to do what we did not know； but we should have found out those
who knew； and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them；
nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which
they were not likely to do well； and they would be likely to do well just
that of which they had knowledge； and the house or state which was ordered
or administered under the guidance of wisdom； and everything else of which
wisdom was the lord； would have been well ordered； for truth guiding； and
error having been eliminated； in all their doings； men would have done
well； and would have been happy。 Was not this； Critias； what we spoke of
as the great advantage of wisdomto know what is known and what is unknown
to us？
Very true； he said。
And now you perceive； I said； that no such science is to be found anywhere。
I perceive； he said。
May we assume then； I said； that wisdom； viewed in this new light merely as
a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance； has this advantage：that he who
possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns；
and that everything will be clearer to him； because； in addition to the
knowledge of individuals； he sees the science； and this also will better
enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows
himself； whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed
to have a feebler and weaker insight？ Are not these； my friend； the real
advantages which are to be gained from wisdom？ And are not we looking and
seeking after something more than is to be found in her？
That is very likely； he said。
That is very likely； I said； and very likely； too； we have been enquiring
to no purpose； as I am led to infer； because I observe that if this is
wisdom； some strange consequences would follow。 Let us； if you please；
assume the possibility of this science of sciences； and further admit and
allow； as was originally suggested； that wisdom is the knowledge of what we
know and do not know。 Assuming all this； still； upon further
consideration； I am doubtful； Critias； whether wisdom； such as this； would
do us much good。 For we were wrong； I think； in supposing； as we were
saying just now； that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state
would be a great benefit。
How so？ he said。
Why； I said； we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which
mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew；
and committing the things of which they are ignorant to those who were
better acquainted with them。
Were we not right in making that admission？
I think not。
How very strange； Socrates！
By the dog of Egypt； I said； there I agree with you； and I was thinking as
much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow； and that
I was afraid we were on the wrong track； for however ready we may be to
admit that this is wisdom； I certainly cannot make out what good this sort
of thing does to us。
What do you mean？ he said； I wish that you could make me understand what
you mean。
I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense； I replied； and yet if a man
has any feeling of what is due to himself； he cannot let the thought which
comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined。
I like that； he said。
Hear； then； I said； my own dream； whether coming through the horn or the
ivory gate； I cannot tell。 The dream is this： Let us suppose that wisdom
is such as we are now defining； and that she has absolute sway over us；
then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences； and no one
professing to be a pilot when