按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
relations； works of art； negative notions （Theaet。； Parm。； Soph。）； and that
what Dr。 Jackson distinguishes as the first class of dialogues from the
second equally assert or imply that the relation of things to the Ideas； is
one of participation in them as well as of imitation of them （Prof。
Zeller's summary of his own review of Dr。 Jackson； Archiv fur Geschichte
der Philosophie。）
In conclusion I may remark that in Plato's writings there is both unity；
and also growth and development； but that we must not intrude upon him
either a system or a technical language。
Balliol College；
October； 1891。
NOTE
The chief additions to the Introductions in the Third Edition consist of
Essays on the following subjects：
1。 Language。
2。 The decline of Greek Literature。
3。 The 'Ideas' of Plato and Modern Philosophy。
4。 The myths of Plato。
5。 The relation of the Republic； Statesman and Laws。
6。 The legend of Atlantis。
7。 Psychology。
8。 Comparison of the Laws of Plato with Spartan and Athenian Laws and
Institutions。
CHARMIDES。
INTRODUCTION。
The subject of the Charmides is Temperance or （Greek）； a peculiarly Greek
notion； which may also be rendered Moderation （Compare Cic。 Tusc。 '（Greek）；
quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam； tum moderationem appellare； nonnunquam
etiam modestiam。'）； Modesty； Discretion； Wisdom； without completely
exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word。 It may
be described as 'mens sana in corpore sano；' the harmony or due proportion
of the higher and lower elements of human nature which 'makes a man his own
master；' according to the definition of the Republic。 In the accompanying
translation the word has been rendered in different places either
Temperance or Wisdom； as the connection seemed to require： for in the
philosophy of Plato （Greek） still retains an intellectual element （as
Socrates is also said to have identified （Greek） with （Greek）： Xen。 Mem。）
and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue； as in the
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle。
The beautiful youth； Charmides； who is also the most temperate of human
beings； is asked by Socrates； 'What is Temperance？' He answers
characteristically； （1） 'Quietness。' 'But Temperance is a fine and noble
thing； and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as
quickness。' He tries again and says （2） that temperance is modesty。 But
this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer： for
temperance is good as well as noble； and Homer has declared that 'modesty
is not good for a needy man。' （3） Once more Charmides makes the attempt。
This time he gives a definition which he has heard； and of which Socrates
conjectures that Critias must be the author： 'Temperance is doing one's
own business。' But the artisan who makes another man's shoes may be
temperate； and yet he is not doing his own business； and temperance defined
thus would be opposed to the division of labour which exists in every
temperate or well…ordered state。 How is this riddle to be explained？
Critias； who takes the place of Charmides； distinguishes in his answer
between 'making' and 'doing；' and with the help of a misapplied quotation
from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good
sense： Temperance is doing one's own business；（4） is doing good。
Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced
to admit at the suggestion of Socrates； and； in the spirit of Socrates and
of Greek life generally； proposes as a fifth definition； （5） Temperance is
self…knowledge。 But all sciences have a subject： number is the subject of
arithmetic； health of medicinewhat is the subject of temperance or
wisdom？ The answer is that （6） Temperance is the knowledge of what a man
knows and of what he does not know。 But this is contrary to analogy； there
is no vision of vision； but only of visible things； no love of loves； but
only of beautiful things； how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge？
That which is older； heavier； lighter； is older； heavier； and lighter than
something else； not than itself； and this seems to be true of all relative
notionsthe object of relation is outside of them； at any rate they can
only have relation to themselves in the form of that object。 Whether there
are any such cases of reflex relation or not； and whether that sort of
knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature； has yet to be
determined by the great metaphysician。 But even if knowledge can know
itself； how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what
we do not know？ Besides； knowledge is an abstraction only； and will not
inform us of any particular subject； such as medicine； building； and the
like。 It may tell us that we or other men know something； but can never
tell us what we know。
Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not
know； which would supply a rule and measure of all things； still there
would be no good in this； and the knowledge which temperance gives must be
of a kind which will do us good； for temperance is a good。 But this
universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good： the only kind
of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil。 To
this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil； and
all the other sciences； are regulated by the higher science or knowledge of
knowledge。 Socrates replies by again dividing the abstract from the
concrete； and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same
definite way in which medicine conduces to health。
And now； after making all these concessions； which are really inadmissible；
we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of temperance；
which Charmides has already discovered； and had therefore better rest in
the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he will be； and not
trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates。
In this Dialogue may be noted （1） The Greek ideal of beauty and goodness；
the vision of the fair soul in the fair body； realised in the beautiful
Charmides； （2） The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole as
well as the parts； and of the mind as well as the body； which is playfully
intimated in the story of the Thracian； （3） The tendency of the age to
verbal distinctions； which here； as in the Protagoras and Cratylus； are
ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus； and to interpretations or rather
parodies of Homer or Hesiod； which are eminently characteristic of Plato
and his contemporaries； （4） The germ of an ethical principle contained in
the notion that temperance is 'doing one's own business；' which in the
Republic （such is the shifting character of the Platonic philosophy） is
given as the definition； not of temperance； but of justice； （5） The
impatience which is exhibited by Socrates of any definition of temperance
in which an element of science or knowledge is not included； （6） The
beginning of metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions： whether
there can be a science of science； and whether the knowledge of what you
know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know； and also in the
distinction between 'what you know' and 'that you know；' （Greek；） here too
is the first conception of an absolute self…determined science （the claims
of which； however； are disputed by Socrates； who asks cui bono？） as well as
the first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete； and
one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object；
and of the subjective element in knowledgea 'rich banquet' of
metaphysical questions in which we 'taste of many things。' （7） And still
the mind of Plato； having snatched for a moment at these shadows of the
future； quickly rejects them： thus early has he reached the conclusion
that there can be no science which is a 'science of nothing' （Parmen。）。
（8） The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here； an
anticipation of the Philebus and Republic as well as of moral philosophy in
later ages。
The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth
Charmides； with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder。 His
childlike simplicity and ingenuousness