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is； by those who are competently acquainted with both； placed so far above the other that they prefer it； even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent； and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of； we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality； so far outweighing quantity as to render it； in comparison； of small account。 Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with； and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying； both； do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties。 Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals； for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures； no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool； no instructed person would be an ignoramus； no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base； even though they should be persuaded that the fool； the dunce； or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs。 They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him。 If they ever fancy they would； it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme； that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other； however undesirable in their own eyes。 A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy； is capable probably of more acute suffering； and certainly accessible to it at more points； than one of an inferior type； but in spite of these liabilities； he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence。 We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness； we may attribute it to pride； a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable： we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence； an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it； to the love of power； or to the love of excitement； both of which do really enter into and contribute to it： but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity； which all human beings possess in one form or other； and in some； though by no means in exact； proportion to their higher faculties； and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong； that nothing which conflicts with it could be； otherwise than momentarily； an object of desire to them。 Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness… that the superior being； in anything like equal circumstances； is not happier than the inferior… confounds the two very different ideas； of happiness； and content。 It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low； has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied； and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for； as the world is constituted； is imperfect。 But he can learn to bear its imperfections； if they are at all bearable； and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections； but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify。 It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied； better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied。 And if the fool； or the pig； are a different opinion； it is because they only know their own side of the question。 The other party to the comparison knows both sides。 It may be objected； that many who are capable of the higher pleasures； occasionally； under the influence of temptation； postpone them to the lower。 But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher。 Men often； from infirmity of character； make their election for the nearer good； though they know it to be the less valuable； and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures； than when it is between bodily and mental。 They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health； though perfectly aware that health is the greater good。 It may be further objected； that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble； as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness。 But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change； voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher。 I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one； they have already become incapable of the other。 Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant； easily killed； not only by hostile influences； but by mere want of sustenance； and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them； and the society into which it has thrown them； are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise。 Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes； because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them； and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures； not because they deliberately prefer them； but because they are either the only ones to which they have access； or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying。 It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures； ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower； though many； in all ages； have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both。 From this verdict of the only competent judges； I apprehend there can be no appeal。 On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures； or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings； apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences； the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both； or； if they differ； that of the majority among them； must be admitted as final。 And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures； since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity。 What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains； or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations； except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both？ Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous； and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure。 What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain； except the feelings and judgment of the experienced？ When； therefore； those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind； apart from the question of intensity； to those of which the animal nature； disjoined from the higher faculties； is suspectible； they are entitled on this subject to the same regard。 I have dwelt on this point； as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness； considered as the directive rule of human conduct。 But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard； for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness； but the greatest amount of happiness altogether； and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness； there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier； and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it。 Utilitarianism； therefore； could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character； even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others； and his own； so far as happiness is concerned； were a sheer deduction from the benefit。 But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last； renders refutation superfluous。
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle； as above explained； the ultimate end； with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable （whether we are considering our own good or that of other people）； is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain； and as rich as possible in enjoyments； both in point of quantity and quality； the test of quality； and the rule for measuring it against quantity； being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience； to which must be added their habits of self…consciousness and self…observation； are best furnished with the means of comparison。 This； being； according to the utilitarian opinion； the end of human action； is necessarily also the standard of morality； which may accordingly be defined； the rules and precepts for human conduct； by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be； to the greatest extent possible； secured to all mankind； and not to them only； but； so far as the nature of things admits； to the whole sentient creation。 Against this doctrine； however； arises another class of objectors； who say that happiness； in any form； cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action； because； in the first place； it is unattainable： and they contemptuously ask； what right hast thou to b