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to say that you are no true son of Hermes； because you are always looking
after a fortune and never in luck。 But； as I was saying； there is a good
deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge； and therefore we had better
leave the question open until we have heard both sides。
HERMOGENES： I have often talked over this matter； both with Cratylus and
others； and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
correctness in names other than convention and agreement； any name which
you give； in my opinion； is the right one； and if you change that and give
another； the new name is as correct as the oldwe frequently change the
names of our slaves； and the newly…imposed name is as good as the old： for
there is no name given to anything by nature； all is convention and habit
of the users；such is my view。 But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to
hear and learn of Cratylus； or of any one else。
SOCRATES： I dare say that you may be right； Hermogenes： let us see；Your
meaning is； that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees
to call it？
HERMOGENES： That is my notion。
SOCRATES： Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Well； now； let me take an instance；suppose that I call a man a
horse or a horse a man； you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a
horse by me individually； and rightly called a man by the rest of the
world； and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by
the world：that is your meaning？
HERMOGENES： He would； according to my view。
SOCRATES： But how about truth； then？ you would acknowledge that there is
in words a true and a false？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And there are true and false propositions？
HERMOGENES： To be sure。
SOCRATES： And a true proposition says that which is； and a false
proposition says that which is not？
HERMOGENES： Yes； what other answer is possible？
SOCRATES： Then in a proposition there is a true and false？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： But is a proposition true as a whole only； and are the parts
untrue？
HERMOGENES： No； the parts are true as well as the whole。
SOCRATES： Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones； or every
part？
HERMOGENES： I should say that every part is true。
SOCRATES： Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name？
HERMOGENES： No； that is the smallest。
SOCRATES： Then the name is a part of the true proposition？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Yes； and a true part； as you say。
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： Then； if propositions may be true and false； names may be true
and false？
HERMOGENES： So we must infer。
SOCRATES： And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
name？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
that there are？ and will they be true names at the time of uttering them？
HERMOGENES： Yes； Socrates； I can conceive no correctness of names other
than this； you give one name； and I another； and in different cities and
countries there are different names for the same things； Hellenes differ
from barbarians in their use of names； and the several Hellenic tribes from
one another。
SOCRATES： But would you say； Hermogenes； that the things differ as the
names differ？ and are they relative to individuals； as Protagoras tells us？
For he says that man is the measure of all things； and that things are to
me as they appear to me； and that they are to you as they appear to you。
Do you agree with him； or would you say that things have a permanent
essence of their own？
HERMOGENES： There have been times； Socrates； when I have been driven in my
perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras； not that I agree with him at
all。
SOCRATES： What！ have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such
thing as a bad man？
HERMOGENES： No； indeed； but I have often had reason to think that there
are very bad men； and a good many of them。
SOCRATES： Well； and have you ever found any very good ones？
HERMOGENES： Not many。
SOCRATES： Still you have found them？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And would you hold that the very good were the very wise； and
the very evil very foolish？ Would that be your view？
HERMOGENES： It would。
SOCRATES： But if Protagoras is right； and the truth is that things are as
they appear to any one； how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish？
HERMOGENES： Impossible。
SOCRATES： And if； on the other hand； wisdom and folly are really
distinguishable； you will allow； I think； that the assertion of Protagoras
can hardly be correct。 For if what appears to each man is true to him； one
man cannot in reality be wiser than another。
HERMOGENES： He cannot。
SOCRATES： Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus； that all things
equally belong to all men at the same moment and always； for neither on his
view can there be some good and others bad； if virtue and vice are always
equally to be attributed to all。
HERMOGENES： There cannot。
SOCRATES： But if neither is right； and things are not relative to
individuals； and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment
and always； they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent
essence： they are not in relation to us； or influenced by us； fluctuating
according to our fancy； but they are independent； and maintain to their own
essence the relation prescribed by nature。
HERMOGENES： I think； Socrates； that you have said the truth。
SOCRATES： Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves； or
equally to the actions which proceed from them？ Are not actions also a
class of being？
HERMOGENES： Yes； the actions are real as well as the things。
SOCRATES： Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature；
and not according to our opinion of them？ In cutting； for example； we do
not cut as we please； and with any chance instrument； but we cut with the
proper instrument only； and according to the natural process of cutting；
and the natural process is right and will succeed； but any other will fail
and be of no use at all。
HERMOGENES： I should say that the natural way is the right way。
SOCRATES： Again； in burning； not every way is the right way； but the right
way is the natural way； and the right instrument the natural instrument。
HERMOGENES： True。
SOCRATES： And this holds good of all actions？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And speech is a kind of action？
HERMOGENES： True。
SOCRATES： And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases？ Will
not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of
speaking； and as things ought to be spoken； and with the natural
instrument？ Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure。
HERMOGENES： I quite agree with you。
SOCRATES： And is not naming a part of speaking？ for in giving names men
speak。
HERMOGENES： That is true。
SOCRATES： And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts；
is not naming also a sort of action？
HERMOGENES： True。
SOCRATES： And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves； but had
a special nature of their own？
HERMOGENES： Precisely。
SOCRATES： Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be
given according to a natural process； and with a proper instrument； and not
at our pleasure： in this and no other way shall we name with success。
HERMOGENES： I agree。
SOCRATES： But again； that which has to be cut has to be cut with
something？
HERMOGENES： Yes。
SOCRATES： And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or
pierced with something？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： And that which has to be named has to be named with something？
HERMOGENES： True。
SOCRATES： What is that with which we pierce？
HERMOGENES： An awl。
SOCRATES： And with which we weave？
HERMOGENES： A shuttle。
SOCRATES： And with which we name？
HERMOGENES： A name。
SOCRATES： Very good： then a name is an instrument？
HERMOGENES： Certainly。
SOCRATES： Suppose that I ask； 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle？' And
you answer； 'A weaving instrument。'
HERMOGENES： Well。
SOCRATES： And I ask again； 'What do we do when we weave？'The answer is；
that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof。
HERMOGENES： Very true。
SOCRATES： And may not a similar description be given of an awl； and of
instruments in general？
HERMOGENES： To be sure。
SOCRATES： And now suppose that