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the gods war against necessity。
All this has a similar drift； for Simonides was not so ignorant as
to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily； as though
there were some who did evil voluntarily。 For no wise man； as I
believe； will allow that any human being errs voluntarily； or
voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions； but they are very
well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things do them
against their will。 And Simonides never says that he praises him who
does no evil voluntarily； the word 〃voluntarily〃 applies to himself。
For he was under the impression that a good man might often compel
himself to love and praise another； and to be the friend and
approver of another； and that there might be an involuntary love； such
as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother； or country； or
the like。 Now bad men； when their parents or country have any defects；
look on them with malignant joy； and find fault with them and expose
and denounce them to others； under the idea that the rest of mankind
will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of
neglect； and they blame their defects far more than they deserve； in
order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be
increased： but the good man dissembles his feelings； and constrains
himself to praise them； and if they have wronged him and he is
angry； he pacifies his anger and is reconciled； and compels himself to
love and praise his own flesh and blood。 And Simonides； as is
probable； considered that he himself had often had to praise and
magnify a tyrant or the like； much against his will； and he also
wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is
censorious。
For I am satisfied ＇he says＇ when a man is neither bad nor very
stupid； and when he knows justice （which is the health of states）； and
is of sound mind； I will find no fault with him； for I am not given to
finding fault； and there are innumerable fools
（implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant
opportunity of finding fault）。
All things are good with which evil is unmingled。
In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good
which have no evil in them； as you might say 〃All things are white
which have no black in them；〃 for that would be ridiculous； but he
means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or
intermediate state。 He says：
I do not hope to find a perfectly blameless man among those who
partake of the fruits of the broad…bosomed earth （if I find him； I
will send you word）； in this sense I praise no man。 But he who is
moderately good； and does no evil； is good enough for me； who love and
approve every one。
（and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word； epainemi ＇approve＇；
because he is addressing Pittacus；
Who love and approve every one voluntarily； who does no evil：
and that the stop should be put after 〃voluntarily〃）； 〃but there are
some whom I involuntarily praise and love。 And you； Pittacus； I
would never have blamed； if you had spoken what was moderately good
and true； but I do blame you because； putting on the appearance of
truth； you are speaking falsely about the highest matters。 And this； I
said； Prodicus and Protagoras； I take to be the meaning of Simonides
in this poem。
Hippias said： I think； Socrates； that you have given a very good
explanation of the poem； but I have also an excellent interpretation
of my own which I will propound to you； if you will allow me。
Nay； Hippias； said Alcibiades； not now； but at some other time。 At
present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates
and Protagoras； to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to
ask； Socrates should answer； or that if he would rather answer； then
that Socrates should ask。
I said： I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined；
but I would rather have done with poems and odes； if he does not
object； and come back to the question about which I was asking you
at first； Protagoras； and by your help make an end of that。 The talk
about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to
which a vulgar company have recourse； who； because they are not able
to converse or amuse one another； while they are drinking； with the
sound of their own voices and conversation； by reason of their
stupidity； raise the price of flute…girls in the market； hiring for
a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath； to be
the medium of intercourse among them： but where the company are real
gentlemen and men of education； you will see no flute…girls； nor
dancing…girls； nor harp…girls； and they have no nonsense or games； but
are contented with one another's conversation； of which their own
voices are the medium； and which they carry on by turns and in an
orderly manner； even though they are very liberal in their
potations。 And a company like this of ours； and men such as we profess
to be； do not require the help of another's voice； or of the poets
whom you cannot interrogate about meaning of what they are saying；
people who cite them declaring； some that the poet has meaning； and
others that he has another； and the point which is in dispute can
never be decided。 This sort of entertainment they decline； and
prefer to talk with one another； and put one another to the proof in
conversation。 And these are the models which I desire that you and I
should imitate。 Leaving the poets； and keeping to ourselves； let us
try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in
conversation。 If you have a mind to ask； I am ready to answer； or if
you would rather； do you answer； and give me the opportunity of
resuming and completing our unfinished argument。
I made these and some similar observations； but Protagoras would not
distinctly say which he would do。 Thereupon Alcibiades turned to
Callias； and said：…Do you think； Callias； that Protagoras is fair in
refusing to say whether he will or will not answer？ for I certainly
think that he is unfair； he ought either to proceed with the argument；
or distinctly refuse to proceed； that we may know his intention； and
then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else； and the
rest of the company will be free to talk with one another。
I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of
Alcibiades and when the prayers of Callias and the company were
superadded； he was at last induced to argue； and said that I might ask
and he would answer。
So I said： Do not imagine； Protagoras； that I have any other
interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own
difficulties。 For I think that Homer was very right in saying that
When two go together； one sees before the other；
for all men who have a companion are readier in deed； word； or
thought； but if a man
Sees a thing when he is alone；
he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he
may show his discoveries； and who may confirm him in them。 And I would
rather hold discourse with you than with any one； because I think that
no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man
may be expected to understand； and in particular of virtue。 For who is
there； but you？…who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman；
for many are this； and yet have not the power of making others good
whereas you are not only good yourself； but also the cause of goodness
in others。 Moreover such confidence have you in yourself； that
although other Sophists conceal their profession； you proclaim in
the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and
education； and are the first who demanded pay in return。 How then
can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these
subjects； and ask questions and consult with you？ I must； indeed。
And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about
the questions which I was asking you at first； and also to have your
help in considering them。 If I am not mistaken the question was
this： Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness
five names of the same thing？ or has each of the names a separate
underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function；
no one of them being like any other of them？ And you replied that
the five names were not the names of the same thing； but that each
of them had a separate object； and that all these objects were parts
of virtue； not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each
other and the whole of which they are parts； but as the parts of the
fa