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ple time； namely； the whole past duration of the human species。 During all that time； mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions； on which experience all the prudence； as well as all the morality of life； are dependent。 People talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off； and as if； at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another； he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness。 Even then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling； but； at all events； the matter is now done to his hand。 It is truly a whimsical supposition that； if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality； they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful； and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young； and enforced by law and opinion。 There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill； if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it； but on any hypothesis short of that； mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness； and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude； and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better。 That philosophers might easily do this； even now； on many subjects； that the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right； and that mankind have still much to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happiness； I admit； or rather； earnestly maintain。 The corollaries from the principle of utility； like the precepts of every practical art； admit of indefinite improvement； and； in a progressive state of the human mind； their improvement is perpetually going on。 But to consider the rules of morality as improvable； is one thing； to pass over the intermediate generalisations entirely； and endeavour to test each individual action directly by the first principle； is another。 It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones。 To inform a traveller respecting the place of his。 ultimate destination； is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction…posts on the way。 The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality； does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal； or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another。 Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject； which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment。 Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy； because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack。 Being rational creatures； they go to sea with it ready calculated； and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong； as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish。 And this； as long as foresight is a human quality； it is to be presumed they will continue to do。 Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality； we require subordinate principles to apply it by； the impossibility of doing without them； being common to all systems； can afford no argument against any one in particular； but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had； and as if mankind had remained till now； and always must remain； without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life； is as high a pitch； I think； as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy。 The remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in laying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature； and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their course through life。 We are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules； and； when under temptation； will see a utility in the breach of a rule； greater than he will see in its observance。 But is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil doing； and means of cheating our own conscience？ They are afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognise as a fact in morals the existence of conflicting considerations； which all doctrines do； that have been believed by sane persons。 It is not the fault of any creed； but of the complicated nature of human affairs； that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions； and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable。 There is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws； by giving a certain latitude； under the moral responsibility of the agent； for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances； and under every creed； at the opening thus made； self…deception and dishonest casuistry get in。 There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation。 These are the real difficulties； the knotty points both in the theory of ethics； and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct。 They are overcome practically； with greater or with less success； according to the intellect and virtue of the individual； but it can hardly be pretended that any one will be the less qualified for dealing with them； from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred。 If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations； utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible。 Though the application of the standard may be difficult； it is better than none at all： while in other systems； the moral laws all claiming independent authority； there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them； their claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than sophistry； and unless determined； as they generally are； by the unacknowledged influence of considerations of utility； afford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities。 We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to。 There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved； and if only one； there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is； in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognised。 Chapter 3 Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility。
THE QUESTION is often asked； and properly so； in regard to any supposed moral standard… What is its sanction？ what are the motives to obey it？ or more specifically； what is the source of its obligation？ whence does it derive its binding force？ It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question； which； though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality； as if it had some special applicability to that above others； really arises in regard to all standards。 It arises； in fact； whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard； or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it。 For the customary morality； that which education and opinion have consecrated； is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory； and when a person is asked to believe that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo； the assertion is to him a paradox； the supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem； the superstructure seems to stand better without； than with； what is represented as its foundation。 He says to himself； I feel that I am bound not to rob or murder； betray or deceive； but why am I bound to promote the general happiness？ If my own happiness lies in something else； why may I not give that the preference？ If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct； this difficulty will always present itself； until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences… until； by the improvement of education； the feeling of unity with our fellow…creatures shall be （what it cannot be denied that Christ intended it to be） as deeply rooted in our character； and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature； as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person。 In the meantime； however； the difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility； but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality and reduce it to principles； which； unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications； always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity。 The principle of utility either has； or there is no reason why it might not have； all the sanctions which belong to any oth