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e Unknown Power （not material） existing beyond consciousness。 We do very well to speak of 〃matter〃 in common parlance； but all that the word really means is a group of qualities which have no existence apart from our minds。 Modern philosophers have quite generally accepted this conclusion； and every attempt to overturn Berkeley's reasoning has hitherto resulted in complete and disastrous failure。 In admitting this； we do not admit the conclusion of Absolute Idealism； that nothing exists outside of consciousness。 What we admit as existing independently of our own consciousness is the Power that causes in us those conscious states which we call the perception of material qualities。 We have no reason for regarding this Power as in itself material： indeed； we cannot do so； since by the theory material qualities have no existence apart from our minds。 I have elsewhere sought to show that less difficulty is involved in regarding this Power outside of us as quasi…psychical； or in some measure similar to the mental part of ourselves； and I have gone on to conclude that this Power may be identical with what men have； in all times and by the aid of various imperfect symbols； endeavoured to apprehend as Deity。＇12＇ We are thus led to a view of things not very unlike the views entertained by Spinoza and Berkeley。 We are led to the inference that what we call the material universe is but the manifestation of infinite Deity to our finite minds。 Obviously； on this view； Matterthe only thing to which materialists concede real existenceis simply an orderly phantasmagoria； and God and the Soulwhich materialists regard as mere fictions of the imaginationare the only conceptions that answer to real existences。
＇12＇ See my Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy； Part I。 Chap。 IV。； Part III。 Chaps。 III。； IV。
In the foregoing paragraph I have been setting down opinions with which I am prepared to agree； and which are not in conflict with anything that our study of the development of the objective world has taught us。 In so far as that study may be supposed to bear on the question of a future life； two conclusions are open to us。 First we may say that since the phenomena of mind appear and run their course along with certain specialized groups of material phenomena； so； too； they must disappear when these specialized groups are broken up。 Or； in other words； we may say that every living person is an organized whole； consciousness is something which pertains to this organized whole； as music belongs to the harp that is entire； but when the harp is broken it is silent； and when the organized whole of personality falls to pieces consciousness ceases forever。 To many well…disciplined minds this conclusion seems irresistible； and doubtless it would be a sound onea good Baconian conclusionif we were to admit； with the materialists； that the possibilities of existence are limited by our tiny and ephemeral experience。
But now； supposing some Platonic speculator were to come along and insist upon our leaving room for an alternative conclusion； suppose he were to urge upon us that all this process of material development； with the discovery of which our patient study has been rewarded； may be but the temporary manifestation of relations otherwise unknown between ourselves and the infinite Deity； suppose he were to argue that psychical qualities may be inherent in a spiritual substance which under certain conditions becomes incarnated in matter； to wear it as a perishable garment for a brief season； but presently to cast it off and enter upon the freedom of a larger existence；what reply should we be bound to make； bearing in mind that the possibilities of existence are in no wise limited by our experience？ Obviously we should be bound to admit that in sound philosophy this conclusion is just as likely to be true as the other。 We should； indeed； warn him not to call on us to help him to establish it by scientific arguments； and we should remind him that he must not make illicit use of his extra…experiential hypotheses by bringing them into the treatment of scientific questions that lie within the range of experience。 In science； for example； we make no use of the conception of a 〃spiritual substance〃 （or of a 〃material substance〃 either）； because we can get along sufficiently well by dealing solely with qualities。 But with this general understanding we should feel bound to concede the impregnableness of his main position。
I have supposed this theory only as an illustration； not as a theory which I am prepared to adopt。 My present purpose is not to treat as an advocate the question of a future life； but to endeavour to point out what conditions should be observed in treating the question philosophically。 It seems to me that a great deal is gained when we have distinctly set before us what are the peculiar conditions of proof in the case of such transcendental questions。 We have gained a great deal when we have learned how thoroughly impotent； how truly irrelevant； is physical investigation in the presence of such a question。 If we get not much positive satisfaction for our unquiet yearnings； we occupy at any rate a sounder philosophic position when we recognize the limits within which our conclusions； whether positive or negative； are valid。
It seems not improbable that Mr。 Mill may have had in mind something like the foregoing considerations when he suggested that there is no reason why one should not entertain the belief in a future life if the belief be necessary to one's spiritual comfort。 Perhaps no suggestion in Mr。 Mill's richly suggestive posthumous work has been more generally condemned as unphilosophical； on the ground that in matters of belief we must be guided； not by our likes and dislikes； but by the evidence that is accessible。 The objection is certainly a sound one so far as it relates to scientific questions where evidence is accessible。 To hesitate to adopt a well…supported theory because of some vague preference for a different view is in scientific matters the one unpardonable sin；a sin which has been only too often committed。 Even in matters which lie beyond the range of experience； where evidence is inaccessible； desire is not to be regarded as by itself an adequate basis for belief。 But it seems to me that Mr。 Mill showed a deeper knowledge of the limitations of scientific method than his critics； when he thus hinted at the possibility of entertaining a belief not amenable to scientific tests。 The hypothesis of a purely spiritual unseen world； as above described； is entirely removed from the jurisdiction of physical inquiry； and can only be judged on general considerations of what has been called 〃moral probability〃； and considerations of this sort are likely； in the future as in the past； to possess different values for different minds。 He who； on such considerations； entertains a belief in a future life may not demand that his sceptical neighbour shall be convinced by the same considerations； but his neighbour is at the same time estopped from stigmatizing his belief as unphilosophical。
The consideration which must influence most minds in their attitude toward this question； is the craving； almost universally felt； for some teleological solution to the problem of existence。 Why we are here now is a question of even profounder interest than whether we are to live hereafter。 Unfortunately its solution carries us no less completely beyond the range of experience！ The belief that all things are working together for some good end is the most essential expression of religious faith： of all intellectual propositions it is the one most closely related to that emotional yearning for a higher and better life which is the sum and substance of religion。 Yet all the treatises on natural theology that have ever been written have barely succeeded in establishing a low degree of scientific probability for this belief。 In spite of the eight Bridgewater Treatises； and the 〃Ninth〃 beside； dysteleology still holds full half the field as against teleology。 Most of this difficulty； however； results from the crude anthropomorphic views which theologians have held concerning God。 Once admitting that the Divine attributes may be （as they must be） incommensurably greater than human attributes； our faith that all things are working together for good may remain unimpugned。
To many minds such a faith will seem incompatible with belief in the ultimate destruction of sentiency amid the general doom of the material universe。 A good end can have no meaning to us save in relation to consciousness that distinguishes and knows the good from the evil。 There could be no better illustration of how we are hemmed in than the very inadequacy of the words with which we try to discuss this subject。 Such words have all gained their meanings from human experience； and hence of necessity carry anthropomorphic implications。 But we cannot help this。 We must think with the symbols with which experience has furnished us； and when we so think； there does seem to be little that is even intellectually satisfying in the awful picture which science shows us； of giant worlds concentrating out of nebulous vapour； developing with prodigious waste of energy into theatres of all that is grand and