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to be called 〃being overcome by pleasure；〃 pray； what is it； and by
what name would you describe it？
But why； Socrates； should we trouble ourselves about the opinion
of the many； who just say anything that happens to occur to them？
I believe； I said； that they may be of use in helping us to discover
how courage is related to the other parts of virtue。 If you are
disposed to abide by our agreement； that I should show the way in
which； as I think； our recent difficulty is most likely to be
cleared up； do you follow； but if not； never mind。
You are quite right； he said； and I would have you proceed as you
have begun。
Well then； I said； let me suppose that they repeat their question；
What account do you give of that which； in our way of speaking； is
termed being overcome by pleasure？ I should answer thus： Listen； and
Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you。 When men are overcome
by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant；
and they； knowing them to be evil； nevertheless indulge in them； would
you not say that they were overcome by pleasure？ They will not deny
this。 And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again： 〃In
what way do you say that they are evil…in that they are pleasant and
give pleasure at the moment； or because they cause disease and poverty
and other like evils in the future？ Would they still be evil； if
they had no attendant evil consequences； simply because they give
the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature？〃…Would they not
answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is
immediately given by them； but on account of the after
consequences…diseases and the like？
I believe； said Protagoras； that the world in general would answer
as you do。
And in causing diseases do they not cause pain？ and in causing
poverty do they not cause pain；…they would agree to that also； if I am
not mistaken？
Protagoras assented。
Then I should say to them； in my name and yours： Do you think them
evil for any other reason； except because they end in pain and rob
us of other pleasures：…there again they would agree？
We both of us thought that they would。
And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view；
and say： 〃Friends； when you speak of goods being painful； do you not
mean remedial goods； such as gymnastic exercises； and military
service； and the physician's use of burning； cutting； drugging； and
starving？ Are these the things which are good but painful？〃…they would
assent to me？
He agreed。
〃And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest
immediate suffering and pain； or because； afterwards； they bring
health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of
states and power over others and wealth？〃…they would agree to the
latter alternative； if I am not mistaken？
He assented。
〃Are these things good for any other reason except that they end
in pleasure； and get rid of and avert pain？ Are you looking to any
other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good？〃…they
would acknowledge that they were not？
I think so； said Protagoras。
〃And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good； and avoid pain as
an evil？〃
He assented。
〃Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good： and
even pleasure you deem an evil； when it robs you of greater
pleasures than it gives； or causes pains greater than the pleasure。
If； however； you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end
or standard； you will be able to show us that standard。 But you have
none to show。〃
I do not think that they have； said Protagoras。
〃And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain？ You call
pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it
has； or gives pleasures greater than the pains： then if you have
some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you
call actual pain a good； you can show what that is。 But you cannot。〃
True； said Protagoras。
Suppose again； I said； that the world says to me： 〃Why do you
spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject？〃 Excuse me；
friends； I should reply； but in the first place there is a
difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression 〃overcome by
pleasure〃； and the whole argument turns upon this。 And even now； if
you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other
than pain； or good as other than pleasure； you may still retract。
Are you satisfied； then； at having a life of pleasure which is without
pain？ If you are； and if you are unable to show any good or evil which
does not end in pleasure and pain； hear the consequences：…If what
you say is true； then the argument is absurd which affirms that a
man often does evil knowingly； when he might abstain； because he is
seduced and overpowered by pleasure； or again； when you say that a man
knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the
moment by pleasure。 And that this is ridiculous will be evident if
only we give up the use of various names； such as pleasant and
painful； and good and evil。 As there are two things； let us call
them by two names…first； good and evil； and then pleasant and painful。
Assuming this； let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that
he does evil。 But some one will ask； Why？ Because he is overcome； is
the first answer。 And by what is he overcome？ the enquirer will
proceed to ask。 And we shall not be able to reply 〃By pleasure；〃 for
the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good。 In our
answer； then； we shall only say that he is overcome。 〃By what？〃 he
will reiterate。 By the good； we shall have to reply； indeed we
shall。 Nay； but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh； if he be
one of the swaggering sort； 〃That is too ridiculous； that a man should
do what he knows to be evil when he ought not； because he is
overcome by good。 Is that； he will ask； because the good was worthy or
not worthy of conquering the evil？〃 And in answer to that we shall
clearly reply； Because it was not worthy； for if it had been worthy；
then he who； as we say； was overcome by pleasure； would not have
been wrong。 〃But how；〃 he will reply； 〃can the good be unworthy of the
evil； or the evil of the good？〃 Is not the real explanation that
they are out of proportion to one another； either as greater and
smaller； or more and fewer？ This we cannot deny。 And when you speak of
being overcome…〃what do you mean；〃 he will say； 〃but that you choose
the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good？〃 Admitted。 And now
substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil； and
say； not as before； that a man does what is evil knowingly； but that
he does what is painful knowingly； and because he is overcome by
pleasure； which is unworthy to overcome。 What measure is there of
the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect；
which means that they become greater and smaller； and more and
fewer； and differ in degree？ For if any one says： 〃Yes； Socrates；
but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and
pain〃…To that I should reply： And do they differ in anything but in
pleasure and pain？ There can be no other measure of them。 And do
you； like a skilful weigher； put into the balance the pleasures and
the pains； and their nearness and distance； and weigh them； and then
say which outweighs the other。 If you weigh pleasures against
pleasures； you of course take the more and greater； or if you weigh
pains against pains； you take the fewer and the less； or if
pleasures against pains； then you choose that course of action in
which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant； whether the distant
by the near or the near by the distant； and you avoid that course of
action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful。 Would you not
admit； my friends； that this is true？ I am confident that they
cannot deny this。
He agreed with me。
Well then； I shall say； if you agree so far； be so good as to answer
me a question： Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your
sight when near； and smaller when at a distance？ They will acknowledge
that。 And the same holds of thickness and number； also sounds； which
are in themselves equal； are greater when near； and lesser when at a
distance。 They will grant that also。 Now suppose happiness to
consist in doing or choosing the greater； and in not doing or in
avoiding the less； what would be the saving principle of human life？
Would not the art of measuring be the saving principle； or would the
power of appearance？ Is not the latter that deceiving art which
makes us wander up and down and take the things at one tim