按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
e benefits would seldom have been conferred。 The important rank； among human evils and wrongs； of the disappointment of expectation； is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise。 Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater； and none wound more； than when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied； fails them in the hour of need； and few wrongs are greater than this mere withholding of good； none excite more resentment； either in the person suffering； or in a sympathising spectator。 The principle； therefore； of giving to each what they deserve； that is； good for good as well as evil for evil； is not only included within the idea of justice as we have defined it； but is a proper object of that intensity of sentiment； which places the just； in human estimation； above the simply Expedient。 Most of the maxims of justice current in the world； and commonly appealed to in its transactions； are simply instrumental to carrying into effect the principles of justice which we have now spoken of。 That a person is only responsible for what he has done voluntarily； or could voluntarily have avoided； that it is unjust to condemn any person unheard； that the punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence； and the like； are maxims intended to prevent the just principle of evil for evil from being perverted to the infliction of evil without that justification。 The greater part of these common maxims have come into use from the practice of courts of justice； which have been naturally led to a more complete recognition and elaboration than was likely to suggest itself to others； of the rules necessary to enable them to fulfil their double function； of inflicting punishment when due； and of awarding to each person his right。 That first of judicial virtues； impartiality； is an obligation of justice； partly for the reason last mentioned； as being a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other obligations of justice。 But this is not the only source of the exalted rank； among human obligations； of those maxims of equality and impartiality； which； both in popular estimation and in that of the most enlightened； are included among the precepts of justice。 In one point of view； they may be considered as corollaries from the principles already laid down。 If it is a duty to do to each according to his deserts； returning good for good as well as repressing evil by evil； it necessarily follows that we should treat all equally well （when no higher duty forbids） who have deserved equally well of us； and that society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it； that is； who have deserved equally well absolutely。 This is the highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice； towards which all institutions； and the efforts of all virtuous citizens； should be made in the utmost possible degree to converge。 But this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation； being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals； and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines。 It is involved in the very meaning of Utility； or the Greatest Happiness Principle。 That principle is a mere form of words without rational signification； unless one person's happiness； supposed equal in degree （with the proper allowance made for kind）； is counted for exactly as much as another's。 Those conditions being supplied； Bentham's dictum； 〃everybody to count for one； nobody for more than one；〃 might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary。* The equal claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation of the moralist and the legislator； involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness； except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life； and the general interest； in which that of every individual is included； set limits to the maxim； and those limits ought to be strictly construed。 As every other maxim of justice； so this is by no means applied or held applicable universally； on the contrary； as I have already remarked； it bends to every person's ideas of social expediency。 But in whatever case it is deemed applicable at all； it is held to be the dictate of justice。 All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment； except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse。 And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient； assume the character not of simple inexpediency； but of injustice； and appear so tyrannical； that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have。 been tolerated； forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of expediency； the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn。 The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions； by which one custom or institution after another； from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence； has passed into the rank of a universally stigmatised injustice and tyranny。 So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen； nobles and serfs； patricians and plebeians； and so it will be； and in part already is； with the aristocracies of colour； race； and sex。
* This implication； in the first principle of the utilitarian scheme； of perfect impartiality between persons； is regarded by Mr。 Herbert Spencer （in his Social Statics） as a disproof of the pretensions of utility to be a sufficient guide to right； since （he says） the principle of utility presupposes the anterior principle； that everybody has an equal right to happiness。 It may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable； whether felt by the same or by different persons。 This； however； is not a pre…supposition； not a premise needful to support the principle of utility； but the very principle itself； for what is the principle of utility； if it be not that 〃happiness〃 and 〃desirable〃 are synonymous terms？ If there is any anterior principle implied； it can be no other than this； that the truths of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness； as of all other measurable quantities。 ＇Mr。 Herbert Spencer； in a private communication on the subject of the preceding Note； objects to being considered an opponent of utilitarianism； and states that he regards happiness as the ultimate end of morality； but deems that end only partially attainable by empirical generalisations from the observed results of conduct； and completely attainable only by deducing； from the laws of life and the conditions of existence； what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness； and what kinds to produce unhappiness。 What the exception of the word 〃necessarily；〃 I have no dissent to express from this doctrine； and （omitting that word） I am not aware that any modern advocate of utilitarianism is of a different opinion。 Bentham； certainly； to whom in the Social Statics Mr。 Spencer particularly referred； is； least of all writers； chargeable with unwillingness to deduce the effect of actions on happiness from the laws of human nature and the universal conditions of human life。 The common charge against him is of relying too exclusively upon such deductions； and declining altogether to be bound by the generalisations from specific experience which Mr。 Spencer thinks that utilitarians generally confine themselves to。 My own opinion （and； as I collect； Mr。 Spencer's） is； that in ethics； as in all other branches of scientific study； the consilience of the results of both these processes； each corroborating and verifying the other； is requisite to give to any general proposition the kind degree of evidence which constitutes scientific proof。＇
It appears from what has been said； that justice is a name for certain moral requirements； which； regarded collectively； stand higher in the scale of social utility； and are therefore of more paramount obligation； than any others； though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important； as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice。 Thus； to save a life； it may not only be allowable； but a duty； to steal； or take by force； the necessary food or medicine； or to kidnap； and compel to officiate； the only qualified medical practitioner。 In such cases； as we do not call anything justice which is not a virtue； we usually say； not that justice must give way to some other moral principle； but that what is just in ordinary cases is； by reason of that other principle； not just in the particular case。 By this useful accommodation of language； the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up； and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice。 The considerations which have now been adduced resolve； I conceive； the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals。 It has always been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency： the difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former； as contradistinguished from the latter。 If this chara