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had these words： 〃To be removable from office by the President of the United States。〃 It was moved to strike out these words； and the motion was sustained with great ability and vigor。 It was insisted that the President could not constitutionally exercise the power of removal exclusive of the Senate； that the Federalist so interpreted the Constitution when arguing for its adoption by the several States； that the Constitution had nowhere given the President power of removal； either expressly or by strong implication； but on the contrary； had distinctly provided for removals from office by impeachment only。 A construction which denied the power of removal by the President was further maintained by arguments drawn from the danger of the abuse of the power； from the supposed tendency of an exposure of public officers to capricious removal； to impair the efficiency of the civil service； from the alleged injustice and hardship of displacing incumbents； dependent upon their official stations； without sufficient consideration； from a supposed want of responsibility on the part the President； and from an imagined defect of guarantees against a vicious President； who might incline to abuse the power。
On the other hand； an exclusive power of removal by the President was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution。 It was maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be removed from office without being guilty of treason； bribery； or malfeasance； and that the nature of things demands that it should be so。 〃Suppose；〃 it was said； 〃a man becomes insane by the visitation of God； and is likely to ruin our affairs； are the hands of Government to be confined front warding off the evil？ Suppose a person in office not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment； is the error not to be corrected； suppose he acquire vicious habits and incurable indolence； or totally neglect the duties of his office； which shall work mischief to the public welfare； is there no way to arrest the threatened danger？ Suppose he become odious and unpopular by reason of the measures he pursues； and this he may do without committing any positive offense against the law； must he preserve his office in despite of the popular will？ Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution； hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction； endangering your domestic tranquility； plundering you of the means of defense； alienating the affections of your allies； and promoting the spirit of discord； must the tardy； tedious； desultory road； by way of impeachment； be traveled to overtake the man who； barely confining himself within the letter of the law； is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government？〃 The nature of things； the great objects of society； the express objects of the Constitution itself require that this thing should be otherwise。 To unite the Senate with the President 〃in the exercise of the power〃 it was said； would involve us in the most serious difficulty。 〃Suppose a discovery of any of these events should take place when the Senate is not in session； how is the remedy to be applied？ The evil could be avoided in no other way than by the Senate sitting always。〃 In regard to the danger of the power being abused if exercised by one man； it was said 〃that the danger is as great with respect to the Senate； who are assembled from various parts of the continent； with different impressions and opinions；〃 that such a body is more likely to misuse the power of removal than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the presidential chair。 As the nature of Government requires the power of removal； it was maintained 〃that it should be exercised in this way by the hand capable of exerting itself with effect； and the power must be conferred on the President by the Constitution as the executive officer of the Government。〃 Mr。 Madison； whose adverse opinion in the Federalist had been relied upon by those who denied the exclusive power； now participated in the debate。 He declared that he had reviewed his former opinions； and he summed up the whole case as follows：
〃The Constitution affirms that the executive power is vested in the President。 Are there exceptions to this proposition？ Yes； there are。 The Constitution says that in appointing to office the Senate shall be associated with the President； unless； in the case of inferior officers； when the law shall otherwise direct。 Have we （that is； Congress） a right to extend this exception？ I believe not。 If the Constitution has invested all executive power in the President； I return to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority。 The question now resolves itself into this： is the power of displacing an executive power？ I conceive that if any power whatever is in the Executive； it is in the power of appointing； overseeing； and controlling those who execute the laws。 If the Constitution had not qualified the power of the President in appointing to office by associating the Senate with him in that business； would it not be clear that he would have the right by virtue of his executive power to make such appointment？ Should we be authorized； in defiance of that clause in the Constitutionthe executive power shall be vested in the Presidentto unite the Senate with the President in the appointment to office？ I conceive not。 It is admitted that we should not be authorized to do this； I think it may be disputed whether we have a right to associate there in removing persons from office； the one power being as much of an executive nature as the other； and the first is authorized by being excepted out of the general rule established by the Constitution in these words： 'The executive power shall be vested in the President。'〃
The question thus ably and exhaustively argued was decided by the House of Representatives； by a vote of 34 to 20； in favor of the principle that the executive power of removal is vested by the Constitution in the Executive； and in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice President。 The question has often been raised in subsequent times of high excitement； and the practice of the Government has nevertheless conformed in all cases to the decision thus early made。 * * * Chancellor Kent's remarks on the subject are as follows：
〃On the first organization of the Government it was made a question whether the power of removal in case of officers appointed to hold at pleasure resided nowhere but in the body which appointed； and； of course； whether the consent of the Senate was not requisite to remove。 This was the construction given to the Constitution while it was pending for ratification before the State conventions by the author of the Federalist。 But the construction which was given to the Constitution by Congress； after great consideration and discussion； was different。 The words of the act （establishing the Treasury Department） are： 'And whenever the same shall be removed from office by the President of the United States； or in any other case of vacancy in the office； the assistant shall act。' This amounted to a legislative construction of the Constitution； and it has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon as decisive authority in the case。 It applies equally to every other officer of the Government appointed by the President； whose term of duration is not specially declared。 It is supported by the weighty reason that the subordinate officers in the executive department ought to hold at the pleasure of the head of the Department； because he is invested generally with the executive authority； and the participation in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle and ought to be taken strictly。 The President is the great responsible officer for the faithful execution of the law； and the power of removal was incidental to that duty； and might often be requisite to fulfill it。〃
Thus has the important question presented by this bill been settled； in the language of the late Daniel Webster （who； while dissenting from it； admitted that it was settled）； by construction； settled by precedent； settled by the practice of the Government； and settled by statute。
The events of the last war furnished a practical confirmation of the wisdom of the Constitution as it has hitherto been maintained in many of its parts； including that which is now the subject of consideration。 When the war broke out rebel enemies； traitors； abettors； and sympathizers were found in every department of the Government； as well in the civil service as in the land and naval military service。 They were found in Congress and among the keepers of the Capitol； in foreign missions； in each and all of the Executive Departments； in the judicial service； in the Post Office； and among the agents for conducting Indian affairs； and upon probable suspicion they were promptly displaced by my predecessor； so far as they held their offices under executive authority； and their duties were confided to new and loyal successors。 No complaints against that power or doubts of its wisdom； were entertained in any quarter。
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